Athens and Ankara have entered a spiral of confrontation with signs of dangerous escalation, over not just a show of flags but a claim to vital space in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum by Benghazi as well, which signals Ankara’s complete dominance over all of divided Libya, two camps with conflicting priorities and completely opposite approaches to the delimitation of maritime zones are taking shape in the wider region.
On one side are Greece, Israel and Egypt, with the clear support of the European Union, both at the institutional level and from all 27 member states. On the other side is Turkey, which, with Libya as its satellite and the illegal memorandum as its spearhead, is trying to become the hegemonic power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, despite the immediate and broad support it secured from partners and allies, Athens must weigh the new reality on its own and chart a long-term strategy to counter Ankara’s expansionist ambitions. The turn the “Libya affair” has taken, namely Greece’s inability to build footholds in the vast North African country against Turkey’s growing influence, has caused understandable concern at the Foreign Ministry.
In this fluid landscape, the government must from now on successfully manage the following major issues: completing the Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection project, ensuring the smooth start of US company Chevron’s surveys south of Crete, and limiting migration flows from Libya. All of them carry the risk of a dispute with Turkey.
NEWSLETTER TABLE TALK
Never miss a story.
Subscribe now.
The most important news & topics every week in your inbox.
The Defeat in Libya and the Day After
According to the prevailing view, the Turkey-Libya memorandum may “produce no legal effects,” but it still creates unpleasant facts on the ground. If international initiatives to unify post-civil war Libya succeed, particularly the US initiative, Greece will constantly face the memorandum as official state policy and not as the result of outside pressure on one of the two rival sides. Turkey and Libya are therefore now entering the arena of Eastern Mediterranean delimitation together, aiming to squeeze Greece’s vital space down to its 6-nautical-mile territorial waters. According to this view, in violation of the basic provisions of the Law of the Sea, the Greek islands have no sovereign rights, the Turkish continental shelf cuts the Aegean in half, and the “Blue Homeland” dominates, creating a border between Turkey and Libya that does not actually exist.
The only concrete challenge to the Turkey-Libya memorandum in the Eastern Mediterranean remains the delimited Exclusive Economic Zone between Greece and Egypt. The two sides are now discussing expanding the agreement geographically, sending a message to Libya and, above all, to Ankara, which has long pressed Cairo for a similar arrangement, promising greater benefits.
As Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis said on Mega News 104.6, however, it “was not in Greece’s hands” to prevent the ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum. Formally, the countdown began recently with the removal of Aguila Saleh from the post of speaker of the House of Representatives. In practice, however, Ankara’s rapprochement with eastern Libya was already signaled in August 2025, when MIT intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Field Marshal Haftar in Benghazi. In reality, despite efforts to build economic and trade ties and Gerapetritis’s repeated visits to the region, it became clear that Athens was never in a position to offset the scale of Turkish influence.
As an informed source confirms, Greece’s inability to supply defense equipment to the Haftar regime was the turning point in relations with Benghazi. At the same time, Ankara, without any kind of commitment, supports the field marshal and his sons in many ways, especially Saddam, who is being groomed as his successor and possibly as a presidential candidate. “Turkey has no restrictions. It can send equipment anywhere without being accountable to anyone, not even at home. That is not the case in Greece,” says a diplomat familiar with the discussions, highlighting the scale of the problem.
More broadly, there is skepticism in Athens about the “superiority of the means of influence” Turkey has in the wider region. Its defense industry exports generously, giving the country the ability to conclude defense agreements, while investment capital is directed abroad in a targeted way to deepen diplomatic ties.
Chevron and the Cable
Attention is now turning to the waters south of Crete, where US energy giant Chevron is expected to begin operations by the end of the year. The surveys concern offshore blocks, parts of which are included in the Turkey-Libya memorandum. Government officials insist that the plans will go ahead as normal, with Athens presenting the US presence as the strongest confirmation of Greek sovereign rights in the area. “The memorandum is effectively rendered void,” they say. However, since Libya, with Turkey’s help, challenged in a note verbale to the UN (July 2025) the Greek median line on which the “Crete-1” and “Crete-2” blocks were drawn, there is keen interest in whether Ankara will move against the US company, and therefore against the United States. For now, what cannot be overlooked is that after the memorandum’s ratification, the State Department followed its usual line of equal distance, calling on Greece and Turkey to “work it out.”
At the same time, the issuing of the NAVTEX for the resumption of surveys for the cable between Crete and Cyprus is being slightly delayed. Despite the government’s assurances to the contrary, consultations between Greece, France and Turkey are in full swing, aiming to find the right formula so that the project is not obstructed by the Turkish armed forces. Ankara appears to accept a solution based on written notification, while Athens insists that the French side is requesting permission solely from the Greek authorities. However, even this option, which notably is not provided for in international law and is considered by officials to be “novel and a compromise,” creates facts on the ground that Turkey will invoke from now on. Following this logic, although the project will be completed as planned, in substance Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s declaration is being put into practice: “No project will take place without our permission or approval.”
In this context, and given that the communication channel between Gerapetritis and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is not working as it did in the past, Athens is trying to decode Fidan’s statement to TA NEA, which many interpret as a “window” for an understanding so that the surveys can be completed smoothly. “What we ask is that when a ship conducts surveys at sea, it sends us a written notification, not just a verbal one, stating: ‘We are going to carry out specific activities in this specific area, here are the coordinates,’” Fidan said, adding that Ankara does not want “the status quo to be disturbed, or a precedent (editor’s note: a fait accompli) to be created in a completely wrong way.”
In short, since Ankara refers to preserving this particular status quo, it is signaling that the area where the surveys will take place belongs to the Turkish continental shelf, over which only Turkey has the authority to issue the relevant permits.
This is obviously not acceptable to Athens, which will be reflected in the NAVTEX and counter-NAVTEX notices expected to be issued legally by the Greek authorities and illegally by the Turkish authorities. It remains to be seen whether the majority stake held by France’s Meridiam in the project will keep the coming confrontation within diplomatic bounds, without spilling over into the field.
The Migration “Bomb”
Returning to eastern Libya, it should be noted that mediation to meet Benghazi’s demands to the European Union on managing migration does not appear to have worked effectively either. As a relevant source reminds ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ, it was the Greek government that negotiated for European funds, previously directed exclusively to the transitional government in Tripoli, to be shared with Benghazi as well. Just ten days ago, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen co-signed the provision of 25 million euros to the Haftar regime as an “extension of migration cooperation in eastern Libya.”
Following the latest developments, Athens is inclined to raise obstacles to the funding of Benghazi, depending on how migration flows develop. The numbers, however, are discouraging: since the start of the year, arrivals from eastern Libya to Crete have exceeded 19,000, with a surge recorded in the past week as well, although this has not been officially linked to the growing Turkish presence in Benghazi. Still, no one can rule out a new weaponization of migration as a hybrid threat against Greece and the European Union. Despite warnings about controlling the “funding protocols” to Libya, Athens knows that the issue requires delicate handling so that the country does not face an unmanageable migration situation like the one in Ceuta.