- Introduction
- Iran: the "evil regime", the "zero red lines" doctrine, and Brent at $113
- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: missile on Riyadh, Aramco evacuated, Iraq disassociates itself, and Istanbul debuts the R4+E3 format
- Ukraine: Brussels responds to Trump's diesel, Starlink remains capped, and Moscow wants a "final agreement"
- France speaks of "sedition"; Sánchez explains Ceuta on a talk show, and a Moroccan MP lays claim to Ceuta and Melilla
- Media Rack
- Editorial Commentary
Introduction
Trump has given the Tehran regime a name: "truly evil". He said it on Thursday afternoon whilst accusing it of inventing attacks on oil tankers to drive up crude prices ahead of the 3 November legislative elections, boasting that more oil has passed through Hormuz over the past week than ever before and warning that "something" will happen "fairly soon".
The oligarchic-jihadist regime, for its part, has stopped disguising its strategy: Mohsen Rezaei threatens in The Guardian to strike oil installations, submarine cables, data centres, and artificial intelligence facilities across as many as seven Gulf countries, and an adviser to Ghalibaf sums it up in three words: "zero red lines". Brent closed at $113.17, its best level since May, and this morning the Emirates closed the beaches of Umm al Qaywayn due to an oil spill.
The Houthi terrorist organisation launched another ballistic missile against Riyadh in the early hours, intercepted by the coalition. Iraq condemns the attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and guarantees its territory will not be used to launch them, the European Parliament calls for the Houthis to be declared terrorists, and Aramco has evacuated its Dhahran headquarters. Today, the Foreign Ministers of the R4 (Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt) and the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are meeting for the first time in Istanbul. Spain is absent.
In Ukraine, the European Union (EU) is preparing fresh sanctions against Russian energy in response to Trump's diesel deal, and Kyiv denies that Washington has lifted Starlink restrictions, even as its troops infiltrate behind Russian lines near Kupiansk via a gas pipeline.
Macron speaks of far-left "sedition" and is chairing a defence council today ahead of a Saturday where only trade union marches will be authorised. In Spain, Sánchez admits on an entertainment programme that the Ceuta crisis "could have been handled better", the JEC reprimands the CIS, and a Moroccan parliamentary vice-president lays claim to Ceuta and Melilla.
Iran: the "evil regime", the "zero red lines" doctrine, and Brent at $113
Facts
Trump toughened his language on Thursday. He described Iran as a "truly evil regime" and accused it of driving up prices to harm Republicans in the midterms (The Jerusalem Post). On Truth Social, he wrote that Tehran "invents fake hits, mines, and everything else, because more oil is passing through the Strait of Hormuz now than before the conflict began". In the early hours, he insisted: "More oil has come out of the Strait of Hormuz this past week than at any previous time," attributing it to the US naval blockade (Iran International).
He added that "we are not negotiating", that "something, one way or another, will happen fairly soon", and that "most people seem to think it will be after the elections" (Anadolu); he also dropped hints that Washington could "go a little further" in Iran. He acknowledged that the war has "a price to pay" at the ballot box (Fox News) and invoked the Defense Production Act, a 1950 statute allowing the federal government to prioritise industrial production for national security reasons, to accelerate domestic crude extraction.
The CENTCOM (United States Central Command) celebrated one hundred days on Thursday of the naval blockade resumed on 14 July, which according to its figures has prevented Iranian exports worth $25 billion. A spokesperson told Al Jazeera that shipping lanes are cleared of mines, 95% of vessels are passing through, and the attacks reflect Tehran's "desperation".
Kpler, the ship and cargo tracking firm, confirmed to The Wall Street Journal that Iranian floating reserves in Asia — crude stored on tankers awaiting buyers — were exhausted by mid-October. Time reveals that Trump has so far rejected five operational plans against Iran, and The New York Times reports on US and Israeli plans to strike energy, nuclear, and missile/drone targets after 3 November.
The Iranian response has been a declaration of doctrine. Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told The Guardian that if Iran is attacked again, it will strike oil facilities, submarine cables, data centres, and artificial intelligence facilities across as many as seven Gulf countries: "If the conflict flares up again, we will have a broader plan." There can be no settlement, he added, where Iran's economic arteries are attacked whilst the architecture enabling it is deemed "untouchable and immune". Mehdi Mohammadi, adviser to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, put it more bluntly: "We view the upcoming conflict as an existential threat. Our strategy is 'zero red lines'."
