Bangladesh’s economic story over the past 15 years is, on paper, a paradox. Average GDP growth of 6-7% annually has vaulted the country into middle-income status, lifting millions out of extreme poverty.
But dig beneath the impressive numbers, and a more troubling reality emerges: this prosperity has been captured by a narrow oligarchy, where a handful of conglomerates have amassed staggering wealth, while the bottom half of society sees their income share shrink to historic lows.
The July 2024 protests, unprecedented in scale and intensity, were not sudden or random.
They were the inevitable consequence of a system where politically connected businesses enjoy extraordinary returns on capital, while ordinary Bangladeshis struggle with stagnant wages, rising costs, and declining opportunities.
The protests reflected the raw frustration of a generation who feel they have done everything right, studying, graduating, working hard yet still face diminishing prospects.
Consider this, the income of the bottom 40% of Bangladeshis has fallen from over 18% in the 1970s to just 11% in 2022, the lowest on record. At the same time, the top 1% control over half of financial assets.
This disparity is not an accident, but a product of deliberate policies that have privileged a small group of conglomerates.
Groups like S. Alam, Summit, and Bashundhara have seen their assets grow 5- to 15-fold since 2010, fueled by access to cheap loans from state-owned banks, generous tax holidays in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and state contracts awarded without open bidding.
These firms have capital returns of 20–30% annually, three to four times Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate.
Economist Thomas Piketty calls this the “r > g” dynamic, where capital returns outpace economic growth, fueling self-reinforcing inequality.
In Bangladesh’s case, it means the rich get exponentially richer, while average families watch their purchasing power erode as inflation races ahead of wage growth.
This disparity has been compounded by government policies that have done little to redistribute wealth.
Capital gains are taxed at just 12%, while salaries face tax rates up to 25%. Meanwhile, the collapse of medium-sized enterprises between 2012 and 2019, whose share of manufacturing output fell from 25% to 4%, shows how economic consolidation has eliminated a crucial middle layer of businesses that could have spread growth more widely.
The July 2024 protests, therefore, were not simply about job quotas or election issues. They were the culmination of years of rising frustration among young Bangladeshis who saw a system stacked against them.
As inflation peaked at 11.66% in early 2024, real wages shrank by over 3% annually, meaning many families couldn’t keep up with the rising cost of essentials like food, rent, and transport.
Critically, oligarchic control doesn’t just distort the economy; it corrodes democracy. When a few conglomerates control key sectors from energy and cement to banking and media, they amass both economic and political influence.
This leads to regulatory capture, where laws and policies are designed or enforced to protect the interests of the elite rather than the public.
It undermines trust in institutions, polarized society, and makes it harder to achieve the inclusive development Bangladesh needs to sustain long-term stability.
Bangladesh’s trajectory today mirrors warning signs from other countries where unchecked oligarchy has destabilized societies.
From Latin America in the 1980s, where elite capture triggered debt crises and lost decades, to Venezuela’s catastrophic collapse under entrenched economic elites, the lesson is clear: when growth benefits only a few, the entire system becomes fragile.
Yet this outcome is not inevitable. History offers examples of societies that broke the cycle of oligarchy and inequality.
South Korea in the 1960s and 70s, for example, combined rapid industrialization with land reform and support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), ensuring that wealth creation translated into broad-based prosperity. Such measures allowed its economy to become dynamic and equitable enough to sustain democracy.
Bangladesh can follow a similar path. Policies like progressive wealth taxes on holdings above Tk 50 crore, indexed wage growth to inflation, and genuine antitrust enforcement to break up sectoral monopolies would go a long way to rebalancing the economy
Equally important is financial transparency: requiring public disclosure of the true owners of companies and their offshore holdings would shine light on networks of hidden wealth that keep inequality entrenched.
Bangladesh must also address the collapse of its SMEs. Requiring state banks to allocate a significant share of lending, such as 30%,to SMEs outside Dhaka and Chattogram could help revitalize rural and secondary urban economies.
This would directly counter the hollowing out of Bangladesh’s industrial base, which has left too many dependent on informal jobs with low wages and no protections.
Finally, policy makers should understand that inequality is not just a moral issue; it’s an economic and political one.
A system where most people cannot share in growth is unsustainable. Already, Bangladesh’s demographic dividendis at risk of becoming a demographic time bomb if job creation lags and frustration deepens.
The choice is stark: reform or risk systemic collapse. Bangladesh’s impressive growth story risks unraveling if it fails to address inequality at its core.
By taking decisive steps now before the anger seen in July 2024 becomes a permanent feature of political life.
Bangladesh has renewed its opportunities by rejoining the democratic world through the 2026 February General Elections and subsequent political government.
Now upholding democratic features, economic justice and equity for all, job creation in the private sector, meritocracy in recruitment instead of quota preservation and educational reform can thrive the country to a new height of prosperity for all.
(Abdullah Zobair & Abdullah Tareuqe both are teacher & researcher)