The warmth of the reception extended by US President Donald Trump to his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping—including meeting him at the foot of the aircraft steps—markedly exceeded customary White House protocols and ceremonial norms. This stands in sharp contrast, at the very least, to Trump’s most recent visit to Beijing, where he was greeted at the airport by Yang Jiechi, then serving as State Councilor for Foreign Affairs.
This scene may not signal a broader realignment in the balance of power between the two nations. On the ground, however, Beijing has, over recent years, successfully constructed instruments of influence that extend far beyond trade into technology, supply chains, and critical minerals—securing spheres of influence that were previously subordinate to Washington, not merely abroad but even within US territory itself.
The summit has concluded, yet the core issues continue to cloud relations between the two powers. As is customary, Xi laid out his red lines concerning Taiwan and urged Trump to handle the matter with the utmost caution, reaffirming that China’s position on safeguarding its national unity and territorial integrity is unambiguous and non-negotiable.
Both sides are navigating a fraught phase of commercial and political negotiations, waging wars by other means across multiple hot and cold fronts—from Taiwan to Venezuela, via the Middle East and Europe. At the heart of this contest lies the issue of rare earth elements and the technology used to separate them, one of the most consequential strategic questions that may well determine the future of the global order.
Washington regards this struggle as an effort to preserve its eroding influence worldwide; Beijing views it as part of the transition of the international system toward a more multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the sole hegemonic power.
Beijing grounds its vision in the instruments it already possesses. Rare earth elements—seventeen in number—are now used in a vast array of advanced technologies, from electronics and electric vehicles to defense systems and artificial intelligence data centers. Separating these rare earths from one another, however, proves far more difficult than extracting them. Herein lies China’s true strength: it resides not merely in the volume of what it mines but in its command of the more complex stages of the value chain—above all, separation, refining, and the manufacture of permanent magnets. These magnets are essential components across a wide spectrum of advanced American industries, including defense and aerospace, rendering control over their production a matter that transcends economics and touches national security itself.
China demonstrated the scale of its leverage over the rare-earth market through a series of export controls imposed in 2025, which disrupted global supply chains. Following subsequent understandings reached between the two sides, Beijing suspended the implementation of certain expanded restrictions while retaining a system of permits and controls that continues to cause concern for American industry.
Although the United States possesses rare-earth deposits, it operates only a handful of mines. China, by contrast, enjoys a broad industrial base and cumulative expertise in processing and separation; the United States faces a far steeper challenge in rapidly reconstituting these capabilities.
According to the International Energy Agency, in 2024 China accounted for approximately 60 percent of global mined production of the rare earth elements used in magnet manufacturing and roughly 91 percent of global refined production of those elements.
For the United States, leaving processing in Chinese hands remains the swiftest and least costly solution—yet it leaves America exposed to Beijing’s restrictions. Even if Washington elects to invest in domestic separation and refining capacity, the endeavor would require years and startup costs measured in the billions of dollars, with no guarantee of final product quality.
The result is a clear asymmetry of instruments. Washington wields tariffs, advanced semiconductors, investment restrictions, financial power, sanctions, and access to cutting-edge technologies, including sophisticated artificial intelligence chips. Beijing, for its part, commands a different arsenal: manufacturing scale, supply-chain dominance, rare and critical minerals, processing capacity, and access to one of the world’s largest markets.
Beneath these economic negotiations, however, lies a deeper security dilemma. Taiwan remains one of the most sensitive and dangerous issues in the Washington–Beijing relationship. During their May meeting in Beijing, Xi warned Trump that mismanagement of the crisis could drive bilateral relations into “a very dangerous place.” On this occasion, he again urged the American president to handle the matter with caution.
Added to the foregoing is artificial intelligence, which has become the most complex issue of all. The two powers compete for mastery of it, yet neither can manage it alone. Measures intended to enhance security by one side—export controls, technology restrictions, military deployments, and supply-chain diversification—can be interpreted by the other as preparations for containment.
With the summit concluded, levels of trust between Washington and Beijing remain exceedingly low. The world has come to view US–China relations primarily through the lexicon of economic disputes and tariffs. Those terms, however, have become markedly inadequate. The relationship has recently transformed into a competition over new, sophisticated chokepoints.
Perhaps both sides will ultimately have to accept the most difficult reality of all: that the other will not disappear anytime soon. America will remain a formidable technological, financial, and military power. China will remain a formidable industrial, commercial, and geopolitical force. This is the truth. It is what Xi Jinping articulated at the summit when he observed that “cooperation between China and the United States may not solve all the world’s problems, but without our cooperation, it will be difficult to solve many of them.”
In the end, the picture appears far more intricate than a mere contest over spheres of influence or control of mines. Strategic wealth resides not solely in the ownership of rare earths but in the capacity to separate, refine, and transform them into materials used in the industries of the future. And it is precisely here that one of the keys to the balance of power in the emerging world order may be found: not merely who possesses the mineral, but who possesses the technology that renders it usable.
Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University