According to The Wall Street Journal, Tehran has further warned it could extend its attacks to Gulf airports and pipelines, and the Fars agency, linked to the Revolutionary Guard, speaks of responding with "political targets" to fresh targeted assassinations. The threat is not novel in its object, but rather in its scope: by mid-October, the Revolutionary Guard had already singled out the seven internet cables running beneath the Strait of Hormuz, and Al Jazeera analysed on 13 October the exposure of the Gulf's digital infrastructure, where US tech giants have installed data and AI centres in recent years. An Iranian parliamentary group even suggests closing the border with Pakistan, the country whose army chief, Marshal Asim Munir, is acting as mediator.
On the Lebanese front, Washington denied having presented a joint proposal with Turkey to alter Lebanon's political system and reaffirmed its objective of disarming the Hizbulá terrorist organisation. The Israeli Ministry of Defence sanctioned Coral Oil, a UK-registered company, for transferring fuel to a company owned by Hizbulá (The Jerusalem Post). In the markets, December Brent closed Thursday up 4% at $113.17, its best close since 4 May according to Dow Jones Market Data (CNBC); WTI closed at $99.47. This morning, authorities in Umm al Qaywayn, one of the seven emirates, closed all their beaches and coastal areas due to an oil spill from a tanker (Iran International); the origin of the spill has not been specified.
Implications
For the first time, the President of the United States is calling the Tehran regime by its moral name, and for the first time the regime is openly confessing its strategy. The two things are related. Rezaei is no longer threatening just Washington or Jerusalem: he is threatening seven countries not at war with Iran, their civilian populations, and the digital and energy infrastructure upon which Europe and Asia depend.
That is not deterrence; it is state terrorism announced in advance, and must be treated as such. Thomas Schelling, the 2005 Nobel Economics laureate, would have recognised it immediately (we shall return to this in the Editorial Commentary): "zero red lines" seek to compel Gulf neighbours to pressure Washington not to attack again. The Carter Doctrine was born to protect the Gulf from Moscow; today it must protect it from Tehran.
Europe would be wrong to believe the matter does not concern it. Passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf are the cables binding the continent to Asia, terminating in Marseille, one of the planet's major telecommunications nodes; the Gulf's data centres host services for European companies, and the refineries and pipelines Rezaei threatens supply diesel to a France that has already had to source it in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama. European digital and energy sovereignty, so much spoken of in Brussels, is also defended in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, not merely through regulations.
For that doctrine to be credible, Washington needs more than adjectives. Denying attacks documented by UKMTO and specialised portals does not weaken Iran; it weakens whoever denies them. Boasting that more oil is passing than ever, when that oil mostly traverses a Saudi pipeline built to bypass Hormuz, is claiming unearned credit. Credibility is a superpower's most valuable capital, and cannot be squandered in an electoral numbers war.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, remains on the frontline. In the early hours, another Houthi missile targeted Riyadh; Aramco has had to vacate its headquarters. There are, however, two encouraging signs. Iraq publicly dissociates itself from any use of its territory against the Saudis, closing, at least on paper, a second front Tehran could open via its Iraqi terrorist organisations. The European Parliament is finally asking for the Houthis to be declared terrorists. It remains for the Council to do so and for Istanbul not to turn into another half-measure. A format bringing London, Paris, and Berlin together with Riyadh, Ankara, Islamabad, and Cairo will only make sense if translated into real deterrence, and deterrence is not proclaimed: it is demonstrated by striking the origin of aggression. For Fidan to also pretend to turn a summit convened for Gulf security into a tribune against Israel dilutes its objective. Spain, once again, is not in the room.
Outlook and Scenarios
Escalation of claimed attacks against Gulf traffic prior to 3 November (highly probable) with Brent above $110 and fresh numbers wars between Washington and Tehran.
US-Israeli campaign after the legislative elections (probable) targeting energy, nuclear, and ballistic assets, with Iranian reprisals against Gulf airports, pipelines, and cables.
