Israel’s Election: Who’s Who and What’s at Stake?

October 22, 2026 4:14 p.m.

Israelis will head to the polls on October 27 to cast their vote to elect the 120 members of the twenty-sixth Knesset, Israel’s parliament. The election is viewed domestically as one of the most consequential in the country’s history, and yet there are concerns that no majority coalition will emerge after the vote.

This will be Israel’s first election since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks, and it could prove to be a referendum on whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should remain in power. Many Jewish Israelis are also weighing how the next government tackles accountability questions surrounding the October 7 attacks, military service for the ultra-Orthodox, cost-of-living concerns, Israel’s standing abroad, and several other national security issues.

Despite the intense attention brought on by the war in Gaza, the question of Palestinian statehood is not a priority for most Israelis, and virtually every Jewish-majority party, including the leading challengers to Netanyahu, has rejected it. Only the minority Arab parties have voiced support for a Palestinian state.

Polls indicate that it will be a close race between Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition. Whether either side can assemble the sixty-one-seat majority needed to govern after the election could depend on a reshuffled party map and a handful of small parties.

How do Israeli elections work?

Israel elects its parliament through nationwide proportional representation. Citizens aged eighteen and older vote for a party, not a candidate, and the number of seats in the Knesset that a party gets corresponds to the percentage of votes they receive. Before the election, parties submit lists of prospective members of the Knesset. To enter the Knesset, a party must receive at least 3.25 percent of the national vote, which is equivalent to four seats.

Under the Bader-Ofer Law of 1973, seats in the Knesset are distributed based on each party’s total votes, as long as that party meets the electoral threshold of 3.25 percent. A complicated formula is then used to distribute the votes that went toward the parties that did not meet the threshold.

After the election, and once all the seats are allocated, the president consults the parties and gives a mandate to the member of the Knesset that the president believes is best suited to form a government. Historically, this has been a coalition of parties rather than an individual, since no single party has ever won the sixty-one seats needed for a majority. If that person fails to form a government within twenty-eight days, the president can either give the mandate to someone else or to the Knesset to find a candidate. If no one manages to form a coalition with a sixty-one-seat majority, Israelis return to the ballot box.

Who is running?

Despite fighting on multiple fronts following the October 2023 attacks and repeated coalition crises, the outgoing Knesset is on track to become the first since 1988 to complete a full four-year term. But that does not mean that Israeli lawmakers will return united after the election.

“There are numerous issues that will make coalition-building especially hard,” Elliott Abrams, a CFR senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, said. “Should Arab parties be in a new coalition or excluded? What about coalitions with the [ultra-Orthodox] Haredim, who are demanding that their young men not be drafted? Should opposition figures agree to a coalition led by Netanyahu if he excludes the far right, or is he unacceptable now, after October 7?” The current party composition heading into this election varies significantly from the last Knesset, and polling indicates that the direction of Israel’s politics and future could be fraught with uncertainty.

There are two political blocs that can differentiate candidates on a macro level: the Netanyahu coalition and the anti-Netanyahu cadre.

Core players in the Netanyahu bloc include National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir of Otzma Yehudit, Shas party leader Aryeh Deri, and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich of the Religious Zionism-Zehut joint list. (A joint list is an electoral alliance in which two or more political parties run together under a shared list of candidates.) But this bloc hasn’t been static. Ben-Gvir’s party left Netanyahu’s governing coalition in January 2025 over the Gaza ceasefire—though it returned two months later—and United Torah Judaism, whose leadership served in Netanyahu’s cabinet, left in July 2025 over the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men.

In the anti-Netanyahu bloc, Gadi Eisenkot of Yashar! is widely believed to be the leading challenger to Netanyahu. But Naftali Bennett, the former Israeli prime minister, is also in contention after his party, Bennett 2026, merged with Yesh Atid, the party of opposition leader Yair Lapid, to create B’Yachad. Other opposition candidates include Yair Golan, former deputy chief of staff in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), of The Democrats, and former Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman of Yisrael Beiteinu, whose base is largely secular and historically Russian speaking.

What could determine the election’s outcome?

