South Sudan’s transitional government was established to move the country from conflict towards peace, constitutional governance, and elections. Its dissolution therefore raises a question more consequential than who has lost office or returned to government: has the transition reached its intended destination, or has the country entered another political arrangement whose conclusion remains uncertain?
On 22 September 2026, President Salva Kiir dissolved the transitional unity government, removed the five vice-presidents and appointed a caretaker administration ahead of elections scheduled for 22 December. The changes also dissolved the national legislature, state governments and their assemblies. Yet the presidency continued. South Sudan consequently entered a new administrative phase without an equivalent transfer of authority at the highest level. Radio Tamazuj’s reporting confirms the scale of this institutional restructuring.
Four explanations help make sense of this decision: formally ending the existing transitional arrangement; opening a new political chapter; clearing the legal path towards elections; and reorganising executive authority during a period of electoral and financial uncertainty. These explanations are not equally established. The electoral justification is publicly stated; the broader implications require critical examination. Responsible scrutiny must distinguish official reasons, observable consequences and suspicions that evidence has yet to substantiate.
The first reason was to bring the existing transitional government to an institutional end. State broadcaster SSBC presented the dissolution as the conclusion of the political transition and preparation for December’s elections. That announcement establishes the government’s stated intention. It does not, by itself, establish that every responsibility entrusted to the transitional administration had been fulfilled. Ending an institution and completing its mandate are separate achievements.
The departure of five vice-presidents should therefore be assessed through public accountability rather than ceremonial language about retirement or accomplishment. Citizens deserve a clear account of what the administration delivered, what remained unfinished, and which institutions now carry responsibility for outstanding commitments. Without such an account, dissolution risks becoming an administrative closure that leaves the political substance unresolved.
The second reason was to start a new journey through a caretaker administration. Such an arrangement can preserve essential services while political institutions prepare for elections. However, a fresh designation does not automatically produce different leadership practices. Where familiar political figures continue in influential positions, the public is entitled to ask what has changed in policy, accountability, and the relationship between government and citizens.
The Catholic Radio Network’s published appointments included established figures such as Martin Elia Lomuro and Michael Makuei Lueth. Their inclusion supports an argument about continuity within the governing establishment. It does not prove that the entire caretaker administration is an exclusive restoration of former SPLA/M loyalists, nor that every appointment formed part of a concealed succession strategy. The stronger criticism concerns whether experience is being matched by impartiality, competence and measurable responsibility.
This new journey also invites comparison with Tumaini, the Kenya-led peace initiative launched in May 2024. Its declaration committed participants to dialogue, political inclusion, civic freedoms and a democratic transition. Tumaini represented an effort to widen political participation beyond existing divisions. There is no established basis for claiming that it caused the September dissolution. Nevertheless, its principles provide a useful standard against which the caretaker arrangement can be judged: does the new phase broaden national agreement, or merely rearrange authority among established leaders?
The third reason was to pave the way for elections by changing the legal framework. According to SSBC, President Kiir signed amendments to the National Elections Act on 21 September. The amendments separated elections from the completion of a permanent constitution and a national census. They also provided for the incumbent executive leadership to continue during the electoral period and described presidential authority to relieve the vice-presidents within three months of polling.
These changes may remove statutory obstacles, but legislation cannot manufacture electoral readiness. A credible election requires an operational timetable, adequate resources, accessible registration, trained personnel, impartial administration and confidence that participation will be safe. Changing the sequence of constitutional and electoral processes also makes transparency essential: citizens must understand which safeguards remain, how representation will be determined and how disputes will be resolved.
The government’s position is that dissolution facilitates elections. It would therefore be inaccurate to present postponement as its proven purpose. The legitimate concern is whether the authorities can demonstrate that the practical preparations match the political announcement. If they cannot, dissolution may leave the country with fewer representative institutions while the promised electoral destination remains beyond reach.
The fourth explanation concerns the concentration of executive authority amid financial uncertainty. This is an interpretation of the arrangement’s consequences, rather than a verified statement of hidden intent. Removing the legislature and the collective presidency while retaining the president changes the distribution of institutional influence. It creates an urgent need for safeguards against indefinite executive discretion.
Financial management illustrates the problem. Eye Radio reported on 5 October that the 2026/2027 national budget had still been under parliamentary consideration when the legislature was dissolved. Government spokesperson Ateny Wek Ateny said spending would continue through presidential provisional orders. That account raises questions about scrutiny, expenditure priorities and how decisions will be reviewed during the caretaker period.
Election financing presents a related challenge. On 22 September, the European Union’s ambassador said the EU had no funding available for the polls because it had not received a clear appeal or budget specifying requirements. He urged the government to allocate resources and identify financing gaps. This supports concern about funding transparency and preparedness; it does not establish that no electoral budget exists anywhere or that postponement has already been decided.
Was the dissolution, then, a coup d’état without gunfire? The expression captures the seriousness with which some citizens may view the removal of power-sharing institutions. But a political description should not be presented as a settled constitutional finding. The government invokes amended electoral legislation. Assessing that justification requires examination of the enacted provisions, the constitutional framework and their relationship with the peace settlement.
Nor were all constitutional institutions overthrown. Reporting on the order states that the judiciary, independent commissions, organised forces and civil service were to remain functional. Precision strengthens the criticism: the central issue is the removal of important representative and power-sharing structures while presidential authority continues.
Predictions of a caretaker government followed by a military council and a five-year extension must likewise remain identified as unverified scenarios. No evidence reviewed for this article establishes that sequence as an adopted programme. A military council could not acquire democratic legitimacy simply by returning power to the same president. Any further extension would require a publicly explained legal basis and political accountability, rather than retrospective justification.
The immediate danger is a transition that loses its boundaries. Political mistrust, uncertain financing and weak scrutiny can reinforce one another, leaving citizens unable to distinguish temporary administration from prolonged rule. The People’s Coalition for Civil Action has called for inclusive national dialogue and a negotiated settlement over constitutional arrangements and credible elections. Its position underlines the continuing absence of agreement among political and civic actors about the way forward.
The caretaker authorities should now publish a costed electoral timetable, disclose resources actually released, explain expenditure controls and guarantee equal political access. Unfinished commitments should have named institutions, deadlines and public reporting arrangements. Women, young people, displaced communities, religious leaders and independent civic organisations must have meaningful opportunities to influence decisions.
South Sudan’s leaders have dissolved a government. They must now demonstrate that they can resolve the problems it leaves behind. The measure of this new journey will be whether citizens gain security, a credible political choice and an enforceable voice in national affairs. Without those outcomes, a new administration risks becoming the previous order dressed in a different mask.
The writer is a researcher and writer specializing in humanitarian and development issues in South Sudan. He holds a degree in Sociology and Political Science from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa and a Master’s in Peace and Development Studies from the University of Juba.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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