Following the conclusion of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), held from September 8 to 28, 2026, the government must double its efforts to secure a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in next year’s election. India’s bid for the 2028-29 two-year term of the UNSC was launched by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar this year, with voting in the UNGA to take place in June 2027. As a result, Mr. Jaishankar was busier than usual during UNGA week, holding nearly 90 meetings over a 10-day stay in New York. Between now and next summer, India needs at least 129 affirmative votes in the 193-member Assembly to win.
This has not been as much of an issue on the eight occasions that India has won the seat over the past eight decades, becoming the Asia-Pacific grouping’s consensus choice once every decade. Even Pakistan votes for India at the UNGA in these elections, and India returns the favour. With the full backing of the 55-member group, India won a record 187 of 191 votes in 2010 and 184 of 192 votes in 2020.
The bid for a ninth term
India’s ambition to win a ninth term is guided by several factors — its terms were in 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92, 2011-12 and 2021-22. Its last tenure, in 2021-22, was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Narendra Modi government felt it had been unable to meet all its objectives. New Delhi may want to complete these objectives, including resolutions on terrorism and United Nations reform, before the Modi government’s current term ends in 2029. With India’s push for permanent membership of the UNSC still elusive, the government may wish to increase the frequency of its non-permanent tenures, keeping India at the centrestage of geopolitics from the UNSC’s horseshoe table.
The difference this time, however, is that when India announced its candidacy for the 2027 election, Tajikistan was already in the fray and, according to the chart drawn up for the Asia-Pacific seat, was to be the consensus choice. On the two previous occasions when India had to contest an election — in 1975 against Pakistan and in 1996 against Japan — it lost. Decisions on consensus are made informally by diplomats at the UN, sometimes decades in advance for the 55-country Asia-Pacific grouping.
Like with all the other regional groups — African, Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC), the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), and the Eastern European Group — a different number of seats fall vacant each year. When consensus breaks down, votes within the group are split, leading to a contest in the wider UNGA. From there it is a race for every country’s vote; the rule that contestants must also win two-thirds of the assembly, or more than 129 votes, complicates the task. Given that the course is set, the Modi government has three options, each opening a differently difficult path. The first is to battle it out against Tajikistan on the global stage; the second is to convince the Tajik government to withdraw its candidature; and the third is for India to withdraw its own. Another option — to divide the two-year term equally between the two candidates — has been tried in the past, but these cases have been countries that are evenly matched in other respects.
Battling it out
At first glance, India’s advantage over Tajikistan seems glaringly obvious, given its size, economic standing and past record on the Council. However, UN insiders know that these are not the only criteria by which UNSC elections are won. To begin with, India’s multiple terms on the UNSC may work against it, as there is a growing push within the UNGA to consider smaller countries that have never held council membership such as Tajikistan. In his UNGA speech, Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin said that, more than status, his country’s bid for a seat on the UNSC was about its responsibilities to the UN Charter and to “listen to all voices — large and small”. This David-versus-Goliath pitch is attractive to other smaller states, especially those from the Global South that feel their lack of representation is unfair. Japan, for instance, which has served 12 terms on the UNSC, announced its candidature for the 2043 election in 2024, having previously declared its intention to contest the 2032 election.
The next important factor is how subregional blocs are likely to vote within the Asia-Pacific grouping. Tajikistan already has the endorsement of its own region, Central Asia, and possibly, by extension, that of several neighbouring countries. It also has the endorsement of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, a grouping of 57 member-states which would largely follow that position, although New Delhi may be able to win over some of its friends within the organisation. India is fairly confident of the votes of the Global North — the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and allied countries — as well as those of Southeast Asian countries (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN), Caribbean nations represented by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Pacific island countries (PIC). This means the battle ground that matters most is the Global South — Africa, South America and also South Asia.
The current mood among Global South countries, as reflected in a number of UNGA resolutions over the past year, has been decidedly against the big powers, the U.S. and Russia, and has been inordinately critical of Israel. During the 80th session, member-states voted overwhelmingly in favour of at least 13 resolutions criticising Israel. The UNSC elections this year were particularly instructive. For the Asia-Pacific seat, the UNGA voted for first-timer Kyrgyzstan over the western-backed Philippines. For the WEOG, Germany, which had never lost a UNSC election, lost to Portugal and Austria, ostensibly due to its stance in support of Israel. In the election for the President of the UNGA, too, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Khalilur Rahman, defeated his rival from Cyprus, another western-backed candidate. While India’s assertion of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the big powers may stand it in good stead, its diplomats may have to answer questions about India’s own ties with Israel in recent years, particularly following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel in February 2026.
Tajikistan or India bowing out
The next option, which has worked in the past, is to persuade Tajikistan to withdraw its candidature — India was able to negotiate with Kazakhstan in 2010 for the 2011-12 term, and Afghanistan in 2013 to step aside for the 2021-22 tenure. However, despite meetings between Mr. Modi and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Bishkek, and between Mr. Jaishankar and his Tajik counterpart during the UNGA session (both in September 2026), there has been no such announcement. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will travel to Dushanbe next week for the SCO Heads of Government Council (October 19-20) and his meetings there will also be watched closely on this issue.
Even if Tajikistan decides to step aside after studying its chances, India must consider the message this would send to other Global South countries: that its second turn in a decade is more important than giving a smaller country its first opportunity to serve on the Council.
This leaves the third alternative, which would certainly make the world sit up: India could agree to step aside for Tajikistan, in order to return to the UNSC a year or two later with the full backing of the Asia-Pacific grouping. Such a move would acknowledge Tajikistan’s special strategic relationship with India in the past, particularly its role in hosting an Indian Air Force base at Ayni and a medical base at Farkhor, strategically important in the Afghan conflict in the early part of this century, despite pushback from the U.S., China and even Russia. There is little evidence so far, however, that the Modi government, which announced its candidature with some fanfare, is considering backing down.
Before choosing an option, the government must undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the value of the UNSC non-permanent seat at a time the global body is seen, in the words of Mr. Jaishankar, as “largely irrelevant”. The last six years of this decade have witnessed shock after shock, but perhaps none have rendered its own significance into question as much as the violation of the UN charter by the Permanent members themselves. China’s refusal to share information on early cases of the COVID-19 pandemic with the World Health Organization, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. backing of Israel despite its violation of every UN covenant, the killing of UN personnel in Gaza and the visa ban on the UN Secretary-General, followed by the U.S.’s war on Iran — the assassination of its leaders, and the bombing of a girl’s school — are all examples of this.
The path to securing another non-permanent seat on the UNSC next year is not easy. India’s win can only be guaranteed by defeating the ambitions of its old friend and regional partner — the choice is between a Pyrrhic victory versus a tactical defeat. In the bigger war for India’s rightful place as a permanent member of the UNSC — one whose voice represents the aspirations of the Global South — this is a battle that could be avoided.
suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in