When world leaders congregate in Antalya, Türkiye, for COP31 in November, Bangladesh, like every other edition, will arrive with one of the strongest moral cases for climate justice, but in a world driven by grossly unequal power dynamics, moral authority alone does not win negotiations.
Bangladesh's participation in the UN climate process dates to the inception years of COP. Over more than three decades, it has earned international recognition for disaster preparedness, community-based adaptation and leadership among climate-vulnerable countries. Yet a difficult question remains: has Bangladesh converted its vulnerability, experience and diplomatic visibility into sufficient negotiating power?
COP31 will be the first major climate summit attended by Bangladesh's newly elected government after July. It should therefore be treated not as another international event, but as the beginning of a 10-year climate diplomacy and investment strategy.
Turning climate vulnerability into negotiating power
Bangladesh has compelling evidence of climate-induced loss and damage. Cyclones, floods, river erosion, salinity intrusion, waterlogging and extreme heat are already damaging homes, infrastructure, agriculture, health and livelihoods. In 2024 alone, heat-related illness and productivity losses reportedly cost the country as much as $1.78 billion and resulted in the loss of 25 million working days.
These impacts are no longer exceptional disasters. They are becoming recurring development costs.
Bangladesh must arrive at COP31 with a quantified national loss-and-damage position. That requires a credible system for recording economic and non-economic losses across districts and sectors including displacement, lost livelihoods, public-health impacts, ecosystem damage and the disproportionate burdens borne by women, children and marginalised communities.
Without such evidence, Bangladesh will continue describing its vulnerability while other countries negotiate with detailed assessments, financing models and investable proposals.
The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage is now operational, although its resources remain far below global needs. Bangladesh should advocate for predictable, grant-based access; direct access for vulnerable countries; simplified procedures; and recognition of slow-onset processes such as salinity, sea-level rise and river erosion. It must also prepare a national pipeline before funding windows open. Winning a global fund but lacking projects ready for submission would be a hollow victory.
Climate finance: Access is not the same as adequacy
It would be incorrect to claim that Bangladesh has failed entirely to access multilateral climate finance. The Green Climate Fund records approximately $464 million in financing associated with Bangladesh, while the country has also received support through the Global Environment Facility, Adaptation Fund and other channels.
The country's COP31 delegation should carry a disciplined set of priorities: capitalising the Loss and Damage Fund; securing grant-based adaptation finance; simplifying direct access to multilateral funds; protecting integrity in carbon markets; financing the National Adaptation Plan; and developing the next generation of negotiators.
However, this remains modest compared with the scale of need. Bangladesh's emerging National Climate Finance Strategy process estimates annual climate-finance requirements exceeding $26 billion. Its National Adaptation Plan extends to 2050 and requires investments on an altogether larger scale.
The real problem is therefore not complete exclusion, but the gap between vulnerability, financing needs and the country's capacity to originate, secure and implement funding at scale.
Bangladesh's difficulties include fragmented institutional responsibilities, lengthy project-development processes, limited feasibility studies, weak coordination between ministries, shortages of specialised climate-finance professionals and inadequate pipelines of bankable projects. Access frequently depends on international accredited entities, which can weaken national ownership and add layers of procedure.
The new government should strengthen direct-access institutions, establish a permanent climate project-preparation facility and build multidisciplinary teams combining climate science, economics, engineering, social safeguards, gender expertise and financial modelling.
The recently established National Committee on Climate Finance, chaired by the prime minister, could provide high-level direction, but only if it produces transparent decisions, measurable targets and clear accountability rather than another layer of bureaucracy.
Carbon trading must not become the next fashionable promise
The government's interest in carbon markets is understandable. Its election manifesto proposed a Measurement, Reporting and Verification system and a domestic carbon-trading framework covering sectors such as energy, agriculture, waste and forestry. Bangladesh has also prepared a draft carbon-market framework and designated an authority for implementing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
These are encouraging beginnings, but carbon credits are not free money.
A credible market requires reliable emissions baselines, sectoral data, accredited verification, a functioning registry, transparent benefit-sharing and safeguards against double counting. Bangladesh must also decide which emission reductions it can transfer without undermining its own nationally determined contribution.
