A 100-day plan to keep Joburg’s lights on

Whoever wins control of Johannesburg on 4 November will inherit an electricity utility in deep trouble. City Power’s infrastructure is deteriorating, its finances are precarious, much of the electricity it buys never becomes revenue, and it has been without permanent leadership for long periods. 

Today City Power operates with an acting CEO, and 122 of its 278 professionally qualified posts are vacant. The utility has failed to generate enough revenue to cover its costs for several years, while rising Eskom prices, electricity theft, illegal connections and customers moving to alternatives such as rooftop solar are putting further pressure on its finances. By 2025, it was running a deficit of R4.3-billion.

Between July 2025 and March 2026, City Power reported 2.1 million forced interruptions. It took 11 hours on average to restore each one, and customers went without electricity for an average of 20.6 hours over the period. In some cases they went without for weeks. Sixty percent of outages were caused by deteriorating and outdated networks, and City Power puts its infrastructure backlog at R44.25-billion. 

So, what is to be done?

Many of the mayoral candidates have argued for collapsing some or all of the City’s entities back into the municipal administration. But, while the sentiment is understandable, this is the wrong approach at this time. 

Collapsing them now will create far more challenges than any possible benefits that may eventually materialise. It would change where the functions sit without addressing the problems that have left the utilities unable to deliver, and it would bog down the entire city administration in a very big restructuring process when what is required is the urgent restoration of reliable service delivery.

The immediate task

That does not mean the current arrangement is sacred. It is not clear whether the ideal approach in the long run is to allow City Power to continue as a separate entity. But that is a question to settle from a position of strength rather than crisis. The immediate task is to get City Power and other utilities responsible for basic services – Johannesburg Water, Pikitup – working again.

Four things matter most: 

1. Fix the leadership, starting with the board and the CEO and then getting the right people into mission-critical positions. 

2. Implement ring-fencing so that City Power has real control and certainty over the revenue it generates. 

3. Radically improve revenue collection by sorting out customer and property records, improving meter reading and resolving billing disputes, while implementing a firm but fair strategy to cut off customers who fail to pay. 

4. Bring in the private sector, with an emphasis on practical, accountable and transparent service and performance-based contracts.

There is a fifth requirement that cuts across all four: rebuilding trust between the City and its residents. That will not come from promises. It requires credible professional appointments, clear deadlines and measurable commitments, followed by regular public reporting on what has and has not been achieved. Residents need to know what the City has promised, who is responsible for delivering it and whether deadlines have been met.

None of this can happen at once. But a new administration will need to tackle the crisis with the utmost urgency from the moment it assumes office.

The Centre for Development and Enterprise’s new report includes a strategy for the first 100 days, developed by a senior businessman with experience in electricity utility turnaround and management. The plan’s logic is simple: “It is imperative to do a few decisive things in the right order: stabilise leadership, secure the cash, stop the bleeding, keep the lights on. Sequence ruthlessly, and crucially, say where the people and money will come from.”

A crisis executive

In the first month, the mayor should appoint an empowered, time-bound crisis executive with a small war room, reporting directly to the mayor. This should be a credible interim leader with strong electricity distribution and turnaround experience, brought in to stabilise City Power while the City runs a rigorous process to recruit the right permanent CEO. The crisis executive should not become a substitute for permanent management.

In the same month, the job descriptions and appointment criteria for the CEO and CFO should be published, covering appropriate qualifications, utility experience, turnaround capability, integrity, procurement discipline and the ability to deal with Eskom, regulators and lenders. Recruitment should be launched against those criteria, and the board reconstituted using clear, published criteria. If Eskom debt is out of control again, negotiate an enforcement standstill in exchange for full, on-time payment of the current account from day one. High-risk contracts should be reviewed, with verification required before any payment.

The second month is about stopping the bleeding. Launch a staged smart-prepayment programme in the five highest-loss areas, with revenue-protection teams working alongside it to identify illegal connections and meter tampering. Then open what the plan calls the grand bargain: host town-hall meetings in the three most-affected service delivery centres, present a clear plan, give tough messages, make an arrears normalisation offer and record the commitments made. Commission a three-year financial recovery plan and develop a debt-resolution menu with the National Treasury.

The final stretch is about locking it in and showing progress. Appoint a permanent CEO and CFO. Show the first measurable reduction in losses and improvement in collection in the target zones. Return to the same town halls to report progress against what was promised. And publish the first quarterly progress report, being honest about what hasn’t worked.

A scorecard of measurable indicators

Underpinning all of this should be a scorecard of around 12 measurable indicators, each with a baseline, a Year One target, a reporting frequency and a named accountable executive. It should track everything from cash collection and payment of the Eskom current account to electricity losses, billing accuracy, outage restoration, maintenance, vacancies and irregular expenditure. Results should be published regularly so residents can see whether the turnaround is working. 

A 100-day plan cannot fix City Power, let alone Johannesburg. But it can establish whether a new administration is serious about reform: whether it is prepared to make credible appointments, take difficult decisions, establish clear priorities and hold itself publicly accountable for results.

Johannesburg’s voters have a vital role to play. Parties and candidates seeking to govern the City should be pressed to explain concretely before the election on 4 November how they will restore reliable electricity, water and refuse collection, who they will put in charge, what they will do first and how residents will know whether they are succeeding.

The outcome of the elections is critical for the future of the city. Will the voters elect new leadership committed to a clear reform programme and the capacity and determination to implement it? The City is being looted and service delivery is collapsing. Another five years of “more of the same” politics and senior appointments that take little account of merit will be disastrous and can only lead to further deterioration. 

The first 100 days at City Power after November this year will be an important test of whether Johannesburg has started to turn the corner. DM

This article is based on ‘Powering Joburg’s Turnaround’, the fourth report in Johannesburg Matters: Fixing South Africa’s Growth Engine, a new Centre for Development and Enterprise series.