Iranian attack against Gulf digital infrastructure (possible) with immediate effects on communications and financial services between Europe and Asia.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: missile on Riyadh, Aramco evacuated, Iraq disassociates itself, and Istanbul debuts the R4+E3 format
Facts
The coalition intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh in the early hours, and on Thursday night destroyed two drones launched towards the south of the country (Arab News, Iran International). GACA raised the death toll from Wednesday's attack against Dammam's King Fahd Airport to two dead — a Saudi citizen and an Indian resident — with eight injured of five nationalities; the airport resumed operations on Thursday (BBC, CBS News). In October, at least 21 people have died at Saudi airports according to authorities, and 22 according to an AFP tally. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed four operations in 48 hours, including against the Ministry of Defence in Riyadh, an Aramco facility in Yanbu, and Abha airport, without Saudi or independent confirmation.
Aramco ordered remaining personnel at its Dhahran headquarters, severely damaged on 14 October, to evacuate and work remotely (Reuters). Its CEO, Amin Nasser, explained that the East-West pipeline, carrying crude from Persian Gulf fields to Yanbu on the Red Sea, has gone from 2 to 7 million barrels per day (Al Arabiya Business), and announced the company is seeking partners to expand its storage capacity abroad; once the situation normalises, he anticipates demand growing by some 3 million barrels per day. The IMF forecasts the Saudi economy will contract by 3.3% this year.
Regional condemnation is broadening. Iraq condemned the Houthi attacks and asserted its territory will not be used to launch them, and the Saudi and Iraqi Foreign Ministers spoke of expanding security cooperation. Arab nations, Djibouti, and the Mufti of Malaysia condemned the attacks on airports, fields, and holy sites, and the European Parliament asked for the Houthis to be included on the Union's terrorist organisation list (Arab News).
In Yemen, OCHA estimates some 260,000 displaced persons since August, half in Taiz, and the UN human rights office has verified 57 civilian deaths and 194 injuries; half of the dead are children (BBC).
The warring sides' figures do not match: the Houthi Health Ministry speaks of 155 civilian deaths in three months, whilst the legitimate Government's puts it at least at 1,574 dead. Government spokesman Majid al Nazili reported fighting in Jabal Han, west of Taiz, in Dhubab, and Al Masrakh, and air strikes in Maafar (Al Jazeera). Saree, meanwhile, accused the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of attacking a yacht carrying 14 Indian nationals near Zuqar Island in the Hanish archipelago, Red Sea, without independent confirmation.
Today in Istanbul, at the initiative of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, R4 and E3 ministers are meeting. The R4 was born this year, grouping Egypt with the three signatories of August's Mecca defence pact (Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan); the E3 was created over twenty years ago to coordinate European diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear programme. The agenda features Palestine, Yemen, Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and Ukraine.
According to Turkish sources, Fidan will back the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's security against Houthi attacks, call for permanent freedom of navigation in both straits, and focus much of his intervention on increasing pressure on Israel over settlement expansion (Kuwait Times). Egyptian Minister Badr Abdelatty has called to "explore all avenues" towards a political solution, and al-Sisi has reiterated that his military support does not include attacking Yemen.
Implications
The day's most relevant novelty is not in Riyadh, but in Baghdad. For the Iraqi Government to feel the need to guarantee its territory will not be used to attack the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the implicit admission of a real risk: that pro-Iranian terrorist organisations in Iraq might join the Houthi offensive and open a second front on Saudi Arabia's northern border. For Baghdad to dissociate itself is good news; that it needs to say so is a warning. The rapprochement between Riyadh and Baghdad, which led to the reopening of the Saudi embassy in 2015 and the Arar border crossing in 2020 after thirty years of closure, is one of the few diplomatic successes of the past decade in the region, and Tehran has every interest in destroying it.
The European Parliament's petition is the other good news, but it is non-binding on the Council, which decides, and Europe has spent far too long finding reasons not to include the Houthis on the list already featuring the IRGC since January.
The economic cost is beginning to be visible. A contraction of 3.3% is not merely a bad figure: it threatens the timeline of Vision 2030, the grand diversification and opening programme with which the Crown Prince wants to transform the country, and that is precisely what Tehran seeks. Aramco's decision to expand its overseas storage is the logical response of one who has understood that geography has become a risk: bringing crude closer to its clients so no strait and no terrorist can cut off supply.
