As Nigeria approaches another general election, repeated presidential directives to the military and security and intelligence agencies to dismantle terrorist networks, curb insecurity and rescue abducted citizens raise critical questions about their effectiveness and why kidnappings and armed violence persist despite successive administrations’ promises to restore peace, writes Linus Aleke.
President Bola Tinubu’s latest directive to the military and other security agencies to dismantle terrorist networks and rescue Nigerians still held captive by violent extremists has reignited debate about the government’s response to insecurity and the effectiveness of repeated presidential orders.
Speaking through the Minister of Defence, General Christopher Musa (rtd), after a National Security Council meeting at the State House, Abuja, the President also assured Nigerians of his commitment to free, fair and credible elections in 2027. He directed security agencies to remain neutral during the elections, allowing citizens to exercise their franchise without intimidation or coercion.
Addressing newsmen after the meeting, Musa said the security chiefs had briefed the President on the country’s security situation ahead of the forthcoming polls.
“We had an intensive discussion, and Mr President made it very clear that he wants a free, fair and credible election. We must do everything possible to ensure that the country is safe and secure for citizens to go out and vote,” he said.
The minister assured political parties and other stakeholders that security personnel would remain impartial, adding that Nigerians should feel safe enough to vote for candidates of their choice without fear of intimidation.
However, the latest directive has reignited questions about the gap between presidential promises and security outcomes. Critics argue that successive administrations have repeatedly ordered security agencies to restore peace, particularly ahead of elections, only for kidnappings and armed violence to persist.
Since assuming office on May 29, 2023, Tinubu had issued several directives to combat terrorism and banditry and rescue abducted citizens.
On 8 March 2024, following abductions in Borno and Kaduna states, he ordered security and intelligence agencies to secure the victims’ release. The following day, he specifically directed security agencies to leave no stone unturned in rescuing pupils and teachers abducted from Kuriga, Kaduna State.
On 30 October 2025, amid persistent attacks, he charged newly appointed service chiefs to intensify operations against terrorism and banditry. On 25 November, following the abduction of schoolgirls in Maga, Kebbi State, and other kidnapping incidents, he ordered intensified efforts to rescue those still in captivity.
On 8 December, he reportedly issued another directive concerning students abducted from St Mary’s Catholic School in Papiri, Niger State.
On 4 January 2026, following an attack involving killings and abductions in Niger State, he directed the military, police and Department of State Services to track down the perpetrators and rescue the victims.
On 25 August, following another mass abduction and killings in Niger State, he ordered an immediate rescue operation and demanded regular updates from security chiefs.
Most recently, on 15 October 2026, following a security meeting at the Presidential Villa in Abuja, Tinubu directed service chiefs and other security agency heads to dismantle terrorist and bandit camps, rescue abducted Nigerians and strengthen security ahead of the 2027 general elections.
These reported occasions illustrate the recurring nature of presidential security directives amid persistent kidnappings, attacks on schools and communities, and threats from armed groups.
The pattern predates the Tinubu administration. Since Boko Haram emerged as a major security threat in 2009, successive Nigerian presidents have repeatedly ordered security agencies to combat terrorism, curb banditry and rescue abducted citizens.
Under former President Goodluck Jonathan, the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, Borno State, on 14 April 2014, triggered national and international outrage and intensified scrutiny of the government’s handling of the insurgency ahead of the 2015 general elections.
His successor, Muhammadu Buhari, faced similar pressure following the abduction of 110 schoolgirls from Dapchi, Yobe State, on 19 February 2018, less than a year before the 2019 elections.
Although the timing of such incidents does not establish that they were politically motivated, insecurity during election periods heightens public scrutiny of government performance and the credibility of security promises. It also raises concerns about whether the persistent threat of violence could discourage voter participation or undermine confidence in the electoral process.
Commenting on Tinubu’s latest directive, security analyst, Umar Bologi argued that successive presidential orders had failed to deliver lasting security because the problem extended beyond political pronouncements to shortcomings in implementation, intelligence coordination, operational capacity and accountability.
He acknowledged that security agencies had recorded successes in counter-terrorism, anti-banditry and anti-kidnapping operations, including rescuing abducted citizens and neutralising armed groups. However, he said these gains were frequently undermined by criminal networks that retained access to weapons, ransom money, local informants and ungoverned spaces where they could regroup.
