Elite capture and the hybrid pretext: Deconstructing governor’s rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Emergency rule and governor’s rule have been imposed under Articles 232 and 234 of Pakistan’s Constitution in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), the country’s northwestern province bordering Afghanistan and a strategic fault line for regional militancy and anti-establishment political resistance. The province is now under the control of federally appointed Governor Faisal Karim Kundi, whose own electoral record includes defeats in 2002, 2013, and 2018. In the 2024 general elections, he finished a distant third in NA-44 (D.I. Khan), securing just 16.89% of the vote. Despite this limited electoral support, the military establishment has placed him in a position of authority over millions, bypassing the popular mandate. Meanwhile, its leader, Chief Minister Sohail Afridi—the only elected leader, unlike the Form 47 leader—has been arrested and placed into preventive custody. People are on the streets protesting against this arbitrary move, while the military-backed government has enforced a brutal security crackdown and shut down cellular internet services to completely isolate the province.

The Counterterrorism Pretext vs. Political Reality

The Sharif-led, military-backed government has justified these measures by citing a deteriorating security situation and the provincial government’s alleged failure to cooperate in counterterrorism efforts. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar accused the PTI-led administration of a “lack of support” in the fight against terrorism, while the federal government alleged “deliberate disengagement from the fight against terrorism.” Information Minister Attaullah Tarar went further, accusing the provincial government of being “hand in glove with terrorists.” The government has used these allegations and the claim of rising militancy to justify the imposition of governor’s rule and emergency measures. However, many believe that the actual objective was to quell the protests and the long march by PTI workers.

The fundamental problem, however, is that the Pakistani military itself directs counterterrorism policy in the region, where it has launched a continuous sequence of no fewer than 16 counterterrorism operations in KPK, ranging historically from Operation Al-Mizan (September 2002) and Zarb-e-Azb (June 15, 2014) to the overarching Radd-ul-Fasaad (February 22, 2017) and the recent Azm-e-Istehkam campaign (June 22, 2024). Under the current command of General Asim Munir, the military has heavily relied on lethal, hardline kinetic strategies, including deploying JF-17 fighter jets to drop LS-6 bombs on residential settlements in the Tirah Valley and border districts like Swabi. If terrorism has sharply increased, it inherently reflects a fatal failure of these highly centralized military operations and the state’s National Action Plan. Yet, the government has used these justifications to bring down Sohail Afridi’s government.

This move could prove counterproductive, as it has removed a popular government that enjoyed local support, effectively removing the safety valve from an already pressurized political environment and bringing it closer to a breaking point. More people could turn against the state, further deepening existing grievances and alienating the population.

Structural Failure and the Shield of the Veneer

Pakistan’s problems, whether related to governance, the economy, political instability, terrorism, or other issues, are largely rooted in the military’s dominance. The army has long run the country, with Field Marshal Asim Munir wielding enormous power. If Pakistan today ranks first globally in terms of terrorism or accounts for a staggering 48 percent of the population living in extreme poverty across the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAAP) region, these outcomes also reflect the military establishment’s failures. Similarly, if the country faces governance failures, corruption, or other challenges, the military must bear responsibility because it is the actual power behind the system. The Pakistan Army has penetrated virtually every sphere and section of society. When military-backed Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi today says that the system has collapsed, the military must reflect on itself rather than shift the blame, as it has prevented other institutions from functioning independently. Yet, when these institutions fail to deliver, the blame is placed on them rather than on the military establishment.

The military in Pakistan rules through a so-called elected government to gain a degree of legitimacy, a typical feature of military-authoritarian regimes. This arrangement also serves as a strategic shield: when the government fails to perform, the blame falls on civilian leaders rather than the military. The establishment strategically uses the civilian government—such as the contemporary Shehbaz Sharif-led administration installed via the highly controversial Form 47 adjustments—to gain external legitimacy, distance itself from raging domestic discontent, avoid direct accountability, and protect its own expansive corporate position and institutional empire within society

Symbiotic Collusion and Elite Capture

Moreover, Pakistan has a long history of military leaders exercising power, and the military is not the only institution responsible for the country’s problems. Civilian leaders, who have also sought greater power and prestige for their own benefit, have equally contributed to this situation. This has become a symbiotic relationship, with a long history of civilian leaders elevating the military’s position for their own political interests, dating back to Pakistan’s early years when leaders like Liaquat Ali Khan and IsKander Mirza first pulled the military into politics, laying the groundwork for dictators like Field Marshal Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq, and General Pervez Musharraf.

The Bhutto-Zardari and Sharif dynasties have contributed to Pakistan’s crisis. Historically trading constitutional principles for political longevity, President Asif Ali Zardari, PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, and the Sharif family continue to partner with the establishment to preserve their dynastic political power, patronage networks, and influence over state institutions. The 26th Constitutional Amendment of October 2024, jointly supported by the PML-N and PPP, provides a concrete example of how these political forces have backed constitutional changes that undermine judicial independence by expanding political influence over judicial appointments. The Sharif family’s financial dealings, which came under intense scrutiny during the Panama Papers investigation, further illustrate longstanding concerns surrounding political power, private wealth, and accountability in Pakistan. This concentration of political and economic influence among entrenched elites reflects a broader pattern of elite capture in Pakistan.

Even today, consider Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, who is neither the prime minister nor the president of Pakistan but is arguably more powerful than some of the country’s top civilian leaders. His position as an unelected senator backed by the establishment, while simultaneously serving as chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB), reflects the symbiotic relationship between civilian figures and the military establishment. This is how Pakistan’s political system functions.

Ultimately, the imposition of governor’s rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa risks deepening Pakistan’s political crisis rather than resolving its security challenges. A state cannot hold civilian institutions accountable for failures while denying them the autonomy to function independently. Unless Pakistan addresses the military’s dominance and the complicity of civilian elites, counterterrorism measures will continue to risk alienating the population, undermining democratic institutions, and reinforcing the very instability they claim to address.

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