Juol Nhomngek Daniel’s response to my article raises an important constitutional argument: dissolving South Sudan’s transitional government cannot substitute for implementing the peace agreement. I agree. Our disagreement concerns his interpretation of my position. Explaining why an administration has been dismantled does not mean endorsing its dissolution. My concern is that the transitional institutions have been displaced while their unfinished responsibilities remain unresolved.
My original article explicitly distinguished ending an institution from completing its mandate. It questioned the continuation of presidential authority, warned against indefinite executive discretion, and demanded accountability for outstanding commitments. It also described the fourth explanation as the reorganization and concentration of executive authority amid financial uncertainty, not an end to that concentration. These distinctions matter because Mr. Nhomngek’s response attributes support for dissolution to an argument that was principally scrutinizing it.
The central question therefore remains: has South Sudan completed its transition, or has the transition been bypassed through a new administrative arrangement? Three developments explain my position: the limited practical resistance to institutional displacement, the ambiguity of international responses, and the growing separation of election preparations from unfinished transitional obligations.
First, the response of those displaced must be assessed through its institutional consequences. The September order removed the vice-presidents and dissolved national and state legislatures while retaining the president and establishing caretaker authorities. Whatever objections individuals or parties may express, the replacement administration has become the machinery through which government operates. That is a substantial political change, regardless of whether its constitutional justification is accepted.
It would be too sweeping to claim that every removed official has remained silent. Nor should silence automatically be interpreted as consent: political restraint may reflect insecurity, restricted opportunities, negotiation or uncertainty. The stronger question is whether those entrusted with the transitional settlement have presented an effective, collective and publicly accountable response to its displacement.
Former officeholders owe citizens more than statements about their removal. They should explain which obligations remained unfinished, what they did to implement them, and how those responsibilities will now be protected. Without that accounting, the departure of leaders can overshadow the disappearance of the institutions through which citizens were promised reform.
Second, international conduct deserves scrutiny, but careful scrutiny. The suggestion that a caretaker arrangement may satisfy external frustration with repeated extensions is a plausible political interpretation. It is not proof that international partners collectively requested, endorsed or welcomed this particular arrangement. Diplomatic engagement with an administration also does not, by itself, establish approval of every measure that created it.
Indeed, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council called in August for credible December elections while also demanding inclusive dialogue, implementation of the peace agreement, security-sector reform and transitional justice. Its position combined electoral urgency with substantive conditions. It cannot fairly be reduced to a demand for polling at any cost.
My concern is the gap between such commitments and their enforcement. International partners should explain publicly how their engagement with the caretaker authorities protects the obligations they previously supported. If they prioritize an election date while accepting the erosion of safeguards, their practical conduct may weaken their stated principles. That possibility requires examination rather than assumptions about hidden agreements.
Third, the unfinished transitional agenda risks being pushed aside by the concentration on December elections. The clearest evidence is the reported amendment of electoral legislation separating the vote from completion of a permanent constitution and a national census. This changed the sequencing of the process. It did not demonstrate that the underlying questions of representation, constitutional legitimacy and public confidence had been resolved.
Here, Mr. Nhomngek’s argument strengthens my warning. If the agreement’s obligations remain necessary, removing the institutions established to pursue them creates an immediate accountability problem. Who now owns those obligations? Which deadlines apply? Who scrutinizes implementation? An appeal to fulfil the agreement must answer these questions within the political circumstances that now exist.
This is what I mean when I say that the transition appears to have been buried without funeral arrangements. The metaphor describes institutional closure without an adequate public reckoning. It does not declare the peace agreement legally extinguished. A government may lose its offices while its obligations remain binding, contested and politically indispensable.
Mr. Nhomngek also identifies motives involving control over security institutions, public finances and political competition. These are serious interpretations deserving investigation. However, claims about what particular leaders fear or secretly intend require evidence. Criticism is strongest when it distinguishes documented actions, observable consequences, and conclusions about motive.
The same discipline applies to Tumaini. An additional peace initiative should be judged by whether it broadens participation and strengthens enforceable commitments. Its existence does not establish that it caused the dissolution, nor does invoking its principles authorize the abandonment of earlier obligations. A practical roadmap should now connect constitutional responsibility with the reality of caretaker rule.
First, the authorities should publish the complete legal record underlying the dissolution, including the enacted amendments and relevant orders. They should explain how these measures relate to the constitutional framework and the peace agreement, and provide an effective avenue for independent legal scrutiny.
Second, an inclusive political dialogue should agree on the caretaker administration’s mandate, limits and duration. Signatories, other political actors, women, young people, displaced communities and civil society should participate meaningfully. Administrative control should not be treated as sufficient evidence of national agreement.
Third, every unfinished transitional commitment should enter a public implementation schedule identifying the responsible institution, financing, deadline, and reporting mechanism. Security arrangements, constitutional reform, justice, and financial accountability must retain identifiable institutional owners. Dissolution should not become a mechanism for dissolving responsibility.
Fourth, electoral readiness should undergo an independent, publicly explained assessment. Authorities must demonstrate accessible registration, adequate resources, impartial administration, political freedoms, security and workable dispute resolution. Any decision about the timetable should follow transparent evidence and lawful procedures rather than political convenience.
Finally, caretaker spending and official conduct require scrutiny throughout this period. Public resources must not become campaign resources, and temporary authority must have enforceable limits. Regional and international partners should report against these safeguards consistently.
Mr. Nhomngek and I share the essential objective of a peaceful, accountable constitutional state. My position is that recognizing an unfinished transition also requires recognizing how its institutions have been displaced. South Sudan cannot recover the transition’s purpose through labels alone. Its leaders must account for what was abandoned, protect what remains obligatory, and demonstrate how citizens will finally gain a meaningful voice in government.
The writer is a researcher and writer specializing in humanitarian and development issues in South Sudan. He holds a degree in Sociology and Political Science from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa and a Master’s in Peace and Development Studies from the University of Juba. He can be reached via moggaloloyo@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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