Chinese-Pakistani scam networks seek foothold in Bangladesh as security gaps raise alarm
Bangladesh may be confronting a dangerous new front in transnational organized crime: international cyberfraud networks seeking to establish operational bases inside the country, exploiting digital technology, local intermediaries and weaknesses in the monitoring of foreign nationals. Recent police raids in Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar have exposed the scale of the challenge, with dozens of foreign nationals detained, hundreds of electronic devices seized and investigators examining suspected links to cross-border fraud operations. The emerging picture raises an urgent question for the authorities: has Bangladesh become an increasingly attractive destination for criminal networks displaced from established scam centers elsewhere in Asia?
The arrests have placed Chinese and Pakistani nationals under particular scrutiny, although the detained groups also included citizens of other countries. Police investigations have yet to establish the full structure of the networks, the precise methods allegedly used to defraud victims, or the extent of any connections between the separate operations. Nevertheless, the incidents, considered alongside a recent United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assessment, point to a serious threat that Bangladesh cannot afford to underestimate.
The issue extends well beyond financial losses suffered by individual victims. International cyberfraud networks can exploit people across borders, recruit vulnerable workers under false pretences, use local infrastructure to conceal their activities and move illicit proceeds through complex financial channels. If Bangladesh becomes an operational base for such networks, the consequences could include damage to its international reputation, increased exposure to money laundering and greater pressure on already stretched law-enforcement agencies.
Chattogram raid exposes an international operation
On September 10, 2026, police in Chattogram raided a rented building in the city’s Khulshi area and detained 63 foreign nationals suspected of involvement in an international online fraud operation. According to police accounts reported by Bangladeshi media, the detainees included 35 nationals of Laos, 21 Pakistanis, five Chinese nationals, and one each from Nepal and Vietnam.
The Counter Terrorism Unit of Chattogram Metropolitan Police, working with Khulshi police, recovered 134 mobile phones, 57 laptops and other electronic equipment. Investigators also found Pakistani national identity cards and a Cambodian employment card. Police said the suspects had been staying in the building, which had reportedly been rented for an extended period through local intermediaries.
According to information, these Chinese-Pakistani gangs targeted wealthy people and well-off women from nine countries including India. They have embezzled millions of US dollars from various countries including India through numerous types of fraudulent activities.
The composition of the group is significant. The operation was not confined to nationals of a single country; it involved people from several jurisdictions, suggesting that investigators need to examine international recruitment channels and the possibility of coordinated criminal activity across borders.
Police have reportedly investigated whether some detainees had previously travelled to Cambodia, where authorities have confronted large-scale cyberfraud operations. Such travel histories, if confirmed, could help investigators establish whether the Chattogram group had links to previously identified scam networks or whether individuals had been recruited through existing transnational contacts.
However, the distinction between suspicion and proof remains essential. The possession of electronic devices, foreign identity documents or a history of international travel does not by itself establish criminal guilt. Forensic examinations, financial records, communications data and evidence from victims will be needed to determine who organized the operation and what activities actually took place.
The Chattogram raid nevertheless demonstrates how quickly a large group of foreign nationals can assemble in a residential property and establish an environment that attracts the attention of law-enforcement agencies only after intelligence or other information triggers an investigation.
Cox’s Bazar: nearly 2,000 iPhones seized
The Chattogram operation followed another significant raid in Cox’s Bazar earlier in September.
On September 3, police detained six foreign nationals—five Chinese citizens and one Taiwanese citizen—at a hotel in the coastal tourist destination over allegations of online fraud. Investigators reportedly recovered 1,938 iPhones, dozens of laptops and additional communications equipment.
The quantity of electronic equipment raises important questions about the intended use of the devices, the people who financed their acquisition and the possibility that they were to be deployed in coordinated digital operations. Police have been investigating the case, and the seized equipment could provide evidence about the suspected activities.
