Based in the UK, Josh is a keen writer with a degree in Military History. Having worked previously as a financial journalist, he has covered the aviation industry extensively, reporting on airlines' results and monthly passenger statistics in the aftermath of the pandemic, alongside the likes of regulation around sustainable fuels, and the prospects for hydrogen-powered commercial flight. He joins Simple Flying with a lifelong love of all things aviation.
Boeing is in the midst of efforts to boost production of its best-selling passenger widebody. Having delivered approximately seven 787 Dreamliners per month in 2025, plans are to push this to ten come the end of this year. While an increase of roughly a third, the truth is the ramp-up is unlikely to deliver the level of profitability Boeing is seeking just yet.
Behind the outward success of the now two-decade-old Dreamliner program has been a struggle on Boeing’s part to claw back vast sums of money poured into developing and producing the aircraft. That is by no means uncommon — it takes billions of dollars to get a commercial airliner from the drawing board into service, of course. But for Boeing and the 787, despite stronger output today, the moment the widebody family finally begins generating financial returns at levels Boeing originally intended still seems far off after all these years. So, why is this?
Boeing 787 Production Actually Peaked Years Ago
In short, both strong demand and sustained, smooth production are needed for manufacturers like Boeing and its closest rival Airbus to recover the massive costs involved in selling aircraft to airlines. The 787 itself has largely done well in attracting customers, with Boeing racking up almost 2,500 orders from 90 customers globally thus far, so it is far from a failure in terms of demand. It is in supplying the jets and meeting this strong demand where Boeing has faced problems, however.
In 2006, just two years after the 787 program officially launched, Boeing set a production goal of 16 models per month. Cut forward to 2019, and the rate eventually peaked at 14 units. At this point, sluggish demand and trade tensions prompted successive decisions to slow output. This turned out to be insignificant, though, as the pandemic hit soon after and wreaked havoc on the entire supply chain globally.
Boeing 787 Dreamliner family specifications:
|
Specification |
787-8 |
787-9 |
787-10 |
|
Seats (two-class) |
200–275 |
250–325 |
300–375 |
|
MTOW |
502,500 lbs (227,930 kg) |
571,500 lbs (259,220 kg) |
574,000 lbs (260,360 kg) |
|
Range |
8,000 nautical miles (14,820 km) |
8,300 nautical miles (15,370 km) |
7,500 nautical miles (13,890 km) |
|
Length |
186 feet, 1 inch (56.7 meters) |
206 feet, 1 inch (62.8 meters) |
224 feet (68.3 meters) |
|
Wingspan |
197 feet, 3 inches (60.1 meters) |
197 feet, 3 inches (60.1 meters) |
197 feet, 3 inches (60.1 meters) |
|
Height |
55 feet, 6 inches (16.9 meters) |
55 feet, 10 inches (17.0 meters) |
55 feet, 10 inches (17.0 meters) |
|
Engine |
GEnx-1B by GE Aerospace / Trent 1000 by Rolls-Royce |
GEnx-1B by GE Aerospace / Trent 1000 by Rolls-Royce |
GEnx-1B by GE Aerospace / Trent 1000 by Rolls-Royce |
The years since have seen Boeing gradually rebuild capacity as the wider industry has recovered, albeit against the backdrop of heightened regulatory scrutiny over its quality control processes. Several production and delivery interruptions have continued to complicate the recovery and add to the program’s woes.
But Setbacks Have Added To Already-High Costs
Indeed, it is not just the last eight years that have brought about setbacks relating to the 787. Having outsourced production to some 50 suppliers early in the project, Boeing ran into issues just assembling the jet at first, leaving the type’s maiden flight to take place behind schedule. Later down the line, launch customer All Nippon Airways received its first 787 in 2011 — over three years after it had initially expected. Once in service, a battery system redesign was required by 2013 after fires onboard some aircraft forced emergency landings.
Needless to say, each setback costs Boeing more money, and the 787 program has faced its fair share over the years. According to aviation analyst Leeham News, forward losses, charges, and adjustments related to the 787 sat at just under $10.4bn alone as of July. Just before the first delivery to All Nippon Airways in 2011, too, Boeing was estimated by The Seattle Times to have poured $32bn-plus into the 787. These figures offer a glimpse into the massive financial burden of developing and building the 787. While the aircraft has proved a commercial success, Boeing has spent years dealing with the financial consequences of its development and production difficulties.
Based on Leeham News’s analysis, the gross margin on each 787 delivered is estimated to be around $35m. In other words, Boeing is said to generate about $35 million more in revenue than the costs of producing and selling each aircraft. However, where individual 787 deliveries can generate a positive gross margin, this does not account for all the wider costs associated with the program.
