Péter Magyar has inherited a luxury most European leaders can only dream of: a kétharmad, Hungary’s politically formidable two-thirds parliamentary majority. After sixteen years, Viktor Orbán is out of power, and Hungary’s new prime minister has the votes to rewrite much of the country’s political rulebook. Unfortunately for him, Brussels plays by another set of rules. Winning an election does not automatically come with the keys to the European treasury.
Guest post by Costantino Pistilli
On 23 September, the European Commission proposed lifting financial measures imposed on Hungary in 2022, potentially releasing €4.2 billion in cohesion funding and restoring access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe for affected institutions. Brussels acknowledged progress on public procurement, anti-corruption safeguards and conflicts of interest. On 13 October, the Council approved the lifting of those measures. After years of disputes, Budapest finally had more than a promise: the restrictions were removed, although other financial conditions remain.
The European machinery has hardly slowed down. At the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg that same day, EU ministers examined Hungary’s position under Article 7 of the EU Treaty, the procedure launched in 2018 over rule-of-law concerns. Budapest outlined reforms already undertaken and further measures planned, while ministers also discussed the EU’s 2028–2034 budget. The meeting offered Magyar an early institutional test before his European partners. The financial breakthrough did not close the separate Article 7 procedure. Governments change. Brussels keeps its files.
For Magyar, the challenge is unusual. He has the parliamentary strength to dismantle much of Orbán’s institutional legacy, but must prove that the replacements will be independent of his own government. Replacing those in charge is relatively easy. Persuading them to respect limits on their power is another matter.
Some changes are already under way. In June, Parliament amended the Constitution to introduce an eight-year limit on the premiership. A broader constitutional amendment followed in July, addressing senior state institutions, the judiciary and the rules governing key legislation. These measures demonstrate Magyar’s willingness to use his supermajority. Whether they produce institutions less dependent on political power is a more demanding question.
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Consider the public-interest foundations established under Orbán, whose governance became a central issue in the dispute over European funding. Transparent appointments, independent audits and enforceable conflict-of-interest rules could help protect them from political interference. The same applies to public procurement: open competition and effective oversight would give Hungarian businesses a better chance of winning contracts without the right political connections. A two-thirds majority makes passing legislation easier. Earning public trust takes rather more than a parliamentary vote.
Poland offers a useful warning. Donald Tusk returned to government in December 2023 promising to restore judicial independence, only to discover how controversial the methods of institutional repair could become. Magyar faces a similar dilemma: how to dismantle a system of political control without building another one, merely changing who gives the orders.
For ordinary Hungarians, the consequences extend well beyond constitutional arguments. The Council’s decision has made €4.2 billion in cohesion funding available again, potentially supporting regional infrastructure and development. It has also reopened Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe opportunities for students and researchers at affected institutions. Yet other restrictions remain: approximately €3.5 billion in cohesion funding is subject to separate EU conditions. Unlocking one part of the money does not mean collecting the entire amount.
The next EU budget adds another complication. On 10 October, Ireland’s presidency of the Council presented a revised negotiating proposal for the 2028–2034 financial framework. Agriculture, regional development, competitiveness and security are competing for resources. Hungary will need practical allies, including countries such as Italy, which also have substantial interests in agricultural and cohesion funding. Political friendships help, but when billions are being divided, every capital reaches for its calculator.
Brussels, meanwhile, has its own credibility to defend. If Hungary meets the agreed conditions, its progress must be recognised regardless of who governs in Budapest. Otherwise, the suspicion that European funding depends partly on political sympathies will only grow. The standards applied to Orbán must also apply to Magyar. Equally, an electoral victory cannot erase unresolved legal concerns.
Hungary’s transition is therefore a test for both sides. Magyar can change institutions, while Brussels retains the authority to assess reforms and enforce financial conditions. The new prime minister must resist the temptation to inherit Orbán’s powers along with his office. The European Union must demonstrate that its rules remain consistent when the political landscape changes.
Magyar has achieved what once seemed improbable: replacing Orbán after sixteen years. His supermajority gives him the means to reshape Hungary, but also deprives him of a convenient excuse if reforms fail. The real achievement would be institutions capable of functioning independently when that majority is gone. Brussels, having demanded such independence for years, will have to demonstrate that it knows how to recognise it.
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*Costantino Pistilli is an Italian geopolitical analyst and author. His work has appeared in the Daily Express, Comment Central and Defensa.com. He has also contributed research and analysis to New Direction.