Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s call for Malaysia and Egypt to expand educational cooperation beyond Islamic studies is strategically sound.
Indeed, it should be understood as part of a larger effort to strengthen Malaysia’s geopolitical depth in the Middle East and North Africa.
Egypt is not merely a centre of Islamic civilisation.
It is one of the nine pivotal states whose affairs can affect the whole region — not unlike Algeria, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico.
It is a massive Arab and African power whose geography, diplomatic influence and control of the Suez Canal make it indispensable to international trade and regional security.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s state visit to Malaysia on Oct 10, 2026, is more than just another diplomatic exchange.
It offers both countries an opportunity to elevate their longstanding relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership.
Anwar’s emphasis on engineering, medicine, electrical and electronics, artificial intelligence and digital technology reflects an appreciation that modern diplomacy must combine intellectual cooperation with economic and technological capabilities.
Al-Azhar University will remain central to Malaysia’s religious and educational relationship with Egypt.
Its intellectual tradition of moderation, or “wasatiyyah”, continues to provide an important foundation for Islamic scholarship.
Yet bilateral cooperation cannot remain confined to religious education when the geopolitical environment surrounding both countries has become increasingly complicated.
Malaysia needs strategic depth beyond Southeast Asia.
This means cultivating durable relationships with countries capable of providing diplomatic access, economic opportunities, technological collaboration and strategic understanding across several regions.
Egypt offers precisely such an opportunity.
Situated at the intersection of Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, Mediterranean and the Middle East, Egypt occupies a geographical position that few countries can replicate.
Its control of the Suez Canal gives Cairo enormous strategic relevance.
The canal connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, making it one of the world’s most important maritime passages.
For Malaysia, whose economy depends heavily on international trade, disruptions along this corridor can produce serious consequences.
The Red Sea cannot be understood separately from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects it to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
Persistent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis against maritime traffic have demonstrated how non-state actors can threaten international shipping, insurance costs and energy security.
Further east, the Strait of Hormuz remains another critical maritime chokepoint through which substantial quantities of global oil and liquefied natural gas move.
Although Egypt does not control either Bab el-Mandeb or Hormuz, its diplomatic networks and proximity to the Red Sea make it an important partner in understanding these interconnected vulnerabilities.
Malaysia must therefore develop a more sophisticated strategic appreciation of the Middle East and North Africa, the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz.
Such understanding cannot be acquired through occasional diplomatic visits alone.
It requires sustained cooperation among universities, maritime institutions, defence establishments, intelligence analysts and diplomatic academies.
Joint research on maritime security, supply-chain resilience, energy transportation and regional conflict management would provide immediate benefits.
Malaysia and Egypt could establish specialised academic programmes examining how instability in West Asia affects Southeast Asian economies.
Their universities could also cooperate in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, medicine, semiconductor technologies and renewable energy.
These initiatives would help transform educational exchanges into instruments of long-term strategic capacity.
The economic foundations are also already strengthening.
Malaysia could use Egypt as a gateway into African and Mediterranean markets, while Egypt could benefit from Malaysia’s established industrial networks and connections throughout Asean.
Both countries should also deepen defence dialogue, particularly in maritime awareness, military education and professional training.
This need not imply a military alliance. Strategic partnerships can strengthen resilience without creating unnecessary security obligations.
Malaysia’s foreign policy has traditionally emphasised non-alignment, constructive engagement and Asean centrality.
Closer cooperation with Egypt would complement rather than contradict these principles.
Indeed, Asean’s strategic interests increasingly extend beyond its immediate geographical boundaries.
Disruptions in the Red Sea or Hormuz can affect Malaysian manufacturers, exporters, consumers and energy markets.
Geographical distance no longer guarantees economic insulation.
The proposed Malaysia-Egypt strategic partnership should consequently be measured not by ceremonial declarations but by tangible institutional achievements.
Joint research centres, student exchanges, investment projects, maritime dialogues and coordinated diplomatic initiatives would demonstrate genuine progress.
Ultimately, Malaysia and Egypt possess complementary strengths.
Egypt offers geographical centrality, diplomatic experience and access to Africa and the Arab world. Malaysia contributes technological capabilities, industrial experience and connectivity to Southeast Asia.
By moving decisively beyond Islamic studies while preserving their historical educational bonds, both countries can construct a partnership capable of navigating an increasingly uncertain international order.
For Malaysia, strategic depth in the Middle East and North Africa is no longer a diplomatic luxury. It is becoming a geopolitical necessity.
The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.