Murray Hunter
PRIME Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim recently admitted what many on the ground already feel that the 2027 federal budget cannot single-handedly resolve Malaysia’s economic woes or substitute for deeper structural and governance reforms.
He is right. The aggregate numbers look respectable, with GDP growth hovering around 5 per cent, foreign direct investment flowing into selected corridors, and stock markets holding up.
However, these figures mask a deeper reality. Malaysia is living through a classic K-shaped economy.
A K-shaped economy describes a situation in which different segments of society, industries, and regions move in opposite directions at the same time.
The upper arm of the K rises; the lower arm stagnates or declines.
Headline growth becomes an illusion of shared prosperity.
Wealth and opportunity concentrate among asset owners, high-skilled professionals, multinational corporations, and government-linked companies, while low- and middle-income households, small businesses, and the informal sector fall further behind.
This is not a temporary post-pandemic anomaly.
It is the logical outcome of long-standing structural features of the Malaysian economy: heavy reliance on low-cost foreign labour, a large informal sector operating outside formal protections, stagnant real wages for most, geographic concentration of investment, and a political economy still shaped by patronage and rent-seeking.
The Upper Arm: Who Is Rising
Capital-intensive, export-oriented sectors are thriving in Malaysia.
The electrical and electronics industry, particularly semiconductors and related activities linked to the global AI upcycle, has been a standout performer.
Data centre investments, especially in Johor, have drawn significant foreign capital. Multinational corporations and large government-linked companies in these hubs enjoy pricing power, access to finance, and the ability to capture productivity gains.
High-income households and asset owners benefit accordingly.
Rising property values in the Klang Valley, Penang, and Johor, together with financial market gains, expand net worth for those already holding capital.
White-collar professionals in finance, technology, and professional services see their incomes and opportunities grow. Geographic concentration reinforces the pattern, where investment and high-value jobs cluster in these established urban corridors, leaving much of the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak relatively starved of comparable opportunities.
Public-sector salary adjustments and GLC compensation packages further tilt the balance toward those connected to the formal, protected segments of the economy.
Aggregate GDP of 4.8–5.3 per cent for 2026 and a projected 4.2–5.2 per cent for 2027 look solid on paper.
For the upper arm, the numbers translate into real gains.
The Lower Arm: Who Is Being Left Behind
The lower arm tells a different story.
Small and medium enterprises, which account for a large share of employment and domestic economic activity, face narrow margins, rising operating costs, labour constraints, and limited access to affordable credit.
Many struggle to pass costs on to consumers already stretched by living expenses.
Domestic-oriented businesses in hospitality, retail, and traditional services operate under continuous pressure.
At the household level, the B40 and large parts of the M40 experience what some have called a “vibecession”.
That is, strong macroeconomic metrics that fail to match daily financial reality.
Real wage growth has remained subdued for years.
Between 2010 and the mid-2020s, substantial cumulative GDP expansion coexisted with only modest gains in median private-sector wages.
Public-sector increases create a demonstration effect that private employers largely resist.
Foreign labour in plantations, construction, manufacturing, and services continues to anchor wages at the lower end of the market, reducing pressure for productivity-linked pay rises for local workers.
The informal sector remains the clearest expression of the lower arm.
Official figures show informal employment at around 3.28 million persons in 2025, or roughly 19.8 per cent of total employment. This remains a significant share of the workforce, even after a decline from earlier years.
Earlier estimates placed the informal economy’s contribution closer to a quarter of GDP.
Hawkers, delivery riders, e-hailing drivers, day labourers, small traders, and self-employed operators form the backbone of everyday economic life for millions of families.
Many earn incomes near or below poverty thresholds, with little access to social protections, formal credit, or pathways to scale.
Household debt compounds the pressure. Outstanding household borrowings reached RM1.73 trillion by early 2026, equivalent to about 84.4 per cent of GDP.
While official indicators of repayment capacity remain stable and impaired loan ratios are low, the absolute burden weighs heavily on middle- and lower-income households already coping with housing, food, transport, and education costs.
Phased subsidy rationalisation, even when targeted, still transmits cost increases through transport, food, and rents.
Geographic and sectoral divides reinforce household ones. Regions outside the main investment corridors remain more dependent on low-productivity informal self-employment and government transfers.
Labour-intensive and face-to-face service industries struggle with high costs while technology, finance, and capital-intensive export sectors pull ahead.
Structural Roots of the Divergence
The K-shape is not accidental. It grows out of several interlocking features of the Malaysian political economy.
First, the economy remains heavily labour-intensive in many segments and dependent on foreign workers.
This suppresses domestic wage pressures and reduces incentives for firms to invest in automation, skills, and higher-value processes.