Istanbul deserves a reading without illusions. Seating London, Paris, and Berlin with Riyadh, Ankara, Islamabad, and Cairo for the first time is a diplomatic breakthrough. If the result is another declaration of support without military commitments, it will be yet another half-measure: Cairo has already ruled out acting in Yemen, and Europe limits itself to passive defence. A pact that renounces in advance striking the origin of aggression condemns the aggrieved to count their dead; deterrence requires striking Houthi launchers, depots, and factories. For Fidan to also claim to turn a summit convened for Gulf security into a tribune against Israel dilutes its objective. Spain, once again, is not in the room.
Outlook and Scenarios
Fresh Houthi attacks against Riyadh, airports, and Aramco plants (highly probable) with more foreign casualties and further flight cancellations until mid-November.
R4+E3 declaration of support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and freedom of navigation (probable) without concrete military commitments or deterrent capacity.
Activation of pro-Iranian terrorist organisations from Iraq (possible) if war against Iran resumes, despite Baghdad's commitment.
Ukraine: Brussels responds to Trump's diesel, Starlink remains capped, and Moscow wants a "final agreement"
Facts
The EU has responded to Trump's Russian diesel deal with a proposal for new energy sanctions: 31 listings targeting Russian oil processing, refining, and export capacity, from St Petersburg to Sakhalin (The Kyiv Independent). It is Europe's second reaction in ten days: on 12 October, the Council had already listed 1,569 individuals and entities linked to the missile production chain, and then-Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned that for Germany and Europe, a decision like Trump's "is ruled out", whilst EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas recalled that "a ceasefire cannot work if only one party respects it" and that an arrangement limited to refineries would benefit Russia (Kyiv Post). Bloomberg reveals that Rosneft officials privately fear months more of Ukrainian strikes against their refineries will cause lasting damage.
A Ukrainian official denied that Trump and Musk have restored Starlink speed in Ukraine, as The Wall Street Journal had published: the speed cap of 161 kilometres per hour remains in force. "In general, nothing has changed," he stated (The Kyiv Independent). Finland announced during its Prime Minister's visit to Kyiv over $336 million for Ukraine's energy system and satellite capability development, and Finnish tech companies presented a plan to help Ukraine acquire its own satellite system.
Putin told state TV that trilateral talks will seek Russia's and Ukraine's security "within the framework of a final agreement, not after some kind of brief pause in fighting" (The Hindu). Political scientist Andreas Umland spoke on the Tagesschau — ARD's news programme — of "negotiating theatre". Zelenskyy referred sarcastically to Russian "humanists", alluding to Witkoff's praise for Putin, and The Kyiv Independent gathered the outrage of Kyiv residents hours after the bombing. Republican Congressman Don Bacon told CNN: "Our president is morally blind regarding this war. He has allied with a dictator and war criminal." Two Democratic lawmakers denounced a covert Russian disinformation campaign against US politicians favourable to Ukraine ahead of the midterms. Trump aims to clinch a peace agreement at the G20 summit to be held at his Doral resort in Miami on 14 and 15 December (taz).
At the front, troops from the 2nd Khartiia Corps infiltrated the Russian rear near Kupiansk through some 15 kilometres of gas pipelines, in an operation dubbed "Veles", and the Ukrainian General Staff claims to have destroyed a Russian electronic warfare station in the Bryansk region. This morning, a Russian drone strike injured nine people, two of them children, in the Zhytomyr region (The Kyiv Independent).
Implications
Brussels has done what is asked of it this week: not following Washington when Washington is wrong. The 31 new listings target the heart of Russia's war economy — hydrocarbon exports — precisely when the White House is buying diesel from Moscow. It is the best possible response to Witkoff's ill-timing: not with press releases, but with pressure. That Rosneft fears for its refineries confirms that pressure, coupled with Ukrainian drones, is working. What does not work is transatlantic incoherence: if Washington relieves on one hand what Europe tightens on the other, the Kremlin merely has to wait.
