Farid Alamdar is a public sector advisor in the Netherlands.
(Oct. 16, 2026 / JNS)
The fall of the Islamic Republic could bring an end to a struggle the Iranian people have waged for decades. But at that very moment, a new struggle may begin—not over who governs Iran but over who will wield influence over the Iran that emerges afterward.
Although many countries speak about Iran’s future, several major powers derive considerable advantages from the current situation.
China is perhaps the clearest example. International sanctions have made Iran heavily dependent on Beijing for its oil exports. China now purchases the overwhelming majority of Iranian oil exports—around 90% by some estimates—and benefits from buying that oil at discounted prices. An Iran that regains unrestricted access to European and Asian markets, attracts foreign investment and decides for itself where to sell its energy would be considerably less dependent on China.
Russia also has much to lose. Moscow and Tehran have grown increasingly close in recent years. Their strategic cooperation encompasses defense, energy, trade and efforts to reduce their dependence on Western financial systems. For Russia, the Islamic Republic is also an important partner in its confrontation with the West. A democratic Iran that normalizes relations with Europe and the United States could once again develop into an independent regional power, potentially costing Moscow an important strategic partner.
For Israel, the situation is fundamentally different. The disappearance of the Islamic Republic could remove one of Israel’s greatest archrivals: a regime that has advocated Israel’s destruction, developed a nuclear program and supported armed organizations fighting Israel for years. A free Iran could restore diplomatic relations with Israel and even eventually become an important economic and strategic partner.
But here, too, a more complicated question emerges. Israel clearly has an interest in a friendly Iran. A friendly Iran, however, is not the same as a dependent Iran. With nearly 90 million people, enormous oil and gas reserves, a strategic location and a predominantly young population, a free and modern Iran could eventually reemerge as an independent regional power.
Allies can be friendly without sharing the same interests. The question, therefore, is not only whether Israel, the United States and the Gulf states want a free Iran, but also how they will respond when Iran once again develops regional ambitions of its own.
This is precisely what makes the position of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi so interesting. He has repeatedly advocated a secular and democratic Iran, normalization of relations with Israel and, ultimately, the Iranian people’s freedom to choose their future form of government. His historic role, therefore, may not necessarily be to govern Iran, but to help bring the country to the point where Iranians can, for the first time, truly decide for themselves how they wish to be governed.
But once Iranians are able to determine their own future, foreign powers will lose some of their grip over the outcome. Washington may expect a democratic Iran to orient itself toward the West. Israel may hope for a strategic ally. China wants to protect its economic influence, while Russia seeks to preserve its geopolitical position. But none of these countries can determine what nearly 90 million Iranians will ultimately choose when they are genuinely free to vote.
They may choose close cooperation with the West and an explicitly pro-Israel foreign policy. But they may just as well choose a strongly nationalist Iran that maintains good relations with multiple power blocs and refuses to become dependent on any foreign power again.
The fall of the Islamic Republic would therefore transform more than Iran’s political landscape. It could trigger a struggle among foreign powers, each seeking to secure its position in the Iran that comes next.
Everyone today speaks about the liberation of Iran. But once Iranians are genuinely free to determine their own future and geopolitical direction, perhaps the most difficult struggle will have only just begun: Whether the rest of the world is prepared to accept their choice.