What you need to know:
- Growing onions or tomatoes is hardly rocket science. Getting them to market profitably is harder.
Uganda has fertile land, abundant freshwater and, across much of the country, two rainy seasons. Yet it imports rice from Tanzania, onions from its neighbours and garlic from China. Why must a country with such agricultural advantages spend foreign currency on food it could potentially grow itself?
World Bank trade data show that Uganda imported $229.5m (Shs942b) of rice in 2024, including $224.6m (Shs922b)from Tanzania. Imports of onions, shallots, garlic and related vegetables reached $12.2m (Shs50b), while fresh tomato imports amounted to $1.6m (Shs6.6b). China alone supplied $2.6m (Shs11b) of garlic. These figures do not establish that every import could be replaced economically. They do, however, expose questions about Uganda's agricultural competitiveness.
The paradox runs deeper. Uganda also exports onions and tomatoes, notably to neighbouring markets. That two-way trade reflects differences in location, season, quality and prices, not necessarily failure. But the ability to export some produce does not excuse the obstacles preventing farmers from supplying domestic consumers consistently and affordably.
Consider the shilling. Importers seeking dollars to purchase food abroad add to demand for foreign exchange. Replacing competitively produced imports with domestic goods, purchased in shillings, could reduce some of that pressure. Yet food is only one component of the import bill. Fuel, machinery, debt servicing and capital movements are major influences on the currency. Agricultural reform will not magically reverse depreciation.
That distinction matters because the Bank of Uganda cannot remedy structural weaknesses through interest rates alone. The central bank can manage liquidity and inflation, but it cannot build irrigation schemes, improve rural roads or make agricultural credit affordable.
Growing onions or tomatoes is hardly rocket science. Getting them to market profitably is harder. Many farmers face expensive transport, inadequate storage, unreliable buyers and limited bargaining power. Perishable crops can rot while households in Kampala pay high prices. Middlemen are often blamed, sometimes fairly, but traders also provide essential transport, financing and distribution. The objective should be competitive supply chains, not simply eliminating intermediaries.
Government has a central role here. Reliable electricity, feeder roads, irrigation, warehouses and transparent wholesale markets can lower production and distribution costs. Producer cooperatives can strengthen bargaining power; better credit and insurance can encourage investment in seeds, equipment and processing. Agricultural policy should be measured by yields, lower losses and farmers' earnings, not ribbon-cutting ceremonies.
There is also a strategic dimension. Trade is beneficial, particularly within the East African Community. But food imports can become a vulnerability when suppliers suffer droughts, impose export restrictions or prioritise their own consumers. Were Tanzania to restrict rice exports after a poor harvest, Uganda could confront shortages or higher prices. Diversified suppliers and stronger domestic production would provide insurance against such shocks.
This is not a case for closing borders. Tariffs and bans that shelter inefficient producers can make basic foods unaffordable, hitting poorer families hardest. If Tanzanian rice is cheaper, policymakers should establish why. Is the difference irrigation, yields, milling, transport, quality or access to capital? Once the bottlenecks are known, reform should make Ugandan produce competitive rather than make imports artificially expensive.
A successful agricultural transformation would also advance industrialisation. Rice milling, tomato processing, packaging, cold storage and food distribution create jobs beyond farming. Higher rural incomes stimulate demand for manufactured goods and services. Competitive producers can earn export revenue, not merely save dollars. Indeed, Uganda's challenge is not to abandon regional trade but to participate in it from a position of greater productive strength.
Uganda should resist confusing hectares cultivated with prosperity delivered. A farmer cultivating a larger plot without water, storage or a predictable market may remain poor. Public spending must therefore address what happens after harvest as seriously as what happens before planting. Otherwise, agricultural expansion merely produces another cycle of gluts, collapsing farm prices and costly shortages a few months later. That cycle is neither inevitable nor sensible.
Political leaders often praise agriculture as the backbone of the economy. The phrase means little if farmers remain trapped between low farm-gate prices and expensive urban markets. Nor is fertile soil, by itself, an economic strategy. Rainfall needs irrigation; harvests need storage; enterprise needs functioning institutions.
Uganda cannot print dollars, and its central bank cannot grow onions, tomatoes or rice. But policymakers can create conditions in which Ugandan farmers supply more of the food Ugandans eat, at prices they can afford. In an uncertain trading world, that is not isolationism. It is economic resilience, built at home.
Samuel Obedgiu, Biotechnologist and geopolitical Analyst. sammyobedgiu@gmail.com