The Starlink denial is graver than it appears. If the White House announces corrections that do not materialise, the credibility of its commitments to Kyiv erodes just as Putin demands a "final agreement" enshrining his conquests rather than a ceasefire. The Democratic lawmakers' denunciation of Russian disinformation also deserves attention: the Kremlin is not only awaiting the outcome of 3 November, but working to influence it, targeting lawmakers from both parties defending Ukraine. Operation "Veles" near Kupiansk, lastly, demonstrates that the Ukrainian military retains an initiative and tactical innovation capacity belying narratives of a collapsing front. Finland, sharing 1,340 kilometres of border with Russia and needing no lessons regarding its neighbour, points the way: native capabilities, including in space, so Ukraine's defence does not depend on a businessman's mood.
Outlook and Scenarios
Approval of the EU's new energy package (probable) with Hungary's resistance as the main hurdle, given the unanimity requirement.
Trilateral talks in mid-November without a ceasefire (probable) with Moscow demanding a "final agreement" and the Donbas as the price.
Framework agreement announced at the Miami G20 (improbable) barring territorial concessions Kyiv and Europe cannot accept.
France speaks of "sedition"; Sánchez explains Ceuta on a talk show, and a Moroccan MP lays claim to Ceuta and Melilla
Facts
Macron condemned on Thursday the "sedition" of far-left groups representing, he said, a "grave danger" to the Republic, denounced "criminal acts", and demanded "extreme measures"; he also acknowledged "anticipation failures" (Euronews, Le Figaro). He is chairing a defence council today. On Saturday the 24th, only trade union-called marches along routes protecting shops and public buildings will be authorised nationwide, and prefects may ban other gatherings; Marseille, Lyon, Nice, and Lille have already vetoed them. Interior State Secretary Jean-Didier Berger announced a 20% increase in personnel compared to 17 October, when nearly 60,000 were deployed, reinforced by Operation Sentinelle soldiers and elite units (Euronews). Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu gathered parties and the mayors of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille at Matignon on Thursday to study a shift in doctrine for maintaining order and securing presidential campaign rallies. Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Édouard Philippe did not attend; Marine Tondelier, Raphaël Glucksmann, and Bruno Retailleau did.
Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin records 2,700 arrests, over 1,000 people referred to court, and 217 jailed, mostly men aged 18 to 25 with no prior record, and has asked prosecutors in a circular to request complementary penalties banning demonstrations and stripping civic rights, including voting (BFM TV). In Strasbourg, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize to the ICC, sanctioned by Washington on 9 October; the abstention of the Patriots for Europe group proved decisive (Euronews).
In Spain, Sánchez kicked off his campaign interview rounds on TVE's "La Revuelta". Regarding Ceuta, he admitted: "We could have handled it better." According to his account, 141 people, many of them children, died during the mass entry of 30 and 31 July, and he defended the Government's response: "Had we done something more aggressive, we would be talking about a higher figure." He acknowledged that "you need Morocco's cooperation to stop it on their side", put the number of Moroccans who have voluntarily returned at over 12,000, and described Ábalos's corruption cases as a "double disappointment" (Demócrata, El Faro de Ceuta).
He has yet to confirm his presence at Mediaset and Atresmedia debates; the PSOE accepts a one-on-one with Feijóo on 16 November, whilst the PP wants him outside RTVE (Infobae). Feijóo, Abascal, and Frente Amplio head of list Ada Colau have also accepted an interview without pre-agreed questions on Jordi Wild's podcast, to which Sánchez has not replied. Feijóo accused the president of "agitating fear" to cover up his Government's scandals and compared his strategy to the 1996 "doberman" campaign, and Abascal reproached the PP for condemning Milei's insults against Sánchez, calling them a "smoke screen". In the interview, Sánchez also maintained that Spain, despite receiving "much migration", has "one of the lowest crime rates in Europe" and that the Government has dedicated €500 million to integration policies.
The JEC partially upheld a PP complaint: the CIS failed in its obligation to inform parties on time regarding the October barometer. It asked its president, José Félix Tezanos, to refrain from actions contrary to electoral legislation, though it did not open proceedings. In Rabat, during the debate on the new Government's programme, House of Representatives Vice-President Adil El Bitar, a PAM MP, laid claim to Morocco's "legitimate rights" to "recover Ceuta, Melilla, and the occupied Moroccan islands", through "dialogue and peaceful means" (Europa Press).
