The insurrection act dilemma: Political disorder, federal power, and the road to 2028
The United States may face a difficult test of political stability as the country approaches the 2028 presidential election: how should the federal government respond if mass protests escalate into sustained violence, local authorities struggle to maintain order, and political organizations turn the government’s response into a national controversy? Reports of planning within Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)-linked networks raise questions that deserve serious scrutiny. However, allegations of a coordinated strategy to provoke nationwide violence must be distinguished from verified facts. The central issue is not merely who benefits politically from unrest, but how democratic institutions can preserve public safety without undermining constitutional freedoms.
The controversy centers on allegations that activist networks could coordinate street demonstrations, legal assistance, and media messaging to provoke a forceful federal response. According to this account, the intended outcome would be to pressure President Donald Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act, then portray the deployment of federal forces as proof of authoritarianism. The theory is politically plausible as a scenario, but the existence, scope, and operational intent of any such coordinated plan require independent verification. Democratic debate is better served by evidence than by treating allegations as established conclusions.
One concept cited in discussions of mass mobilization is the “3.5 percent rule,” associated with research by political scientist Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan. Their research examined historical campaigns of nonviolent resistance and found that none of the campaigns studied with active participation from at least 3.5 percent of the population had failed to achieve their objectives during the period examined. This finding is not a universal formula for political change, nor does it establish that mass participation necessarily leads to violence. Nevertheless, it helps explain why organized movements may view sustained public mobilization as a powerful political instrument.
Questions have also been raised about the international dimensions of activist networks, including Neville Roy Singham, a businessman based in Shanghai who has been the subject of reporting about alleged links to Chinese state-aligned political activities. Such connections warrant transparent investigation where credible evidence exists. But claims of direct coordination with foreign intelligence or government bodies should not be presented as proven without substantiation. Foreign influence operations are a legitimate national security concern; responsible analysis must distinguish documented relationships, political associations, and demonstrated operational control.
The federal government nevertheless has a clear responsibility to protect federal buildings, personnel, courts, and essential government functions. That responsibility does not automatically make Washington the primary law-enforcement authority in every American city. State and local governments retain substantial responsibility for public safety, while federal agencies operate within defined legal jurisdictions. The distinction matters because the United States does not have a single, centralized national police force that routinely manages ordinary urban disturbances.
The New York Police Department, for example, has historically employed tens of thousands of sworn officers, while the FBI has a far smaller workforce of special agents nationwide. These organizations perform fundamentally different duties, so their headcounts cannot be compared as though they were interchangeable forces. Still, the broader point stands: maintaining public order across America’s cities depends heavily on local policing, state resources, and cooperation among levels of government.
Invoking the Insurrection Act would therefore carry significant legal and political consequences. The law provides circumstances in which a president may use federal forces domestically, but it is not an unrestricted license to override local government. Any deployment must be evaluated against the statute, applicable constitutional protections, and the specific conditions on the ground. If violence threatens lives or prevents the enforcement of federal law, intervention may be justified. If the situation can be addressed through ordinary law enforcement and cooperation with state authorities, a less extraordinary response may be preferable.
The 1992 Los Angeles riots offer an important historical comparison. Following the acquittals of four police officers in the Rodney King beating case, widespread violence erupted across the city. Local authorities struggled to contain the unrest, California Governor Pete Wilson activated the National Guard, and President George H. W. Bush authorized federal intervention under the Insurrection Act. The episode demonstrated the potential importance of coordinated local, state, and federal action when violence overwhelms existing capacity. It also showed why political leadership and public confidence matter during a crisis.
The circumstances today may differ considerably. If local officials request assistance, cooperation could reduce confusion and help restore order. If they oppose federal intervention, however, a deployment could trigger legal challenges, protests, and a dispute over the legitimacy of federal authority. That possibility should not prevent necessary action to protect lives, but neither should it be dismissed as irrelevant. The objective must be to restore lawful order, not to win a political argument.
The alternative is not simply to do nothing. Federal authorities can prioritize protecting federal interests, investigate crimes within their jurisdiction, support lawful coordination with state officials, and prepare contingency plans while leaving routine policing to local agencies. Yet a limited federal response cannot substitute for competent local governance. Where police departments lack sufficient personnel, prosecutors cannot effectively address serious crime, or officials fail to protect residents and businesses, the consequences can extend far beyond the immediate crisis. Workers, small-business owners, vulnerable residents, and people who depend on functioning urban economies often bear the heaviest burden.
France’s recent experience with violent unrest offers another cautionary example. Episodes involving arson, looting, and confrontations with police have exposed the difficulty of balancing the right to protest with the obligation to protect the public. The appropriate lesson is not that governments should suppress demonstrations, but that peaceful assembly and violent criminal conduct must be treated differently. Democratic governments weaken public confidence when they either tolerate serious violence or respond disproportionately to lawful dissent.
As the 2028 election approaches, the greatest danger would be allowing political calculations to supersede constitutional responsibility. If allegations of coordinated destabilization are substantiated, the public deserves a transparent account and lawful accountability. If they are exaggerated or unsupported, that too must be acknowledged. Neither political affiliation nor ideological disagreement should determine whether evidence is taken seriously.
The president’s challenge is to avoid being driven by provocation while refusing to abandon communities facing genuine danger. Federal intervention should be lawful, proportionate, narrowly tailored, and grounded in demonstrable necessity. Local leaders, meanwhile, should be judged by whether they protect residents and uphold the law, not by whether a crisis advances their political narrative.
Ultimately, the strength of American democracy will depend less on which party wins the argument over unrest than on whether public officials preserve both public safety and civil liberties. The answer to political violence cannot be political retaliation, and the answer to fears of government overreach cannot be indifference to victims. The rule of law must remain the governing principle-before, during, and after the 2028 election.
Suraiyya Aziz specializes on topics related to the Middle East and the Arab world.