The Gulf needs a security order that Washington cannot switch off

The Gulf has spent decades buying security from the world’s most powerful military. American bases dot the region, advanced weapons fill its arsenals, and defence agreements bind its rulers to Washington. Yet the war involving Iran has exposed a troubling paradox. The Gulf’s security arrangements may help deter adversaries, but they cannot guarantee that the region will escape a conflict shaped by decisions made elsewhere.

The consequences are no longer confined to military installations or oil terminals. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz threatens energy exports and maritime commerce, while attacks on critical infrastructure jeopardise the economic transformation programmes on which Gulf governments have staked their futures. Wealth can finance reconstruction, but it cannot restore lost confidence overnight.

The problem is not that the United States has become irrelevant. Its intelligence, airpower, naval capabilities and logistical reach remain difficult to replace. Nor does greater independence mean that Iran’s regional ambitions should be ignored. Rather, the Gulf faces a structural dilemma: the states most exposed to escalation do not necessarily possess the greatest influence over the decisions that produce it.

That dilemma demands a different ambition.

The Gulf does not need a security order without Washington. It needs one that can survive Washington’s changing priorities. The objective should be to turn external protection into one pillar of regional security, rather than the foundation on which everything else depends.

The limits of an American security umbrella

For decades, American military power has underwritten the security of the Gulf monarchies. The US Fifth Fleet operates from Bahrain, while Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, a major centre for American air operations. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have invested heavily in American aircraft, missile defence and other advanced systems. These arrangements provide capabilities that would be costly and difficult to reproduce independently.

But military protection is not the same as strategic control. Washington ultimately decides how to deploy its forces, which threats deserve priority and when military action serves American interests. Gulf governments can influence these calculations through diplomacy and cooperation, but they cannot assume that their preferences will prevail.

The distinction becomes critical when Washington’s objectives collide with the region’s exposure to retaliation. An American operation may be designed to weaken an adversary or restore deterrence, yet its consequences can fall disproportionately on neighbouring states whose ports, airports, energy facilities and shipping routes become vulnerable. The presence of American forces can strengthen deterrence without eliminating the risks associated with escalation.

Recent events have also exposed the limits of military expenditure as a measure of security.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Arabia spent an estimated $83.2 billion on its military in 2025, making it the Middle East’s largest military spender. Nevertheless, sophisticated arsenals cannot automatically prevent attacks by adversaries using drones, missiles and other asymmetric capabilities.

The lesson is not that American protection has failed or that Gulf governments should abandon their alliances. It is that a security model built around external military superiority leaves too much dependent on decisions that regional governments cannot control. A durable system must preserve the benefits of American power while reducing the consequences of its possible absence, inconsistency or strategic redirection.

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Why the Gulf cannot secure itself alone

Reducing dependence on Washington, however, is easier said than done. The Gulf Cooperation Council has existed since 1981, yet its members have struggled to translate shared vulnerabilities into a fully integrated security system. They differ in their perceptions of Iran, their relationships with outside powers and their preferred responses to regional crises. Their rulers also remain reluctant to surrender sovereign authority over national defence.

These divisions matter more than the number of weapons purchased. A regional security order requires compatible warning systems, reliable intelligence-sharing, coordinated responses and clear procedures for consultation when a crisis erupts. Without these mechanisms, neighbouring states may possess formidable individual capabilities while remaining collectively vulnerable.

Nor would replacing American dependence with a collection of new foreign partnerships solve the problem. Saudi Arabia’s expanding defence relationship with Pakistan and Turkey illustrates the search for additional strategic options.

Their Mecca Joint Defence Agreement promises closer military cooperation, including coordination among their armed forces. Such arrangements can broaden the Gulf’s choices, but their value will ultimately depend on operational coordination, credible commitments and the ability to respond effectively under pressure.

The danger is that diversification becomes an exercise in accumulating partners rather than building regional capacity. Multiple alliances can offer useful insurance, but they can also create competing expectations and overlapping commitments. A state that depends on several external powers without developing its own mechanisms for crisis management may remain exposed to the same underlying problem.

Iran must also be part of the equation. No credible Gulf security order can simply assume away Tehran’s military capabilities, its regional relationships or its ability to threaten maritime commerce. Yet treating Iran exclusively as a target to be deterred leaves little room for managing incidents before they become wars. Deterrence and diplomacy are not alternatives; each is more effective when the other exists.

The challenge, therefore, is political as much as military. Gulf governments must recognise that national security cannot be secured through bilateral relationships alone when threats cross borders and the consequences of conflict spread across the entire region.

Building an order Washington cannot switch off

A more resilient security order should begin with practical cooperation rather than grand declarations. The GCC needs stronger mechanisms for sharing intelligence, coordinating early warning and integrating air and missile defence. Common operating procedures would help governments identify threats, distinguish deliberate attacks from accidents and coordinate responses before confusion escalates into confrontation.

Second, the region needs institutionalised crisis diplomacy. Direct communication channels, maritime incident protocols and regular consultations involving Gulf states and Iran could reduce the danger of miscalculation. Such arrangements would not resolve every dispute or eliminate the need for deterrence. Their purpose would be narrower but essential: to prevent individual incidents from triggering a regional conflict that no government can easily contain.

Third, economic resilience must become part of security planning. The International Monetary Fund has highlighted the potential benefits of completing the GCC Railway and Saudi Landbridge projects, which could reduce economic losses during a closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Alternative energy routes, diversified shipping arrangements and stronger regional logistics would likewise give governments more options when maritime traffic is disrupted. Infrastructure should be assessed not only by its commercial return, but also by the strategic flexibility it provides.

Finally, Gulf governments must define more clearly what collective security means in practice. Which threats require immediate consultation? How should members coordinate assistance after an attack? What commitments can each state credibly make, and how can those commitments be implemented without undermining national sovereignty? Answering these questions will be more valuable than announcing another ambitious pact whose operational foundations remain uncertain.

None of this requires the United States to withdraw. Washington can remain an indispensable partner, providing capabilities that regional states cannot quickly replicate. But a stronger regional framework would also make that partnership more sustainable by giving Gulf governments greater agency, reducing the risk of unilateral escalation and ensuring that essential security functions do not depend entirely on decisions made abroad.

The ultimate test of Gulf power is not how much its governments spend on weapons or how many foreign partners they can attract. It is whether they can shape the conditions under which their people, economies and infrastructure remain secure.

The Gulf cannot dictate Washington’s choices, any more than it can eliminate rivalry with Iran. It can, however, build institutions, capabilities and diplomatic channels that make those choices less decisive for its future. That is the difference between being protected by a powerful ally and possessing a security order of its own.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.