Poorly regulated trading could allow inexpensive emission reductions to be sold abroad while communities receive little benefit, and Bangladesh retains more costly mitigation obligations. Carbon markets should therefore complement, not replace public climate finance, grants and domestic mitigation. Environmental integrity and community rights must come before optimistic revenue projections.
Learn from the implementation failures of the past
Previous governments did not leave Bangladesh without climate policies. The country developed the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, established the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund, prepared the Delta Plan 2100, adopted a National Adaptation Plan and promoted the country's first Climate Prosperity Plan. Bangladesh also gained recognition through the Climate Vulnerable Forum.
The central weakness was not an absence of plans. It was the gap between plans, budgets, institutions and implementation.
Climate responsibilities remained dispersed across ministries. Projects were too often short-term and donor driven. Monitoring focused more on expenditure and activities than long-term resilience. Local governments and affected communities had insufficient influence over investment decisions. Meanwhile, continued dependence on fossil-fuel infrastructure weakened the coherence of Bangladesh's international climate message.
The new government should not repeat the practice of announcing another strategy whenever implementation falters. It should consolidate existing plans, publish annual progress against measurable indicators and connect climate priorities to national budgeting, energy planning and local development.
Manifesto commitments, including increasing renewable energy, expanding afforestation, reducing plastic waste and developing carbon markets must now be translated into financed programmes with deadlines and responsible institutions.
Bangladesh needs negotiators, not merely delegates
Climate diplomacy is increasingly technical. Negotiations now cover adaptation metrics, climate-finance accounting, Article 6 rules, transparency frameworks, technology transfer, just transition and the governance of loss-and-damage finance. No country can influence these discussions through speeches alone.
Bangladesh has a respected group of experienced climate negotiators, but many are approaching the later stages of their careers. The country has not built a sufficiently institutionalised succession system. Officials are transferred, younger delegates may attend without defined negotiating responsibilities, and knowledge acquired at one COP is not always retained.
Youth participation also requires honest reflection. Bangladesh has many visible climate advocates, but visibility, social-media campaigning and attendance at side events are not substitutes for technical expertise. Advocacy is valuable, but across the negotiating table sit lawyers, economists, scientists and career diplomats who have followed the same agenda for years.
Bangladesh should establish a national climate-negotiation academy or fellowship that trains young professionals continuously, not only before COPs. Participants should specialise in specific negotiating tracks, work under senior mentors, contribute to technical submissions and remain engaged between conferences. Youth representation must progress from symbolic inclusion to informed participation.
Diplomacy can multiply Bangladesh's influence
Bangladesh is not a permanent member of the Security Council, but climate negotiations do not formally operate through veto powers. Decisions are generally reached by consensus. Nevertheless, richer states possess greater influence through larger delegations, technical capacity, finance and geopolitical alliances.
Bangladesh cannot compete through delegation size alone. It must negotiate through coalitions, particularly the Least Developed Countries Group, Climate Vulnerable Forum, Group of 77 and China, and regional partnerships. Its scheduled graduation from the LDC category also makes it urgent to develop a diplomatic identity that does not depend exclusively on LDC status.
COP31's Türkiye–Australia partnership creates an additional opening. Bangladesh should engage both the host presidency and the Australian-led negotiation process well before Antalya, building alliances around adaptation finance, loss and damage, locally led adaptation and simplified access for vulnerable countries.
Bangladesh's population, adaptation experience and strategic position in the Bengal Delta mean it is not diplomatically insignificant. But influence must be organised.
The country's COP31 delegation should carry a disciplined set of priorities: capitalising the Loss and Damage Fund; securing grant-based adaptation finance; simplifying direct access to multilateral funds; protecting integrity in carbon markets; financing the National Adaptation Plan; and developing the next generation of negotiators.
After three decades of climate diplomacy, Bangladesh no longer needs to prove its vulnerability. Its next challenge is to prove that it can turn vulnerability into evidence, evidence into alliances, and alliances into finance and action.
Lamia Mohsin is a young Bangladeshi researcher working on climate change, governance and public policy and a PhD Candidate/Doctoral Researcher at the Wageningen Institute for Environment and Climate Research (WIMEK), University of Wageningen and Research (WUR), Netherlands.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of The Business Standard.