In September, two consecutive top US military officials made public for the first time that America has offensive weapons already deployed in space.
That the US, China, and Russia have anti-satellite weapons available is no secret, and has been assumed in recent years, with China unofficially demonstrating old space weapons in 2007, and Russia and China both demonstrating newer weapons since 2021.
But a public declaration by the US set off speculation about whether the deployed weapons are focused more in the area of: 1) directed-energy weapons (lasers); 2) kinetic anti-satellite weapons (missiles); or 3) platforms for disrupting or disabling satellites’ activity without actually destroying them – this is also known as rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs).
A fourth method could be nuclear, but it is assumed that this was not the focus of the US announcement because the terrible consequences in space would impact the attacker as much as the defender.
In April, Unit 9900 officer Lt.-Col. "S" and space war expert Tal Inbar discussed Israeli efforts to defend its assets in space from adversaries.
Also, on June 24, with the Post noting that Russia, China, and Iran have all worked on ways to attack, damage, jam, or drag satellites in space, IDF Brig.-Gen. Yael Grosman responded, "There are threats from space. We work with the Defense Ministry with a lot of power; with the broader defense establishment, we can all bring forward achievements."
Regarding the US announcement, so far those space experts who are commenting are leaning toward category 3 of RPO.
This is especially true for deploying RPOs, which can fight off other RPOs.
The reason is that RPOs have existed in one form or another since the US used multiple space vehicles to repair one another in the 1960s. In that sense, the largest jump was developing the technology and tactics for sending one space vehicle or satellite to match the orbit of another.
Once a country makes that major scientific jump, adding on a robot arm to attack or an additional system to jam is just a matter of time and energy.
Another reason RPOs may be favored would be to avoid the debris problem caused by using kinetic anti-satellite weapons, such as missiles.
The US has said it is hoping to make major advancements in stationing anti-missile physical interceptors in space that can protect satellites by 2028.
Despite all this focus on RPOs for the US, China, and Russia, Israel has made its biggest noise regarding space weapons in relation to lasers.
On June 29, Defense Minister Israel Katz told a briefing of military reporters that Israel is developing space lasers to carry out attacks above the Earth.
This was an expansion and more specific version of a statement which Katz made earlier in June, when he committed Israel to becoming the leading player with space attack capabilities.
"One of the central goals which the prime minister and I set is that we are recruiting the best minds," since "as of today, no country has the ability to mount attacks in space. We must be the leading country in the world with this capability," said Katz.
The defense minister continued, "If we achieve this, it will ensure the advantage of deterrence, of the ability to attack, destroy, and all of the other matters, versus our enemies with large resources."
But Monday was the first time that Katz specifically mentioned space lasers.
Israel is already a leading country in developing Iron Beam as a land-based space laser, and during a visit to Elbit earlier in the summer, The Jerusalem Post saw and heard about work on presumed future fighter-jet-based lasers.
Overall, it seemed clear that Katz on June 29 was referring to Iran.
This is especially true since during the 2026 war, Israel struck multiple Iranian space war-related facilities, including facilities working on developing capabilities to attack satellites in space.
It was unclear if he indirectly also wanted to deter Russia and China from assisting Iran in this and other spheres.
According to foreign reports, lasers might be able to destroy enemy satellites and also burn up any debris that an attack in space by other means might cause.
Some have already speculated that Israel could destroy enemy space satellites using the Arrow 3 missile system, given that it already strikes ballistic missiles in space.
Yet, due to the same issue that Russia and China already fell into regarding debris, many countries are working on other techniques, such as paralyzing, damaging, jamming, dragging, or using lasers against satellites in space.
While some Israeli officials have hinted at such efforts, Katz's public statements on June 29 were the clearest one to date by a senior Israeli official.
In contrast, if Iran or other enemies advanced past Israel in space, they could attack Israeli satellites and reduce its surveillance capabilities.
After all of this, why then do most experts believe that the US's first and current focus is on RPOs, and not lasers?
It is not that the US and the other countries with space programs are not working on developing space lasers. They are.
Also, Israel's success with developing the Iron Beam for actual deployments as a ground laser has spurred other countries forward in the more general laser defense area.
But lasers in space or on aircraft are still a distant solution, as they involve a series of more complex physics and engineering problems, which invariably will take longer to solve than RPOs.
RPOs then are an immediate answer to help deter enemies from attacking, since they can be used to attack enemy satellites, as well as providing defense against other countries' potential RPO attacks.
If enemies have existing and immediate weapons to attack an object, such as a satellite, the US and other countries, potentially even including Israel, are likely to focus on immediate solutions, with the focus on space lasers being a longer-term goal.
In that sense, the US statement in September was about immediately deterring China and Russia from attacking American satellites.
In contrast, Katz's June statement was less about immediate attack, defense, or deterrence.
Rather, it was more about either bragging to the Israeli public about a future distant achievement, or psychological warfare against Iran to the extent that the Islamic Republic might believe it can work with Moscow and Beijing to go after Israel's satellite advantage.