Illiberal political movements in central and eastern Europe are using state assets, welfare spending and control of public institutions to entrench their influence, while networks of think tanks help spread their strategies across borders, the European Policy Centre (EPC) said in a report.
Hungary represented the most advanced case of democratic backsliding among seven European countries examined in the study, while Poland is struggling to reverse institutional changes introduced under its previous nationalist government, the Brussels-based think-tank said in a commentary published on October 18.
The report, written by Goran Buldioski, a senior adviser at On Think Tanks, argues that illiberal movements have moved beyond electoral campaigning to build networks of institutions and financial resources that can preserve their influence even if governments change.
“Illiberalism in Europe is gradual, adaptive, and increasingly networked,” the report said, warning that support for democracy does not necessarily translate into a commitment to liberal principles such as minority rights, independent courts and checks on executive power.
Hungary under former prime minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party provides the clearest example of this model, the study said. The government reshaped constitutional arrangements, gained influence over media and cultural institutions and promoted a work-based social system that favoured citizens deemed deserving while marginalising others.
A central feature was the financing of institutions aligned with the government through transfers of state assets rather than reliance on annual grants. The Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC), a Hungarian educational and intellectual institution, is cited as an example of how endowments linked to state-owned companies in sectors such as energy and pharmaceuticals could provide long-term financial independence from changes in government. Such organisations also establish parallel universities, professional bodies and media institutions, creating alternative routes to professional status and influence outside existing liberal institutions.
The EPC describes this as a strategy of institutional replacement rather than simply competition with liberal organisations. Think-tanks including MCC and Poland's Ordo Iuris also serve as intermediaries, it said, translating US culture-war arguments into European debates over sovereignty, national identity and the powers of the state.
Poland illustrates the difficulties of reversing democratic backsliding after a change of government. The nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party, which lost power in 2023, used paternalist populism and large-scale social transfers to establish lasting support, the report said. Its flagship 500+ child benefit helped build voter loyalty by offering tangible benefits to families.
The country is now undergoing a contested democratic recovery, with the legacy of the previous government's policies continuing to shape political competition. The report argues that the institutional and social foundations of illiberalism can survive an electoral defeat, making restoration of democratic safeguards more complicated than simply replacing those in power.
The study identifies several ways in which illiberal parties consolidate their position. These include appointing allies to cultural institutions, changing educational systems to promote national narratives and directing public money towards constituencies that already support the governing party.
In Hungary, research on the Hungarian Village Programme found that discretionary infrastructure funding was more likely to reach settlements where Fidesz had previously performed particularly well. Such spending was seen as mobilising loyal voters while discouraging opposition participation, the report said, creating local networks of political dependence.
Illiberal parties also use family subsidies, pension policies and other welfare measures to reward groups regarded as core supporters. The report argues that this selective redistribution can leave poorer and more marginalised citizens behind, even when governments present their policies as a defence of ordinary people against established elites.
Elsewhere in Central Europe, the return to power of Andrej Babis' Ano party in Czechia in 2025, backed by the radical right, signals a shift towards technocratic populism and Euroscepticism, the study said. Czech institutions remain comparatively resilient, while President Petr Pavel's 2023 campaign is cited as an example of how a positive message centred on shared values and civility can challenge divisive political tactics.
The report also examines Austria, where the Freedom Party (FPO) remains an established illiberal force, drawing on nationalist fraternities and advocating restrictions on welfare benefits linked to language proficiency.
Beyond Central Europe, France's National Rally has pursued a strategy of “de-demonisation”, presenting exclusionary nationalist positions in the language of republican values. The report warns that mainstream parties can contribute to this normalisation by adopting far-right rhetoric on Islam and multiculturalism, a process it calls “position contagion”.
In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy promotes a Europe of sovereign nations and maintains links with religious intermediary organisations, a phenomenon the study describes as “confessional illiberalism”. The UK, meanwhile, faces potential democratic backsliding as Reform UK moves from the political fringes towards the mainstream, drawing on post-Brexit grievances and social media to promote a conception of majority rule that can undermine institutional constraints.
Across the seven countries, the report finds that illiberal movements are increasingly connected through informal international networks. Platforms such as X and Telegram allow them to circulate political messages and coordinate activity without building formal cross-border organisations.
The EPC recommends strengthening judicial independence, protecting public-service media from political control and enforcing conflict-of-interest rules. It also urges mainstream parties not to imitate far-right rhetoric, arguing that doing so risks legitimising the very positions they seek to contain.
Democratic movements should also address economic insecurity and regional inequality, the report said, rather than treating the challenge solely as a battle over institutions or political messaging. Greater transparency over think-tank funding and cross-border influence networks is needed to establish how these organisations operate.
The central challenge, according to the study, is that illiberal movements can continue reshaping public life between elections, using financial resources, social benefits and cultural influence to build durable support. Countering them therefore requires a sustained response that combines institutional safeguards with policies addressing the economic grievances on which they draw.