Ali v Maradi and abuse of fundamental rights cases (2)

Whether Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules for Recovery of Debt or Contractual or Commercial Disputes:

The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is not designed as a debt-recovery mechanism and it is not a procedural shortcut for resolving contractual or commercial disputes. The fast-track nature of fundamental rights proceedings must not be abused to circumvent the regular processes prescribed for the determination of commercial or contractual claims. A claim brought for the enforcement of fundamental rights cannot, either directly or by judicial ingenuity, be transformed into an action for the recovery of a debt or for redress for breach of contract. Where the substratum of the action is commercial or contractual, the invocation of fundamental rights jurisdiction is incompetent and the action must fail. The applicable procedure must align with the nature of the claim. Where the principal or dominant claim is not the enforcement or protection of a fundamental right, the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules are inappropriate. Where the enforcement of a fundamental right constitutes the principal claim, the appropriate vehicle for such action is the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.

Per ADAH, J.S.C. at page 92-93, paras H-D:

“In the instant case, the. appellants initiated the proceedings seeking the enforcement of their fundamental rights. From the affidavits and the record before the court, the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint was the threat of arrest. The trial court, upon a proper evaluation of the matter, held that the transaction between the respondent and the appellants was purely civil in nature. In furtherance of that finding, the trial court ordered that the respondent shall not employ the services of any law enforcement agency to enforce the transaction between him and the appellants. That order adequately addressed the declaratory relief sought by the appellants in the enforcement proceedings. Regrettably, the lower courts thereafter veered off course. Having rightly found that there was no breach of the appellants’ fundamental rights and that the dispute was essentially contractual, the lower courts nonetheless proceeded to make orders for the recovery of an alleged debt arising from the transaction between the parties. By so doing, the lower courts exceeded the bounds of their jurisdiction in a fundamental rights application brought by the appellants.”

The Need for Court to Hear Parties on Issue Raised Suo Motu:

In Nigerian procedural jurisprudence, a court presiding over the case of parties may raise any issue suo motu as the interest of justice demands. However, once the issue is raised, it must allow the parties to address it before it settles the issue and make it part of its judgment. Courts of law must refrain from raising suo motu issues upon which their decisions or judgment would turn. The rationale for the approach is not difficult to understand. It is an inseparable adjunct of the concept of fair hearing. In the determination of dispute between parties, the court should confine itself to issues raised by the parties. The court is not competent, suo motu, to make a case for either of or both parties and then proceed to give judgment in the case so formulated contrary to the case of the parties before it.

When Court Need not Hear Parties on Issue Raised Suo Motu:

For every rule, there is potently and potentially an exception. The need to give the parties a hearing when a court raises an issue on its own motion or suo motu would not be necessary if: (a) the issue relates to the court’s own jurisdiction; (b) both parties are/were not aware or ignored a statute which may have bearing on the case, that is, where, by virtue of statutory provision, the court is expected to take judicial notice under section 73 of the Evidence Act; (c) on the face of the record, serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings is evident. In the instant case, no circumstance(s) existed to warrant the trial court and the Court of Appeal raising and turning an application for enforcement of a fundamental right to liberty into a contract debt recovery claim.

Proof of Registration of Company:

The only way and means by which the law requires the proof of existence of a registered company is by the production of its certificate of Incorporation. By section 36(6) the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the certificate of incorporation shall be prima facie evidence that all the requirements of the law in respect of registration and of matters precedent and incidental to it have been complied with and that the association is a company authorised to be registered and duly registered under the law. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the 2 nd appellant’s certificate of incorporation was the prima facie evidence that it was a registered company with its own legal personality. [Reptico S.A. Geneva v. Afribank Plc (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1373) 172 referred to.] (P. 88, paras. A-D)

The Constitutional Guarantee of Right to Personal Liberty:

Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), prescribes the fundamental rights guaranteed to every individual. Section 35 thereof specifically provides for the right to personal liberty. By virtue of section 35(1), every person is entitled to his personal liberty and shall not be deprived of such liberty except in the circumstances permitted under paragraphs referred to therein and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law.

 The Jurisdiction of High Court in Respect of Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Who can Invoke:

The enforcement of all fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty, falls within the special jurisdiction of the High Court. Section 46 (1)of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) expressly provides that any person who alleges that any of the provisions of Chapter IV has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him may apply to the High Court in that State for redress and that the High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine such application and may make appropriate orders, issue writs and give directions necessary for the enforcement of such rights. The provision is clear, unambiguous and admits no doubt. It confers locus on any person whose fundamental right has been breached, is being breached or is threatened with breach to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court for redress. Therefore, it is not a condition precedent that the right must have been actually violated. A likelihood or threat of violation is sufficient.

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CONCLUSION

As we come to the end of this piece on the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, it is important to reflect on the central message of our discussion: the protection of fundamental human rights is not merely a constitutional declaration; it is a practical commitment to justice, dignity, liberty, and the rule of law. These unique set of Rules provide an important framework through which individuals can seek redress when their fundamental rights are violated or threatened. They remind us that access to justice should not be an empty promise and that the courts have a vital role to play in protecting the rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. One of the key lessons from the case under review is that the enforcement of fundamental rights must be approached with diligence, procedural competence, and a clear understanding of the law. While the Rules are designed to facilitate access to justice, their effective application requires proper identification of the rights involved, compliance with relevant procedural requirements, and the presentation of credible facts and appropriate reliefs before the court. We must also appreciate that the abuse of the enforcement procedure can undermine the very purpose for which it was established. The procedure should not be used as a tool for harassment, oppression, or the pursuit of claims that do not genuinely fall within the scope of fundamental rights enforcement. Rather, it must be invoked responsibly, in good faith, and in furtherance of justice.

As legal practitioners, judicial officers, students of law, and stakeholders in the administration of justice, we have a collective responsibility to ensure that the enforcement procedure remains an effective instrument for protecting the vulnerable, holding public authorities accountable, and preserving the integrity of our justice system. Ultimately, the true value of fundamental rights lies not simply in their recognition by the Constitution, but in their effective protection and enforcement in the lives of ordinary citizens. I therefore encourage us all to put the knowledge acquired from this piece and case cited into practice, to remain committed to the principles of fairness and justice, and to ensure that the law is used as an instrument of protection rather than oppression. The point must be made with sufficient clarity that we do not by this piece advocate a blanket gag on all fundamental rights enforcement cases or draw the line of frivolity upon them all; far from that. Rather, the concern is the likely bandwagon effect of incidences of abuse of this special procedure created originally to address genuine cases of infringement or likely infringement of fundamental rights. As the saying goes, if we close our eyes against bad people, good people will pass us by unnoticed. The appeal generally is to all public interest litigation advocates to always filter out cases that may ultimately take away the special flavour with which the fundamental rights enforcement procedure has so far been clothed. As it happened in the case under review and indeed many other cases, bad precedents created in our statute books are all capable of eroding the gains that have been recorded in this special genre of litigation that was developed to safeguard the fundamental rights of all persons.