Implications
Macron has finally named the problem: an organised far-left seeking to overthrow the Republic. Darmanin's firmness is necessary and has legal basis, because Article 131-26 of the French Penal Code allows judges to impose civic rights deprivation as a complementary penalty for up to five years in cases of felonies; it must, however, be applied in an individualised and reasoned manner, never en masse, or it will hand violent actors the narrative of repression.
The profile of those detained — mostly young men aged 18 to 25 with no record — also compels a reflection exceeding public order: the organised far-left has managed to mobilise a generation without prospects, and the State's response cannot be solely penal. The absence of Le Pen, Bardella, and Philippe from Lecornu's consultation is, for its part, irresponsible: aspiring to govern France in April precludes absenting oneself when discussing how to protect the campaign leading to the Élysée.
Sánchez's interview portrays a Government confusing accountability with spectacle. One hundred and forty-one dead in two days on Spanish soil — nearly double what was admitted in August — warranted a appearance before Congress, not an entertainment set.
El Bitar's claim demands a firm and serene response: Spanish sovereignty over Melilla dates back to 1497, and Ceuta's was recognised in the 1668 Treaty of Lisbon. It is appropriate, nonetheless, to distinguish an MP's voice from the position of Rabat's Government, whose cooperation has enabled over 12,000 voluntary returns, avoiding succumbing to the anti-Moroccan hysteria stoked by some in Spain.
Outlook and Scenarios
Tense yet contained Saturday in France (probable) with union-only marches, local bans, and a 20% increase in personnel.
Ceuta and sovereignty at the centre of the 29 November campaign (probable) with the opposition demanding explanations in Congress over the 141 dead.
Spanish diplomatic response to the Moroccan claim (possible) likely discreet, so as not to damage migration cooperation.
Media Rack
The Guardian: Publishes Patrick Wintour's interview with Rezaei and the "zero red lines" doctrine.
The Wall Street Journal: Reports that Iran warned it could attack Gulf airports and pipelines and that Trump asked Musk to restore Starshield.
Reuters: Reveals, via six sources, the evacuation of Aramco's Dhahran headquarters.
The Jerusalem Post: Carries Trump's epithet, "truly evil regime", and Israeli sanctions against Coral Oil for supplying Hizbulá.
Bloomberg: Reveals Rosneft officials' unease over Ukrainian strikes against their refineries.
Al Arabiya Business: Carries Amin Nasser's explanations regarding the East-West pipeline, now carrying 7 million barrels per day.
Time: Analyses post-midterm strike plans and the five operational plans Trump has rejected.
Arab News: Reports on the missile interception over Riyadh, Iraq's and Arab nations' condemnation, and the European Parliament petition to declare Houthis terrorists.
Al Jazeera: Carries CENTCOM's denial regarding mines and displacement figures in Taiz.
Kuwait Times: With AFP, previews Fidan's agenda for the Istanbul R4+E3 meeting.
The Kyiv Independent: Covers the European energy sanctions proposal, the Starlink denial, and Operation "Veles" near Kupiansk.
Tagesschau: Cites Andreas Umland, who speaks of Russian "negotiating theatre".
Le Figaro: Summarises Macron's statements on the far-left and Saturday's protest regime.
Euronews: Details the 24 October police reinforcement, absences at Lecornu's consultation, and the Sakharov Prize awarded to the ICC.
BFM TV: Carries Darmanin's circular asking to strip rioters of voting rights.
Infobae: Follows the Spanish campaign: debates, the JEC, and Sánchez's agenda.
El Faro de Ceuta: Carries Sánchez's admission on crisis management.
Demócrata: Reproduces Sánchez's lines on "La Revuelta" regarding Ceuta, cooperation with Morocco, and Ábalos's corruption.
Europa Press: Broadcasts the claim to Ceuta and Melilla by the Moroccan House of Representatives Vice-President.
Editorial Commentary
The regime that confesses
For forty-seven years, the Tehran regime has practiced terrorism whilst denying it. This week it stopped denying it. Mohsen Rezaei announces in a British newspaper that if Iran is attacked, it will strike cables, data centres, refineries, airports, and pipelines in seven countries not at war with it. His colleague Mohammadi sums it up with a frankness that should chill the blood of any chancellery: "zero red lines". Trump, for his part, has finally found the exact word: "truly evil". It is one of those rare occasions when the US president's language and reality coincide.