“The real test is not the forcefulness of a presidential directive, but whether it is backed by genuine political commitment, sustained operations, reliable intelligence, effective policing, the prosecution of financiers and collaborators, and the protection of communities after military operations end,” Bologi said.
Without these measures, he argued, security forces might disrupt criminal groups without dismantling the networks that sustain them.
He also raised concerns about the possible exploitation of insecurity during election periods, warning that political sponsorship, illegal arms proliferation, weak border controls and violence intended to intimidate opponents or influence electoral outcomes must not be overlooked.
Bologi called for a shift from reactive, presidentially ordered operations to a consistent, intelligence-led national security strategy independent of political pressure and the electoral calendar. He added that security agencies must be held accountable for measurable results, while anyone found to be sponsoring or protecting armed groups should face prosecution, regardless of status.
A veteran defence editor and publisher of Security Digest Online, Chief Chidi Omeje, similarly argued that the effectiveness of presidential directives should be measured by their impact on public safety rather than the forcefulness of their announcement.
He observed that Nigeria had never lacked security directives; rather, the persistent challenge was the gap between presidential orders and operational outcomes.
“Dismantling terrorist networks and rescuing citizens in captivity require more than renewed commands to service chiefs. They demand actionable intelligence, effective inter-agency coordination, adequate equipment, accountability for results and the political will to pursue not only terrorists but also their financiers, informants and collaborators,” Omeje said.
He stressed the importance of addressing governance failures, poverty and criminal economies that create fertile ground for insecurity.
As Nigeria approaches another general election, he said, the government must demonstrate that security is a continuing national obligation rather than a recurring political promise. The credibility of the latest directives, he added, would depend on whether communities became safer, kidnappings declined, terrorist networks lost their operational capacity and more captives returned home alive.
Omeje also emphasised that security agencies must remain professionally neutral and ensure that preparations for credible elections do not distract them from their constitutional responsibility to protect all Nigerians.
Ultimately, he argued, lasting security would depend on consistent implementation, measurable outcomes and a comprehensive strategy that makes it increasingly difficult for terrorists to operate.
A public affairs analyst, Festus Fifen offered a more critical assessment, describing repeated presidential directives to security agencies as increasingly ritualistic.
He noted that, as Commander-in-Chief, the President was expected to issue orders in response to security threats, and such pronouncements could reassure the public that the government was taking action. However, he said the persistent gap between official assurances and tangible results remained a major concern.
Fifen identified the absence of a reliable national database for identifying, tracking and prosecuting criminals as one of Nigeria’s major security weaknesses. He argued that multiple identities, inconsistent addresses and inadequate mechanisms for tracing suspects made it difficult to hold offenders accountable.
He also pointed to vast ungoverned spaces and limited operational capacity, which he said left security agencies reacting to attacks rather than preventing them.
Consequently, he argued, criminality often continued without meaningful consequences, making presidential directives appear largely symbolic.
Fifen expressed particular concern about insecurity during election periods, arguing that violence could be exploited to create fear, discourage voter turnout and intimidate citizens, potentially facilitating electoral manipulation.
“When communities feel unsafe, eligible voters may stay away from polling stations, while those who vote may be too frightened to challenge irregularities,” he said.
He also urged the media to report security threats accurately without unnecessarily amplifying public fear, warning that sensational narratives about the impossibility of conducting safe elections could further undermine confidence.
Fifen maintained that presidential directives must be supported by effective intelligence, reliable identification systems, stronger security operations and accountability if they are to deliver lasting security and protect citizens’ democratic rights.
The views expressed by the three experts converge on a central issue: Nigeria’s security challenge is not simply the absence of presidential orders but the difficulty of translating them into sustainable results.
Their observations point to the need for better intelligence, stronger coordination among security agencies, improved criminal identification systems, adequate operational resources and the prosecution of those who finance or facilitate armed violence.
They also highlight the importance of protecting vulnerable communities after military operations, addressing the conditions that sustain criminal networks and ensuring that security agencies remain impartial during elections.
As the country approaches the 2027 general elections, the effectiveness of Tinubu’s latest directive will ultimately be judged by its outcome: fewer kidnappings, safer communities, dismantling of criminal networks, successful rescues and accountability for perpetrators.
Repeated presidential orders may signal political resolve, but they cannot substitute for sustained implementation and effective institutions. The enduring question is whether successive administrations can move beyond issuing familiar assurances and establish a security system capable of preventing attacks, protecting citizens and preserving the integrity of the electoral process.