Second, the informal sector, despite its size and importance, receives insufficient policy attention.
It is treated more as a residual or problem to be managed than as a potential engine of broad-based growth. Innovation programmes, financing schemes, and skills initiatives often bypass the traditional informal operators who need support most.
Third, productivity gains have not translated into shared wage growth.
Capital-intensive and resource-linked activities, together with GLC dominance in key sectors, capture a disproportionate share of the benefits.
Value addition remains weak in many domestic firms; copying and low-tech methods persist.
Fourth, education and skills systems continue to produce mismatches.
Tertiary-educated underemployment remains significant.
Graduates drift into gig work or informal activities that do not utilise their training. Brain drain removes talent that could otherwise upgrade the economy.
Fifth, geographic and institutional concentration of investment and opportunity perpetuates regional disparities. Infrastructure and high-value activity remain clustered; peripheral regions lag.
These features interact with patronage networks, equity requirements rooted in older policy frameworks, and regulatory barriers that favour the connected.
The result is a three-tier labour market with foreign workers at the bottom under precarious conditions, local semi-skilled and service workers in the middle with limited mobility, and a protected upper tier of public-sector, GLC, and professionally connected individuals.
Why Budgets Alone Cannot Close the Gap
Anwar’s acknowledgement that the 2027 budget cannot resolve structural problems is candid.
Cash transfers, tax relief, minimum-wage adjustments, and targeted assistance can cushion pressures.
They matter for immediate household budgets.
Yet they do not alter the underlying divergence.
Higher minimum wages help those in formal employment but leave large informal segments untouched.
Subsidy rationalisation and fiscal consolidation may be necessary for medium-term sustainability, but without complementary reforms they risk further squeezing the lower arm in the short term.
The upper arm continues to benefit from global technology cycles and concentrated investment.
The lower arm continues to absorb cost pressures and wage stagnation.
Aggregate growth can coexist with eroding living standards for the majority, with an outcome that eventually undermines domestic demand, social cohesion, and political stability.
Pathways Toward a More Equitable Trajectory
Closing the K requires moving beyond labour-intensive, low-wage models toward an innovation-driven economy. This is not a slogan; it demands concrete shifts.
Malaysia needs to reduce structural dependence on low-cost foreign labour through higher levies (which would be controversial), stricter enforcement, and genuine incentives for firms to train and retain local workers.
Productivity-linked pay and skills upgrading must become central rather than peripheral.
The informal sector must move from the margins of policy to the centre.
Support should focus on raising incomes and capabilities within it, through accessible TVET and apprenticeship pathways in trades, value-addition initiatives for food, crafts, and small manufacturing, simplified formalisation that does not crush micro-operators, and better access to markets and working capital.
Raising earnings in the informal economy creates upward pressure on formal wages and reduces the pool of vulnerable workers.
Domestic and collaborative innovation must replace pure OEM dependence.
Firms need to move toward branded products, higher local content, and problem-solving research that addresses Malaysian conditions.
University and public R&D should prioritise commercialisation and societal challenges rather than paper outputs.
Regulatory burdens on SMEs should be eased; equity and licensing rules that deter scaling and investment require review.
Data-centre and high-tech investments carry their own risks, with high energy demand, limited local linkages, and competition from regional peers.
They should be assessed for genuine multiplier effects rather than accepted uncritically as markers of progress.
Neighbouring economies are competing for the same capital and talent; Malaysia’s advantage will depend on institutional quality, skills depth, and the ability to spread benefits beyond narrow enclaves.
Governance and institutional reform remain indispensable.
GLCs need to prioritise efficiency, innovation, and broad economic multipliers over rent extraction and dividend flows. Patronage networks that channel opportunity to the connected undermine merit and dynamism.
Progressive taxation that captures a greater share of capital gains and high incomes, combined with effective safety nets, can support those left behind without perpetuating dependency.
The Choice Ahead
Malaysia’s respectable growth numbers are real.
So is the lived experience of divergence. A K-shaped economy is sustainable only for a time.
Eventually, constrained domestic demand, talent loss, regional discontent, and political pressure will force the issue.
The upper arm cannot carry the entire economy indefinitely.
Broad-based prosperity requires deliberate attention to the lower arm, particularly the informal sector that remains the Achilles heel of Malaysian development. Transforming from a labour-intensive, rent-seeking model toward one centred on domestic innovation, higher productivity, and shared gains is not optional if Malaysia is to escape the middle-income trap and deliver rising living standards for the majority.
Anwar is correct that one budget cannot achieve this.
The harder work of structural reform, institutional change, and a genuine reorientation of policy toward those currently on the lower arm of the K remains ahead.
Without it, growth will continue, but shared prosperity will remain elusive. – October 12, 2026