The outcome of the election is difficult to predict, in part because there are fractures within Netanyahu’s coalition in the current Knesset. For example, after disagreement over the conscription laws for Haredim, United Torah Judaism said it will not block an Eisenkot-led coalition. Steven A. Cook, CFR senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, also noted that the incentives of Netanyahu’s current partners are not necessarily aligning with his own.

“It seems to me that Ben-Gvir wants to be a kingmaker on the right and is looking not only at this election but elections in the future,” he told CFR. “To the extent that he can shield the Haredim from the draft, the better it is for him electorally.”

The anti-Netanyahu coalition is branding itself as the so-called change bloc. In September 2026, the leaders of the bloc signed a joint statement outlining their priorities. They include agreeing to not attack each other politically, establishing a commission of inquiry into the October 7 attacks, agreeing on a unified position on conscripting ultra-Orthodox men currently exempt from serving in the IDF, setting term limits for the prime minister, and drafting a formal constitution.

The change bloc, however, has not agreed upon a successor to Netanyahu as prime minister. Significantly, the signed document also did not include a position on sitting with any of the Arab parties, which Netanyahu was quick to attack. Polling indicates that Arab parties could receive a record level of support this election.    

“The opposition cannot get to sixty-one seats without either the Haredim or Ra’am [an Arab political party],” Cook said. “It seems that it is easier for some members of the opposition coalition to accommodate the latter, but it will break a taboo in Israeli politics. [It’s] a step they are reluctant to take.”

Where do things currently stand?

Neither side has a clear path to a majority in the Knesset. Netanyahu is constricted by being significantly less popular than in previous runs and will have to build a coalition with far-right parties. The change bloc is restricted by some of its members’ unwillingness to build a government with any Arab party. There are other constraints as well.

“Personal ambition is a factor, as always, and several opposition leaders may demand to be prime minister either now or in a rotation agreement,” Abrams said. “Negotiations will take weeks, and their failure, leading to another election, is quite plausible.”

Israel is known for drawn-out coalition negotiations, and there is no reason to believe that this election will be any different. Small parties could emerge as major players in certain circumstances. These include Amcha Yisrael, which is led by retired IDF General Ofer Winter, and the center-right Reservists-Economy joint list, led by Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelekha, which is mostly pulling votes from the Netanyahu bloc. This leads to a stronger possibility that there is no majority reached without the Arab and ultra-Orthodox parties. 

“The way out of the mathematical mess is a rotational government with Eisenkot and Netanyahu trading places after an agreed time, but then what is the point of the opposition coalition?” Cook said. “Wasn’t the rationale—and their subsequent program—geared toward preventing Netanyahu from occupying the prime ministry again? This reveals the difference between what their constituents want and what is possible in Israeli politics at the moment.”

Consequently, there are three concessions that could lead to a government: a rotational government, sitting with Arab parties, or sitting with ultra-Orthodox parties.  

How could the election outcome influence Israel’s foreign policy?

Israel’s relationships with the United States, Europe, and its Arab neighbors have grown increasingly strained, leading to a period of deepening international isolation. However, Abrams and Cook agreed that regardless of the election results, it is unlikely that Israel will abruptly change its foreign policy.

“There is a strong Israeli consensus on a tough policy toward Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, and against the formation in the foreseeable future of a sovereign Palestinian state,” Abrams explained. Cook added that an opposition victory wouldn’t change too much, “other than an improved tone and tenor of Israel’s relations with its neighbors.”

A shift in tone might be the biggest foreign policy change to emerge from the election, and Abrams and Cook said it could give the United States greater flexibility in its approach to the region. Beyond helping strengthen U.S.-Israel relations, a change in government could also lead to a shift in Israeli policy toward settler violence in the West Bank.

“If Netanyahu is defeated, a new coalition is likely to be tougher on settler violence in the West Bank and that should alleviate some criticism, especially from Democrats,” Abrams said. Cook agreed: a “clamp down on settlers who are attacking Palestinians in the West Bank… will be helpful, especially for Israel-Jordan ties,” he said.

It is unlikely that a conclusive leadership coalition will materialize soon after the October 27 vote. Even when it does, the prevailing questions facing Israel will linger. Whatever the outcome of the upcoming election, countries across the world—notably the United States and those in Europe and the Middle East—will be watching closely.