Libya’s latest push toward elections faces a familiar and dangerous enemy: a political order in which armed factions can sabotage national progress while rival institutions argue over legitimacy and accountability. The country’s Aug. 30 agreement between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based General Command offers a potential pathway out of years of fragmentation. Yet no diplomatic document can guarantee peace when powerful networks retain the ability to attack oil facilities, disrupt electricity supplies and threaten the water infrastructure on which millions depend.
The question confronting Libya is no longer simply whether its rival political camps can negotiate. It is whether they can enforce what they sign-and whether those responsible for undermining the process will face consequences.
Facilitated by Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the negotiations included meetings in Rome and seven rounds of discussions in Tunis. The resulting agreement establishes a 24-month framework toward presidential and legislative elections, addresses the reconstitution of the High National Elections Commission’s board, and seeks to resolve outstanding constitutional and legal obstacles.
This is a significant diplomatic opening. Direct negotiations between the principal centers of power offer a more practical alternative to agreements imposed without the participation of those capable of implementing or obstructing them. For the GNU, the process also demonstrates that western Libya’s fragmented political landscape can produce a negotiating position despite competing institutions, armed formations and municipal interests.
The eastern camp, dominated by Khalifa Haftar’s military structure, presents a different challenge. Its apparently centralized command may facilitate negotiations, but competing interests within Haftar’s family and the ambitions of rival power brokers raise questions about whether formal authority translates into reliable political commitments.
Ultimately, both camps must demonstrate that their signatures carry weight beyond the negotiating table.
Political agreements cannot replace institutional legitimacy
Progress on financial arrangements has offered grounds for cautious optimism. American engagement, including efforts by US special adviser Massad Boulos, has helped advance a unified financial spending agreement across Libya’s political divide, creating a foundation for the subsequent political initiative.
But the legislative response has exposed the fragility of the process. The eastern-based House of Representatives endorsed the 4+4 agreement on Sept. 14, following an Aug. 31 statement of support by 103 lawmakers. On Oct. 5, however, the High Council of State rejected the agreement and associated measures, arguing that they bypassed constitutional requirements and institutional consensus.
This is not a procedural disagreement that diplomats can simply brush aside. Libya’s rival institutions base their claims to legitimacy on competing legal interpretations. Bypassing one institution risks creating another disputed transitional arrangement-precisely the kind of political ambiguity that has repeatedly undermined the country’s attempts to establish stable governance.
Addressing the UN Security Council on Oct. 14, Tetteh continued to defend the agreement while signaling plans to engage the 4+4 participants in developing a broader political mechanism. That approach is sensible, provided that expanding participation strengthens the agreement’s legitimacy rather than becoming another excuse for indefinite negotiations.
Libya cannot afford a political process that produces signatures but no elections, or elections whose legitimacy is contested before the results are even announced.
Sabotage turns political instability into an economic weapon
The threat extends well beyond parliamentary disputes. Drone attacks in August and September targeted oil storage, electricity and water infrastructure in western Libya while negotiations were advancing. These incidents demonstrate how vulnerable the country remains to actors capable of turning essential services into instruments of political pressure.
At Zawiya, approximately 50 kilometers west of Tripoli, attacks struck a refinery capable of processing 120,000 barrels per day. One damaged storage tank held about 4.5 million liters of gasoline. The complex is connected to the Sharara oilfield, which has a production capacity of approximately 300,000 barrels per day, linking extraction, transportation, refining and domestic fuel supplies.
The consequences spread beyond the oil sector. An attack on the South Zawiya electricity substation contributed to major power outages, while General Electric withdrew technical personnel from a nearby power plant. More than 700 megawatts of its 1,300-megawatt capacity subsequently remained unavailable. Attacks on desalination infrastructure added another threat to already vulnerable communities.
These are not merely technical failures or isolated acts of vandalism. In a country heavily dependent on oil revenues, damage to energy infrastructure threatens public finances, salaries, subsidies and essential services simultaneously. Electricity shortages disrupt hospitals and businesses, while fuel interruptions raise transportation costs and intensify pressure on households already struggling with inflation reportedly exceeding 14 percent.
Tetteh has also reported that 30–40 percent of subsidized fuel was diverted into smuggling, generating estimated losses exceeding $4.4 billion. This exposes another structural weakness: subsidies designed to protect ordinary citizens can become a lucrative source of income for trafficking networks exploiting weak state institutions.
Armed groups have additional leverage through pipeline blockades. September disruptions involving the Petroleum Facilities Guard reportedly caused production losses of one million barrels and financial losses of approximately $100 million. When armed actors can interrupt national revenue to extract concessions, the distinction between security enforcement and political coercion becomes dangerously blurred.
No election agreement can deliver lasting stability while the country’s economic lifelines remain vulnerable to armed pressure.
Allegations demand investigation, not political convenience
The GNU announced in September that it had arrested five Libyan and foreign nationals over attacks on oil storage facilities in Tripoli and Zawiya and the Zawiya power station. Authorities linked the alleged cell to Omar Al-Majarhi of the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade and alleged connections to Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the eastern-based Libyan National Army.
In an Oct. 3 report, The Guardian cited sources within the GNU alleging that suspects detained over the attacks were working for Haftar. These remain allegations, not established findings of guilt. Nevertheless, their implications are serious enough to demand a credible, independent investigation.
If evidence establishes that individuals connected to powerful military networks organized attacks on civilian infrastructure, political influence must not shield them from accountability. Equally, accusations cannot substitute for proof or become weapons for discrediting opponents without due process.
Walid Al-Lafi, the GNU’s communication and political affairs minister and head of its 4+4 negotiating delegation, has defended the process as a route toward elections while stressing that negotiations must not excuse violations or disregard the rights of affected citizens. His position reflects the dilemma facing Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah: abandoning negotiations could strengthen those benefiting from division, but continuing them without credible accountability could undermine public confidence in the government itself.
The solution is neither diplomatic paralysis nor political impunity. It is to protect negotiations while allowing investigators to establish responsibility through evidence, transparent procedures and lawful prosecution.
Libya needs enforceable peace, not another promise
The international community must recognize that Libya’s political and security crises cannot be resolved in isolation. Financial unification, electoral preparations, infrastructure protection and security-sector reform are interdependent. Progress in one area will remain fragile if armed networks can sabotage another.
The United Nations and external partners should press Libya’s rival authorities to establish credible monitoring mechanisms, strengthen protection for critical infrastructure and pursue security-sector reforms that place armed formations under accountable state authority. Electoral preparations must also include meaningful institutional consensus, clear legal rules and safeguards against renewed political obstruction.
Libya’s 4+4 agreement offers a potential route toward elections, but its success will depend on whether commitments become enforceable obligations. The country has already endured years of failed transitions and competing promises.
The decisive test is whether Libya’s leaders can prevent armed power brokers from holding the nation’s future hostage. Until sabotage is investigated, institutions gain genuine legitimacy and security forces become accountable, every diplomatic breakthrough will remain vulnerable to the next attack.
Libya does not need another agreement that looks convincing on paper. It needs a political settlement strong enough to survive those who profit from its failure.
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