Boeing 787 Production Set For Further Boost
As mentioned, everything from the costs of operating the factory where the 787 is built, dating back to research and development, has to be accounted for. So where one newly built 787 could turn a profit over its own production cycle, it is the amount Boeing has spent on the program overall throughout the years that is really key.
Boeing’s answer to recover this is to, quite simply, build more 787s. No doubt, the demand is there today and should be for the foreseeable future, as reflected in Boeing’s own latest commercial market outlook. In this, the manufacturer forecasts the global airliner fleet to rise from just shy of 28,000 currently to more than 50,000 by 2045. Widebody numbers themselves are anticipated to balloon from approximately 4,500 today to roughly 8,300 in the meantime.
It is in this context that Boeing’s decision to take 787 production up to not just ten a month, but even more longer term by expanding its Boeing South Carolina site in North Charleston, makes sense. Through an extra $1bn worth of investment, Boeing is currently building a new final assembly building of similar size to the existing 1.2 million-square-foot (111,484 square meter) plant, along with a parts preparation area and upgraded interior component section. All told, this will help in pushing production past the ten-per-month milestone pegged for later this year.
New 787 Production Capacity Could Boost Profitability
Time will tell how many 787s Boeing ultimately ends up producing each month over the coming years. Either way, Leeham News' analysis suggests that a production rate of ten aircraft per month would be insufficient to make the economics of 787 production in South Carolina profitable.
As Leeham News’ Karl Sinclair wrote in July, increasing production from seven to ten aircraft per month would mean an additional 36 annual deliveries. At a gross margin of approximately $35 million per aircraft, this would mean an estimated additional $1.26bn annually compared with the seven-per-month baseline. “This is the current full production capacity of the Charleston facility," Sinclair flagged, "that would not get the division back into the black, hence the expansion plans.”
Boeing 787 Dreamliner deliveries to year-end 2025:
|
Year |
Number of deliveries |
|
2011 |
3 |
|
2012 |
46 |
|
2013 |
65 |
|
2014 |
114 |
|
2015 |
135 |
|
2016 |
137 |
|
2017 |
136 |
|
2018 |
145 |
|
2019 |
158 |
|
2020 |
53 |
|
2021 |
14 |
|
2022 |
31 |
|
2023 |
73 |
|
2024 |
51 |
|
2025 |
88 |
|
Total |
1,249 |
By stabilizing output beyond that point, though, Boeing could drastically boost its overall gross margins for the 787 family and achieve far more desirable financial performance. Using Leeham News’ figures, 12 extra 787s rolling off the production line a year — so one more each month — would generate roughly $420m in additional gross margin. Further increasing production to 14 aircraft per month, or 48 more deliveries annually than at a rate of ten, would therefore generate an estimated additional $1.68bn in annual gross margin.
But Only If 787 Output Can Be Smoothed Out And Sustained
There are several caveats to that, including the fact that Boeing does not publish specific data for how much each aircraft sale returns, so gross margin estimates could differ from reality. Another is that in order to achieve positive returns, Boeing must sustain stable production rates — a factor that is only partially within its control.
In September, Boeing’s leadership said at Morgan Stanley’s annual Laguna conference that engine deliveries from GE Aerospace were behind schedule and certification of new 787 seating configurations were taking longer than expected. A plan was in place regarding the engine supply, the company assured. Production flow was also said to be otherwise stable, having reached eight per month after a pause in the spring. In turn, deliveries were reported in October to have hit 62 for the first nine months of the year.
Boeing 787 deliveries over the first nine months of 2026:
|
Period |
Number of deliveries |
|
First quarter |
15 |
|
Second quarter |
25 |
|
Third quarter |
22 |
|
Total |
62 |
|
Average per month |
6.9 |
Nonetheless, such examples offer insight into some of the problems Boeing is working against going forward. All of this is bound by a timeline of sorts too, with 787 demand inevitably set to taper off over time. As a result, it is really a case of getting to a point where 787s can be rolled out and delivered faster and more efficiently sooner rather than later.
Boeing 787 Order Backlog Supports Production Ramp-Up
On Boeing’s part, the question of how to do that has been made easier by the hefty backlog it has for the 787. Citing 1,150 unfilled orders as of July, Leeham News noted firm purchases “barely supported” the 14 aircraft per month production rate Boeing would need to hit to start seeing serious returns from its 787s. Factoring in options held by airlines and letters of intent, as well as the fact the expanded Charleston facility could one day handle a new program, left the target far more viable in analysts’ eyes, though.
Unsurprisingly, Boeing’s own thinking mirrors pushing output to such a level. “We do have plans to go to 14 in time. Our second assembly facility is under construction today [and] we expect that to be complete next year,” chief financial officer Jay Malave clarified in September. Beyond that, it was “a matter of just catching up to the profitability” and “exceeding what we have on our average booking rates,” he added.
Boeing was approached for comment by Simple Flying.
