Armed clashes in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan have intensified in recent weeks, reaching their highest level in a decade.
With the US-Israel war threatening to enter an even more volatile phase, such tensions have raised growing concern in Tehran.
At the centre of the escalation is the emergence of a coalition of diverse Baloch militant factions, the Popular Fighters Front (PFF), also known by its Persian acronym JMM (Jebhe-ye-Mobarezin-e Mardomi).
Consisting of Jaish-ul-Adl, PADA Baluch, Harakate Nasr Baluchestan, and the Mohammad Rasulullah Brigade, the militant umbrella was formed in December 2025.
Though they claim to fight for all of Iran, which they say has been “held hostage,” at least one faction among them has advocated Baloch separatism in the past.
But despite their differing political ambitions, the groups share a conservative Sunni Muslim identity, providing common ground in Shia-dominant Iran where the Sunni population is less than 9%.
Tehran's security dilemma
Suddenly, Sistan-Baluchestan has become dangerous.
Since January 2026, at least 37 armed attacks have been reported on police stations, military bases, and checkpoints, while security patrols have been targeted as they move through cities.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel are a primary target. There have been high-ranking assassinations, and last month, a regime-linked Sunni cleric was shot dead.
If this continues, the Iranian government may have to send large reinforcements from other parts of the country to contain the unrest, stretching the security infrastructure at a time when it is prepared for a return to war.
Such instability in Sistan-Baluchestan could have consequences for Iran in the coming months.
As per the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), approximately 70 armed confrontations took place between Iranian security forces and armed groups in Sistan and Baluchestan during 2026, the highest annual level in a decade. Thirteen occurred in the past two weeks alone.
ACLED’s assessments suggest that although Tehran has intensified efforts to dismantle the militant network, raids have often turned into “prolonged battles”, with some lasting as long as nine hours.
Pointing towards a more entrenched insurgency, it says that the “key risk” would be convergence, and a full-scale resumption of the US-Israeli war on Iran could “stretch Tehran’s security forces thin.”
Meanwhile, the human toll is also mounting, according to the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), with at least 94 people killed and 33 wounded in 63 armed incidents between 31 March and 10 October.
On 13 October, more than 20 Fatemiyoun brigade members were reported killed or wounded in fighting that lasted for seven hours in the mountainous Taftan area.
The Fatemiyoun are an Iran-backed Shia militia composed largely of Afghan fighters and organised to fight alongside the IRGC. Their reported involvement underscores the extent to which Tehran is drawing on its wider security network to confront the violence.
The use of drones, artillery, and armoured vehicles by government forces in recent clashes further indicates the intensity of the fighting and raises concerns about the consequences of expanded operations in populated areas.
Consequently, Tehran faces a difficult strategic dilemma, and while a forceful response could disrupt militant networks, it may result in deepening local alienation.
While the Iranian government is not losing its grip, chronic instability constrains its ability to respond to war.
Rebranding a Baloch uprising?
Ridden by poverty, plagued by unemployment, and the least developed region in Iran, Sistan-Baluchestan has been tense for decades.
Since their unification as the PFF, however, the region’s militants have changed their narrative, pointing not only to Baloch grievances but also calling for broader political change in Iran.
So far, it cannot be determined whether this consolidation has increased their capabilities, but the ongoing war with Washington has created space for the militants to regroup in Iran.
Dr Farzan Sabet, an Iran expert at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told The New Arab that when “conditions for ordinary people are deteriorating, and the regime is perceived as vulnerable, there are surges of opposition hoping to overthrow the regime, or extract concessions”.
He highlighted the convergence during the 12-day war in June 2025 amid the so-called ‘Lion and Sun’ protests among “leading opposition organisations including the nationwide Pahlavi movement, the coalition of political forces of Iranian Kurdistan in majority Kurdish-speaking areas of Iran, and the PFF in Sistan-Baluchestan”.
Sabet said that Iranian security forces in this province have “historically been poorly equipped and trained, experiencing greater disarray due to the assassination of Iranian security leaders and personnel” during the war.
Militancy in the province has also received a boost from deteriorating material conditions, the dire state of human rights, a disproportionate degree of executions and violations, and, possibly, foreign support.
According to Sabet, the political dynamics in Sistan-Baluchestan are often distinct from those in the core of the country, and there are fewer sensitive population centres and economic hubs.
“It is seen as less of a threat than, say, a comparable event in Tehran or another major city in the core, and there is a lower risk that discontent and instability spread from the periphery to the core than the other way around,” he added.
The impact of such peripheral insurgencies is usually geographically and politically contained in Iran, even though the PFF is “targeting its discourse toward the broader Iranian nation”.
However, “given the recent successes of Balochi militants, the regime may want to surge further security forces into the area,” Sabet said, such as the Fatemiyoun Division - an IRGC-backed militia of Afghan Shia whose members died in recent clashes.
The US-Israel war has added a new dimension to the fragile situation in Sistan-Baluchestan as Iran’s security establishment has diverted away resources and armed groups have seen it as “an opportunity to intensify their activities and test the state’s capacity to respond”, Babak Vahdad, an independent researcher and Iran analyst, told The New Arab.
In his view, the escalation is not an immediate threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic, as Baloch militancy remains geographically concentrated and is not a broader national uprising.
But the situation has exposed “some of the structural weaknesses of the Iranian state, particularly its difficult relationship with ethnic and religious minorities, and a predominantly military response may contain the insurgency in the short term without addressing its underlying causes”.
Meanwhile, according to Iran’s narrative, “certain regional actors” might be encouraging instability there to “divert Tehran’s military and security resources away from the main confrontation in the Gulf, possibly even preparing the ground for a future military attack against Iran”, Vahdad added.
Fractious borders, wider risks
The security issue is made worse by geography. Across mountainous terrain, the porous 900 km Iran-Pakistan border stretches from a tripoint with Afghanistan to the northern Arabian Sea, and policing it is an arduous task for Tehran as deserted, interconnected frontiers with low populations create fertile ground for armed groups and mercenaries.
Even the Pakistani province of Baluchistan across the border has separatist outfits, mercenaries, a smuggling nexus, and long-standing political and socio-economic issues.
Currently, border crossings along the Pakistan-Iran border have been closed by Islamabad.
Naveed Ali Sheikh, an Islamabad-based military analyst, told The New Arab that Pakistan has been facing terrorist attacks originating from the Iranian border region of Sistan and Baluchestan, where banned militant outfits operate and carry out “hit-and-run” [back across the border] attacks.
These groups have targeted Iranian and Pakistani government forces, as well as civilian infrastructure, he said. Noting that a surge in such attacks was observed recently, Sheikh said the border required better security infrastructure, upgraded surveillance systems, and more effective mechanisms to prevent further incursions.
However, border security was not the primary reason behind the recent closure of cross-border trade, as “shadow banking networks are being used by smugglers and black-market operators, which the United States alleges are helping finance Iran's sanctioned military establishment”.
And the temporary closure of border crossings may be intended to manage the anticipated backlog of transactions and documentation if the banking and trade standstill continues.
Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Follow her on X: @sabena_siddiqi
Edited by Charlie Hoyle