Somalia’s domestic instability is being compounded by sharpened regional rivalries, paving the way for a more entrenched conflict as seen elsewhere in the Horn of Africa.
16 October, 2026
Somalia has been embroiled in a political crisis since May 2026, when the term of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was originally due to expire. Parliament passed constitutional amendments in March that extended presidential terms to five years, keeping President Hassan Sheikh in office until May 2027.
This was disputed by Somalia’s opposition alliance, a coalition of political figures including the leadership of the federal member states of Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south, as well as the former president of South West State, Abdiaziz Laftagareen. This week, the opposition also rejected the electoral commission’s unilateral announcement that parliamentary and presidential polls would take place in April and May 2027.
The political crisis has sparked fierce clashes in Mogadishu and the city of Baidoa in South West State. The recent fighting around Baidoa, between government forces and opposition-allied fighters loyal to Laftagreen, reportedly involved thousands of fighters and the use of drones and fighter jets.
The federal government, along with its allied federal member state administrations – South West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug – controls most major cities in southern and central Somalia, while Jubaland, in the far south, is at odds with Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization, controls much of the surrounding countryside. Meanwhile, the administrations of Puntland and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland govern much of the north, with the newly created and federal government-aligned North East State squeezed in-between.
High stakes amid regional tensions
This is not Somalia’s first experience of constitutional disputes leading to armed clashes, with similar conflict occurring in 2021. But the stakes are higher this time, as the balance of power within the federal system is at stake. The opposition accuses the current federal government under President Hassan Sheikh of seeking to consolidate power in Mogadishu at the expense of the states.
The conflict in Somalia is also taking place in a region that has increasingly become the focus of escalating rivalries between foreign powers in a complex web of alliances. Two broad, fluid blocs have taken shape: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are seen as broadly aligned with Sudan’s Armed Forces and Eritrea in the region, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel are seen as broadly aligned with Ethiopia.
In Somalia’s current political crisis, Turkey and the UAE are the two most important external actors. Turkey is seen as backing the federal government, while the UAE has relations with the opposition state administrations.
These dynamics are helping to both incentivize new alliances and deepen divisions. Given the existing domestic volatility, there is a serious compound risk of newly entrenched conflict.
Turkey and the UAE
Turkey has been engaged in Somalia for over a decade, primarily but not exclusively through the federal government in Mogadishu. Its initial involvement concentrated on humanitarian and development initiatives. It has also run a military training camp for the Somali armed forces since 2017.
Turkey has drawn closer to the Hassan Sheikh administration since 2024 after signing several strategic agreements with Mogadishu. This prompted some opposition figures to question Turkey’s neutrality in the context of the current conflict over the presidential term extension. Turkey has rejected accusations of political interference and says its position is consistent with its support for Somalia’s federal government institutions.
However, more recently, Turkish fighter jets were reportedly involved in the fighting near Baidoa. This has not been confirmed by Ankara, but would constitute a notable direct intervention against armed political opposition.
The UAE established multi-layered ties with the current federal government and some of the country’s federal member states. However, in January 2026, Somalia’s federal government annulled all its defence and security cooperation agreements with the UAE, accusing it of undermining Somalia’s national sovereignty.
This move coincided with the Saudi-Emirati rift in Yemen. Days before annulling the agreements, Somalia launched an investigation after the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen accused Abu Dhabi of facilitating the evacuation of a Yemeni separatist leader to the UAE via Berbera and Mogadishu. Somalia then signed defence agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with diplomatic support from Turkey and Egypt.
The UAE has maintained direct relations with Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland, with Emirati firms maintaining significant interests in port operations. All of these regional administrations had rejected the cancellation of the agreements by Mogadishu.
Retaining influence with the leadership in each territory is therefore critical to the UAE’s wider strategy in the Horn of Africa. But its relations with the federal states opposed to Mogadishu are contributing to further inflaming tensions.
Domestic drivers
Local actors are also increasingly looking outwards for foreign backing to shore up their domestic interests and legitimacy. To attract support, both the federal government and the opposition are making efforts to show that their domestic influence aligns with the interests of external actors.
This appeal to foreign players is driven by multiple factors. Key among them is the profound political division among Somali political actors, and the persistent failure to genuinely address these divisions. To counterbalance their local political rivals, competing domestic elites are therefore seeking to offer strategic incentives to external powers such as port investments, economic partnerships, transport corridors and military bases.
The federal government’s controversial constitutional and electoral reforms have solidified these divisions. Some federal member states and Somaliland feel threatened by Mogadishu’s consolidation of power, backed by Turkey’s reported military support and investments.
Shifting regional geopolitical dynamics are also increasing the leverage available to domestic actors in Somalia. The Houthis’ advance in Yemen has once again exposed the importance of the Bab al-Mandab Strait connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, reinforcing Somalia’s strategic location. The Houthis reportedly have growing relations with al-Shabaab in Somalia.
The risks of deepening war
Somalia has been embroiled in armed conflicts for over three decades. No single entity – whether a clan, a specific administration or a regional government – has been able to dominate the rest and rule the entire country.
However, the escalation of current armed clashes between political opponents, and the involvement of more sophisticated weaponry, points to a new chapter. Local actors are increasingly seeking external support and new alliances as a counterbalance to rising threats.
For example, a minister from Laftagareen’s former South West State administration recently stated that their forces used drones in the latest Baidoa conflict and said they would accept drones from any external power. In the north, Puntland and Somaliland formed an alliance in response to the federal government establishing North East State in 2025. These dynamics risk a widening conflict fuelled by the support of foreign powers.
Furthermore, these armed conflicts provide an opportunity for terrorist organizations active in Somalia, such as al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. During political crises, security operations against these groups often decline considerably, allowing them to recover and regroup. The deepening armed conflicts between the federal government and opposition groups offers these organizations an opportunity to expand their influence within a multi-layered conflict.
Given these broader stakes, it is in the interests of all external parties who have relations with the federal government and member states to pursue options for de-escalation between Somali political actors. Considering their intersection with wider regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, it is also vital that de-escalation efforts are triangulated through regional institutions such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
In the short term, there is a need to facilitate dialogue that can pave the way for an inclusive political agreement on constitutional amendments, electoral issues and interim governance arrangements, with a realistic timetable until elections can be held. Without such an agreement, the risk of a wider protracted conflict will continue to rise.