It is worth understanding what that confession means. Thomas Schelling taught that the most effective threat is one leaving something to chance: the adversary appearing capable of anything forces others to calculate for them. Tehran has read Schelling better than many European chancelleries. Its message is not aimed at Washington, but at Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, and Manama: if you wish to remain the financial, logistic, and digital hub of the world, convince the Americans not to attack us. It is blackmail in its purest form, and the response can only be that formulated by Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. The Carter Doctrine was born to protect the Gulf from Moscow; today it must protect it from Tehran.
Europe would do wrong to believe the matter does not concern it. Passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf are cables binding the continent to Asia terminating in Marseille, one of the planet's major telecommunications nodes; the Gulf's data centres host services for European companies, and the refineries and pipelines Rezaei threatens supply diesel to a France that has already had to source it in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama. European digital and energy sovereignty, so much spoken of in Brussels, is defended also in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, and not merely through regulations.
For that doctrine to be credible, Washington needs more than adjectives. Denying attacks documented by UKMTO and specialised portals does not weaken Iran; it weakens whoever denies them. Boasting that more oil is passing than ever, when that oil mostly traverses a Saudi pipeline built to bypass Hormuz, is claiming unearned credit. Credibility is a superpower's most valuable capital, and cannot be squandered in an electoral numbers war.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, remains on the frontline. Early this morning another Houthi missile aimed at Riyadh; Aramco has had to clear its headquarters. There are, however, two encouraging signs. Iraq publicly dissociates itself from any use of its territory against the Saudis, closing, at least on paper, a second front Tehran could open via its Iraqi terrorist organisations. The European Parliament asks, at last, to declare the Houthis terrorists. It remains for the Council to do so and for Istanbul not to turn into another half-measure. A format bringing London, Paris, and Berlin together with Riyadh, Ankara, Islamabad, and Cairo will only make sense if translated into real deterrence, and deterrence is not proclaimed: it is demonstrated by striking the origin of aggression. For Fidan to also pretend to turn a summit convened for Gulf security into a tribune against Israel is a distraction no one should countenance.
In Ukraine, the Union has given a lesson in coherence this week. Whilst Washington buys diesel from Moscow and its envoy praises Putin, Brussels prepares 31 new sanctions against the Russian oil industry, and Finland finances its own satellites so Ukrainian defence does not depend on anyone's goodwill. Putin, for his part, has clarified that he does not want a ceasefire, but a "final agreement" enshrining his conquests. Thucydides placed in the Athenians' mouths, in the Melian dialogue, that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must; Europe was built precisely so that law would no longer rule on its soil. European sanctions are, in that sense, much more than economics: they are the refusal to accept the Melian law. For Finland to set the pace also carries symbolic value hard to exaggerate. During the Cold War, the word "Finlandisation" denoted the prudent submission of a small country to Moscow's will. Since April 2023, Finland has been a member of NATO, and today funds Ukraine's space autonomy. Few countries know the price of complacency with the Kremlin better, and few have corrected it with such determination.
France and Spain offer, instead, two lessons in how not to do things. In Paris, Le Pen, Bardella, and Philippe leave their chairs empty in Matignon when discussing how to protect democracy from sedition; violent far-left elements and those hoping to reap their fruits in April deserve equal severity. In Madrid, the Prime Minister chooses an entertainment show to recount that 141 people died in Ceuta over two days in July. Article 108 of the Constitution provides that the Government is collectively responsible for its political management before the Congress of Deputies, not before a television set. That he should do so, moreover, on the very day a Moroccan MP lays claim to Ceuta and Melilla and seven countries discuss Gulf security in Istanbul without Spain portrays a social-communist Government that has turned foreign policy into absence and accountability into spectacle. El Bitar's response must be firm, legal, and serene; the response to the 141 dead, an immediate appearance.
Four demands stem from all this. First: that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's allies assume an updated Carter Doctrine for the Gulf, with real deterrent capacity against Iran and its terrorist terminals. Second: that the EU Council heed without delay the European Parliament's petition and declare the Houthis terrorists. Third: that Washington and Brussels close ranks on sanctions against Russia, because every transatlantic fissure is a victory for the Kremlin. Fourth: that Sánchez appear before Congress over Ceuta before the end of the legislative term. The Tehran regime has confessed it has no red lines. The West must prove that its own exist.