The first task of Israel’s next government should be to confront a question that can no longer be postponed: What does Israel intend to do with the West Bank?
This is not merely a question of territory. It is a question of Israel’s security, its relations with its neighbors and allies, its democratic character, and its future as a Jewish state.
In February 2026, the government took a series of decisions concerning the West Bank, including authorizing the resumption of land-registration procedures in Area C. It allocated an initial NIS 244 million to the process for 2026-30 and created new positions to carry it out.
Critics, including hundreds of former senior members of Israel’s security and governmental establishments who filed a petition to the High Court of Justice, have argued that these measures, together with other changes in the administration of the West Bank, amount to a process of de facto annexation.
The government has presented the measures in different terms, short of annexation, including as steps related to security, land administration, and strengthening Israeli control.
That distinction matters. Except for the annexation of east Jerusalem neighborhoods immediately after the war, Israel did not annex any part of the West Bank during the close to six decades elapsed since then.
But sovereignty does not necessarily arrive in a single dramatic act. It can also emerge incrementally – through changes in land administration, planning, settlement, jurisdiction, regulation, and the exercise of governmental authority.
The question before Israel, therefore, is not only whether it has formally declared annexation. It is whether fundamental changes to the status and governance of the territory are taking place without an explicit national decision on their ultimate destiny.
The February measures and other recent policies have generated legal challenges and international criticism.
Whether one accepts every legal argument advanced by the petitioners or every characterization of the government’s policies, the underlying democratic question remains: A transformation of this magnitude should not occur through administrative accumulation. It should result from an explicit decision by Israel’s elected government and Knesset, following a transparent public debate about its consequences.
Those consequences extend far beyond the legal status of particular parcels of land or the application of military and administrative orders.
First, there are the security consequences.
The Palestinian Authority has serious shortcomings, but Israeli security officials have for years regarded security coordination with it as an important instrument for preventing terrorism and disrupting attacks.
Policies that weaken the PA – whether through territorial fragmentation, economic pressure, or other measures – could increase the risk of its eventual collapse.
The result could be a vacuum that fundamentalist radical armed organizations would seek to exploit, leaving Israel with greater responsibility for security and civilian administration across the West Bank.
That would come at a considerable cost. The Israel Defense Forces would face the task of maintaining security among a large Palestinian population while protecting Israeli communities and confronting threats on multiple fronts. Direct Israeli responsibility for civilian administration would also impose substantial financial and administrative burdens.
In addition, the decisions in question are liable to be interpreted as providing a tailwind to disastrous acts of Jewish terrorism which are on the rise while state authorities either turn a blind eye or convey silent encouragement through decisions such as the granting of governmental legitimacy to Israeli-Jewish takeovers of lands in the Judea and Samaria area. This is liable to spur further violence.
Second, there are legal and diplomatic consequences. Unilateral changes to the status of the West Bank could intensify disputes with international institutions and governments over international law and the framework established by the Oslo agreements. The Oslo II agreement envisioned the gradual transfer of territorial powers in the West Bank to the Palestinians, with permanent-status issues – including borders and settlements – to be resolved through negotiations.
Israel must account for the possibility that further unilateral changes could expose the country, its officials, and military personnel to additional international legal and diplomatic pressure. The international response to settlement and annexation-related policies is already affecting relations with governments and international institutions.
Third, there are regional consequences. Jordan’s security relationship with Israel is particularly important. Jordan has a direct interest in developments in the West Bank and in preventing instability or displacement from spreading across the Jordan River. Egypt likewise has a central role in Gaza, Sinai security, and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
The same applies to Israel’s broader relationship with Arab states that have established or developed ties with it. Policies that make Palestinian statehood or a negotiated regional framework more remote violate an explicit Israeli commitment included in the Abraham Accords and could complicate further normalization, as well as make it much harder to construct a broader regional security and economic architecture, such as has been envisioned with Saudi Arabia.
Fourth, there is a fundamental question about Israel’s political character and national identity. If Israel ultimately extends sovereignty over the West Bank, it will have to confront the political status and rights of the Palestinians living there.
Granting Israeli citizenship and full political rights to Palestinians in the territory would have profound implications for Israel’s demographic and political structure. Maintaining Israeli sovereignty while denying those rights would leave different political and legal arrangements for different populations living under Israeli authority and would amount to apartheid.
This is therefore not simply a debate about borders. It is a debate about what kind of state Israel intends to be.
'Freedom, justice, and peace'
Israel’s 1948 Declaration of Independence pledged that the state would be based on “freedom, justice, and peace” and would ensure equality of social and political rights to its citizens. Any long-term arrangement involving the West Bank must therefore be measured not only against security considerations but also against the principles Israel has proclaimed as part of its national foundation.
There is also a profound question for world Jewry. Israel’s relationship with Jewish communities abroad has never rested only on security or national identity. It has also been connected to a shared commitment to democratic values. Permanent Israeli sovereignty over millions of Palestinians without full political rights could deepen disagreements within parts of the Jewish world over Israel’s direction and its relationship to democratic principles.
Such a fissure with the Jewish world, in which Israel operates against its own Declaration of Independence, violates the fundamental reason for Israel’s existence – to be a secure and democratic home for the Jewish people.
None of this means that Israel can ignore security threats emanating from the West Bank, nor does it mean that the PA or Palestinian political system should be idealized. It means that the consequences of changing the territory’s status are too consequential to be determined incrementally.
The next government, following the October 27 election, should therefore make the question of the West Bank a priority.
It should define it in explicit terms and initiate a thorough, transparent, and sustained national process for deciding the future of the West Bank and, in coordination with relevant actors, Gaza.
It should begin by reviewing measures that could alter Israel’s long-term strategic position, starting with the recent measures enacted last February, and determining which, if any, should be suspended pending an explicit national decision.
It should also present the Knesset and the public with a clear assessment of the security, legal, diplomatic, economic, and democratic consequences of the available alternatives.
Israel can choose its future. But it should do so consciously, transparently, and through its democratic institutions – not by allowing a historic transformation to occur one administrative decision at a time, without a clear decision by the Israeli public about where that process leads.
The central question is therefore unavoidable: Does Israel intend to move toward permanent sovereignty over the West Bank, toward a negotiated territorial arrangement, or toward some other defined political framework?
Whatever answer Israel ultimately chooses, it should be explicit – and its consequences should be understood before the choice becomes irreversible. Continuing with measures that lead to annexation will be catastrophic.
V.-Adm. (ret.) Ami Ayalon is a former director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) and commander of the Israel Navy.
Gilead Sher, a fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute and a reserve colonel in the IDF, is a former senior peace negotiator and chief of staff to prime minister Ehud Barak.
Orni Petruschka is a social activist, philanthropist, and former technology entrepreneur.