The U.S. midterm elections on Nov. 3 amount to a report card on the first two years of President Donald Trump's term. They are a watershed that will gauge his governing momentum for the rest of his term and the direction of the 2028 presidential race, while also shaping the terms of tariffs, investment in the United States and security cooperation between Seoul and Washington.
In the House, where sentiment to judge the administration is running strong, the Democratic Party has a good chance of reclaiming majority status. In the Senate, tight races in battleground states make it difficult to say with confidence whether Republicans will hold their majority. Political terrain in each state, candidate competitiveness and fundraising all matter, but Trump's approval rating is also a variable that cannot be ignored.
The decisive variable will be how voters feel the economy. Rising gasoline prices and grocery bills weigh more directly on voter judgment than the argument that tariffs will revive U.S. manufacturing. Fatigue over a prolonged war with Iran could translate into distrust of Trump's follow-through on his campaign pledges. A hard-line immigration crackdown could also drive moderates away.
If the Democrats take the House majority, they will tighten checks on the executive branch through hearings, investigations and budget reviews. If Republicans hold both chambers, Trump will gain momentum to push ahead with his existing policies. In either case, however, it is hard to expect trade pressure and burdens on South Korea to ease. A shift in the balance of Congress does not immediately strip the president of his trade authority. If anything, he may raise diplomatic and trade pressure even on allies to rally his base. That is why the government needs thorough preparation to defend the national interest in tariff and security negotiations.
The government must respond to Trump's political demands, which will intensify before and after the election, on the basis of what has already been agreed and the conditions for carrying it out. In tariff talks, the focus should be on stable implementation of existing agreements rather than expanding the agenda to new items. The $350 billion in investment in the United States that Seoul has already promised should also proceed under consistent principles of commercial viability and foreign exchange market stability. Agreeing on a total investment figure does not mean the scale, pace of execution and profitability of individual projects have been settled. In shipbuilding and semiconductor cooperation as well, concrete mechanisms are needed to guarantee opportunities for Korean companies to participate, the recovery of their investments and the protection of their technology.
The recent controversy over a former ruling party leader's U.S. visa and intelligence cooperation shows the need to manage the alliance carefully. Seoul must guard against trade friction spilling over into additional burdens on security issues such as defense cost sharing and U.S. Forces Korea. Nor should it overlook how Washington's policy of countering China after the midterms, and changes in the strategic role of U.S. Forces Korea, could affect security on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations.
The question we should be asking is not who wins the U.S. midterms but whether we are prepared to defend the national interest whatever the result. The government should draw up responses for each possible configuration of Congress and concentrate on reducing economic and security uncertainty. After the midterms, the central task for Korean diplomacy will be to build a comprehensive negotiating strategy spanning tariffs, security and investment in response to America First and demands for greater contributions from allies.