The Middle Eastern War is now expanding from its traditional battlefield into a broader theater of conflict, with Yemen and the seas around the Arabian Peninsula becoming one of the major fronts of such escalation. The initial conflict, which was aimed at Israel and merchant vessels by the Houthi movement that is aligned with Iran, has been transformed into a bigger dispute between Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and possibly even Africa's shores of the Gulf of Aden. The Gulf seems to be caught between Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb
The latest escalation has exposed the vulnerability of even the region's most heavily defended infrastructure. On October 10, a Houthi attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed at least 13 people and injured more than 300, according to subsequent reports. A further strike the following day killed a Pakistani national and wounded 11 others. Saudi authorities have since investigated the failure of their air defences, while international airlines have suspended services and the airport is expected to remain closed until at least October 17.
Interestingly enough, the attacks have also reopened a sensitive diplomatic question, whether Israel and Saudi Arabia could find common military ground against the Houthis despite the absence of formal relations.
Because, according to an October 12 report by Haaretz, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought Saudi approval, through American intermediaries, for Israeli participation in operations against the Yemeni movement. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reportedly resisted the proposal, fearing a domestic backlash against overt military cooperation with Israel. The claims remain unconfirmed by Saudi authorities, but they illustrate the complicated intersection of security interests and political constraints confronting Riyadh.
Yet the potential geography of this confrontation extends much further than Saudi Arabia. Across the Gulf of Aden, on the African shore facing Yemen, Somaliland has emerged as a possible strategic foothold for Israel.
In December 2025, Israel became the first country to formally recognise Somaliland's independence, a decision condemned by Somalia and criticised by several regional governments. Three months later, Bloomberg reported that Israel was exploring a possible military and intelligence presence near Berbera, raising questions about whether the Gulf of Aden could become a new theatre of operations against the Houthis.
For Lebanon-based political analyst Hazem Al-Tawil, the significance of these developments lies in the unusual possibility of an Israel-Iran confrontation extending to opposite shores of a strategically vital maritime passage. In his commentary to AzerNEWS, he drew attention to the emerging geographical relationship between Somaliland and Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, arguing that the Gulf of Aden could develop into a flashpoint of its own rather than remaining merely an extension of the Red Sea shipping crisis:
"When we examine the map of the Gulf of Aden, an interesting geopolitical configuration emerges. On its southern shore lies Somaliland, which Israel recognised in December 2025. On the opposite shore, roughly 260 kilometres away in the area under consideration, are the Houthis, who belong to the Iran-aligned Axis of Resistance and have been attacking Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since 2023. Usually, when external powers compete through their allies, the confrontation takes place within the borders of a single country, as we have seen in Libya, Syria, and Yemen itself. What makes this case different is that the opposing sides are located on separate shores, with their own political authorities and external supporters. It is an unusual configuration, and finding an exact historical precedent is difficult."
Al-Tawil compared the situation with the confrontation between Chad and Sudan during the second half of the 2000s, when both governments were accused of supporting armed groups operating against the other.
"The possibility of an Israeli foothold in Somaliland is particularly significant because of Berbera's proximity to Yemen. That access to Berbera International Airport could considerably shorten Israeli military operations against Houthi targets, while providing additional surveillance capabilities over the southern Red Sea.
The conditions for such a confrontation are gradually taking
shape. In March, Bloomberg reported that Israel was considering
establishing intelligence and early-warning facilities near
Berbera. The Houthis had already warned in December that any
Israeli military presence in Somaliland would become a target.
Following the beginning of the American-Israeli military campaign
against Iran in February, the Houthis resumed attacks against
Israel in March. More recently, the Somali president stated that
Israel was planning a naval facility in Berbera. Taken together,
these developments suggest that the confrontation may gradually
acquire a second geographical dimension, extending from Yemen
towards the African shore."
He then emphasised that several factors could restrain escalation. Somaliland has its own political interests and aspirations for international recognition, while the Houthis, despite their close relationship with Tehran, retain a degree of operational autonomy:
"As I see it, there are several factors that may hinder the realization of this scenario. Somaliland is not merely a tool of Israeli foreign policy; it has its own political ambitions and is capable of weighing the risks involved in participation in the conflict which may compromise its security and economic interests. In addition, the Houthis do not entirely depend on Tehran; therefore, it would be wrong to view all their actions as direct orders from Iran. The fact is that the UAE has vested interests in Berbera which include port infrastructure managed by DP World. In other words, the assault on the city would impact the interests of the Emiratis too. But above all else, the exact scale of Israel’s military presence has not been confirmed yet. It is significant since there is a huge difference between intelligence collaboration and negotiations about military bases. Repeated attacks on airports, energy facilities and maritime infrastructure strike directly at the kingdom's ambitions to attract investment, expand tourism and diversify its economy under Vision 2030."
The expert argued that these economic vulnerabilities could become a powerful incentive for further military cooperation, but also a reason for governments to avoid an uncontrolled expansion of the conflict.
"The economic consequences of the US-Israel-Iran confrontation have already become evident. Since the onset of this dispute, the idea of securing safe access to trade routes has deteriorated. Houthi attacks have significantly affected Israel's access to the Red Sea, while renewed threats against Saudi Arabia and commercial shipping have raised security costs throughout the region. If the Gulf of Aden turns into another military front, the repercussions will likely extend beyond Israel, Iran, and Yemen. This situation could disrupt the maritime route that links Asia with Europe via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, impacting both shores of the waterway. The real danger is that a confrontation initially involving military facilities, intelligence networks or limited strikes could gradually expand into a broader regional conflict. Once multiple countries and external powers become involved, controlling the process of escalation becomes much more difficult."