One justification for war with Iran was that time was running out. Tehran, Israelis were told, was “racing” toward nuclear weapons, “a step away” from a bomb.
Yet Iran has been near the nuclear threshold for years. Its distance from a weapon has never depended solely on centrifuges, enriched uranium, or the time needed to produce fissile material. US intelligence assessed that Tehran had acquired capabilities bringing it close to the threshold but had not decided to cross it. A crucial barrier was political.
Six months into the war, it is difficult to say that barrier has strengthened. Nuclear facilities have been damaged, but subsequent US intelligence assessments do not indicate a significant increase in the time Iran would need to produce a weapon.
Questions remain about its enriched uranium stockpile, while discussion in Iran about crossing the threshold has become more open. The war has also opened a front in the Strait of Hormuz and increased Israel’s diplomatic costs, particularly in the United States. Whether it has made Israel safer from nuclear threats remains unclear.
The only effort in the past decade that successfully imposed agreed, monitored, verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program was diplomatic. The 2015 agreement dramatically reduced its enriched uranium stockpile, restricted enrichment and centrifuges, and introduced extensive monitoring.
The International Atomic Energy Agency and Western intelligence assessments found Iran compliant with its core nuclear commitments. Missiles, proxies, and other security issues could – and still can – be addressed separately.
When the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally in May 2018 and reimposed sanctions, the IAEA was still verifying compliance. Iran began exceeding the limits afterward. Israel’s push for US withdrawal, followed by the shift from diplomacy to war, demands a sober assessment of this strategy’s costs.
A low-risk diplomatic option remains largely unknown to Israelis. Since 2019, regional states have gathered annually at UN headquarters in New York for the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Its seventh session takes place this November. Iran and the Arab states participate. Israel is invited but stays away.
Israel has long argued that disarmament cannot be separated from regional security; that arrangements must be developed by regional states with their consent; and that states cannot relinquish capabilities considered essential while remaining in conflict with their neighbors.
It has rightly opposed focusing exclusively on its nuclear capabilities while ignoring missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and other threats. These concerns remain relevant.
They do not, however, require postponing disarmament discussions until peace, recognition, normalization, and extensive confidence-building measures have been achieved. Arab states see this approach as an endless series of prerequisites before weapons of mass destruction reach the table.
Peace, confidence-building, arms control, and disarmament can advance in parallel. War only increases the need for communication, escalation prevention, monitoring, and agreements.
Changing the regional landscape
Participation in November would not require Israel to relinquish weapons attributed to it, join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), abandon nuclear ambiguity, or accept a future treaty in advance. The conference operates by consensus: regional states participate, and decisions cannot be imposed on Israel.
Several longstanding Israeli demands are therefore already met. If Israel wants missiles, delivery systems, escalation prevention, regional security, and confidence-building on the agenda, it should make those demands inside the room.
Participation could itself build mutual confidence. Israel would discuss weapons of mass destruction directly with its neighbors without committing to an outcome. Arab states and Iran would have to accept Israel as a full, equal negotiating partner.
This would not constitute normalization: states conditioning full relations on ending the occupation and reaching an Israeli-Palestinian settlement could retain their positions. But accepting Israel as a legitimate participant would matter to a country that has long insisted recognition and regional relations are essential to disarmament.
The United States also stays away. Alongside its own reservations, Washington has linked its absence to incomplete regional participation and Israel’s opposition to the format.
An Israeli shift could enable an American one. The government formed after October’s elections could invite Washington to join it in November. After months of confrontation with Iran, this would be a significant diplomatic gesture without advance commitments to disarmament, NPT accession, or an unwritten treaty.
There are precedents. Israel participated in Arms Control and Regional Security talks with Arab states in the 1990s and consultations on a weapons of mass destruction conference in 2013–2014; Iran attended one meeting.
Beginning in 1980, Israel joined the UN General Assembly consensus supporting a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East for over two decades, while retaining reservations about how to achieve it. Attending November’s conference would revive a tradition of raising objections and demanding conditions while continuing to talk.
Meanwhile, the regional landscape is changing. Saudi Arabia is expanding its civilian nuclear program and security alliances, including the Mecca Agreement with Turkey and nuclear-armed Pakistan. Iran is reconsidering its nuclear future, and another confrontation remains possible.
Burying one’s nuclear head in the sand does not preserve freedom of action. It leaves others free to shape the reality Israel must confront.
The next government should arrive in New York with Israel’s security interests, reservations, demands, and proposals – and ask Washington to join it. It need not commit to disarmament. Entering the room does not endanger Israel’s security. In today’s regional reality, remaining outside requires an explanation.
The writer is a guest writer at the Mitvim Institute and an advocate for eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. She is the founder and executive director of the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO).