President Trump has recently developed a renewed appreciation for the importance of elections. Unfortunately for Venezuelans, he seems to have discovered it in Ukraine. Last week, he called for Volodymyr Zelensky to face voters, apparently unconvinced that an ongoing Russian invasion and martial law constitute sufficient reasons to postpone an election. In Venezuela, where his administration removed Nicolás Maduro nine months ago, elections would apparently be premature.
There are legitimate reasons to prepare carefully for elections, particularly given the condition of Venezuela’s electoral institutions. But nine months into the transition, the more interesting question is no longer simply why Delcy Rodríguez and Washington might prefer to postpone them. It is whether other actors, including some of those who have spent years demanding political change, are developing reasons to prefer the current arrangement as well.
Results amid uncertainty
Every additional month gives the ruling elite more time to influence the terms under which its own future will be decided. Cooperation in the oil industry is advancing, economic relations are being restored, and American companies have opportunities that were largely unavailable before Maduro’s removal. An election would introduce uncertainty into a relationship that has become increasingly useful to the Trump administration. That does not mean Washington has abandoned the idea of elections, but it does mean that postponing them carries fewer immediate costs than it otherwise might.
The calculation is not limited to governments and foreign investors. Venezuelan businesses are also beginning to see opportunities in the new environment. The prospect of renewed oil production, investment in electricity infrastructure, fewer financial restrictions, and improved international connections offers reasons to invest in a country that many had spent years trying to leave.
What happens if Venezuelans begin to associate the present arrangement with the prospect of economic recovery?
For a sector of Venezuelan society, the appeal may be even simpler. After years of economic collapse, shortages, political confrontation, and mass emigration, the possibility of a more normal life matters enormously. People want reliable electricity, decent wages, functioning businesses, and the ability to travel, save, and plan for the future.
What happens if Venezuelans begin to associate the present arrangement with the prospect of economic recovery? A Venezuelan can continue supporting María Corina Machado while becoming increasingly reluctant to jeopardize the economic opportunities that Washington’s accommodation with Delcy appears to offer. And those opportunities do not even have to materialize fully for the calculation to change. Businesses make investments based on expectations, families make plans around the possibility of better incomes, and people who have spent years waiting for conditions to improve may be understandably hesitant to embrace another period of uncertainty. Their political preferences may remain exactly where they were, even as their willingness to bear the costs of political change begins to diminish.
The model of a tolerable status quo
This creates a peculiar possibility for Venezuela’s transition. The government could become more difficult to dislodge without becoming more popular. Economic normalization could make the existing arrangement increasingly tolerable to people who would still vote to replace it if given the opportunity. And the longer elections are postponed, the more time those expectations have to develop into economic interests that depend, or appear to depend, on the continuation of the status quo. Supporting political change and accepting the practical benefits of the present arrangement are not mutually exclusive.
This distinction matters because Delcy does not need to become popular for her government to become easier to live with. Nor does chavismo need to recover the support it enjoyed under Hugo Chávez. It may be enough that Venezuelans who would prefer a different government become increasingly reluctant to risk the improvements they are beginning to anticipate.
For traditional opposition parties, parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections offer opportunities that a presidential contest does not.
That creates a problem for the opposition. Machado may retain considerable popular support, but popular support does not automatically translate into pressure for an election. People can agree about who they want to govern them while disagreeing about how urgently the question needs to be settled, particularly when the alternative appears to involve another period of uncertainty.
The negotiating opposition may have reasons of its own to be comfortable with a slower timetable. For traditional opposition parties, parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections offer opportunities that a presidential contest does not. These are elections in which established party organizations, local networks, and political machinery matter considerably more than the popularity of any single national leader. Holding them before a presidential election could allow those parties to rebuild their institutional presence and strengthen their negotiating position within the opposition, including in relation to Machado. That does not mean they necessarily oppose her becoming president, or that they are deliberately working to postpone an election. But the order in which elections are held could have significant consequences for the balance of power within the opposition itself.
A frozen trip to democracy
There is, of course, another possibility. Economic recovery could strengthen civil society, give independent businesses more room to operate, and make a democratic transition easier. The return of investment and international connections need not come at the expense of political freedom.
The trouble is that nothing about economic normalization guarantees democratization, particularly when the institutions that determine whether elections take place remain under the control of the existing government.
Today’s Venezuelan authorities have taken a different approach. Elections are something to be held after the necessary reforms, agreements, and guarantees have been secured. Some of those conditions are reasonable, but without a deadline there is little to prevent the process from continuing indefinitely. The government can always identify another problem to resolve, Washington can always find another reason to prioritize stability, and some businesses and private sector leaders can always argue that the country needs more time to consolidate its recovery.
The danger is not necessarily that Delcy Rodríguez herself intends to remain interim president forever. It is that an arrangement nobody originally expected to last may become sufficiently useful, or simply tolerable, that ending it stops being an urgent priority.
Venezuelans do not have to choose between economic recovery and democracy. But unless elections become a concrete part of the political process, they may find themselves enjoying some of the benefits of a transition without ever reaching its intended destination.