The presence of such a large collection of phones does not, by itself, establish the precise nature of the alleged fraud. Investigators must determine whether the devices were used for deceptive online marketing, fraudulent financial schemes, manipulation of digital accounts or other unlawful purposes.
Yet the discovery warrants serious scrutiny. Large collections of devices, when combined with evidence of organized recruitment, suspicious financial transactions or coordinated communications, can help investigators identify the infrastructure behind transnational cybercrime.
The two September cases have raised the possibility that criminal groups are seeking to operate from more than one location in Bangladesh. Whether the Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar cases form part of a single network, however, remains a matter for investigators to establish.
Bangladesh’s growing exposure to cyberfraud
The threat is not limited to foreign groups operating inside Bangladesh. The country is also vulnerable to the trafficking of its citizens into scam compounds abroad.
A UNODC report released in Dhaka in September 2026, titled Trafficked to Scam: South Asian Responses to Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Forced Criminality in Scam Operations, examines the situation in Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. It warns that countries in the region face a dual challenge: their citizens are being recruited or trafficked into overseas scam operations, while some countries are also at risk of becoming locations from which criminal networks operate.
The report describes recruitment methods involving deceptive online job advertisements, social media approaches and informal brokers. People may be promised well-paid positions in information technology, customer service or data entry, only to discover that the employment arrangements are fraudulent. In some cases, victims are taken abroad, have their freedom restricted and are forced to participate in online scams.
This is a crucial distinction for Bangladesh’s law-enforcement agencies. Not every person found inside a suspected scam center is necessarily a willing participant. Some may be organizers or knowing collaborators; others may have been deceived, coerced or trafficked.
A credible investigation must identify the difference. Arresting people at the operational level without tracing those who finance, recruit and direct them risks leaving the principal organizers untouched.
The UNODC assessment also identifies weaknesses in financial investigations, cryptocurrency-related inquiries, digital evidence collection and coordination between relevant agencies. These shortcomings can allow criminal networks to continue operating even when individual premises are raided.
For Bangladesh, the message is clear: police action must be accompanied by a sustained investigation into recruitment, financial flows, international contacts and the identities of the people controlling the operations.
How changes to Pakistani visa procedures entered the debate
Changes in Bangladesh’s visa procedures have become another focus of concern.
On December 2, 2024, Bangladesh’s interim administration removed the requirement for Pakistani citizens to obtain prior security clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs before receiving visas. The change was reported as part of a broader easing of restrictions amid improving diplomatic engagement between Dhaka and Islamabad.
Under the earlier arrangement, Pakistani visa applications were subject to additional scrutiny. Removing that requirement changed the administrative process and reduced a specific barrier to travel.
The policy change is a verifiable fact. What remains unproven is whether it directly enabled the criminal operations uncovered in Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar.
That question requires evidence, not assumptions. Investigators should establish when the suspects entered Bangladesh, which visas or travel permissions they used, whether they complied with the conditions of entry and whether any local individuals facilitated their accommodation or activities.
It is also important to recognize that a visa policy change does not make all nationals of a particular country security threats. The appropriate response is risk-based screening, verification of immigration status and targeted investigation of credible evidence of criminal activity.
At the same time, the government cannot ignore vulnerabilities simply because tighter screening may complicate diplomatic or commercial relations. Visa facilitation and effective security checks are not mutually exclusive. A well-designed system can accommodate legitimate visitors while identifying individuals whose travel, financial activity or stated purpose raises credible concerns.
The question facing Dhaka is therefore not whether Pakistani citizens should be treated collectively as suspects. It is whether Bangladesh has effective mechanisms to identify and investigate the small number of individuals who may attempt to exploit legitimate travel arrangements for criminal purposes.
The same principle applies to visitors from China and every other country.
A coastal tourist belt under pressure
Cox’s Bazar and the wider Chattogram region offer obvious advantages for legitimate tourism, trade and investment. Hotels, resorts, rented properties and a steady flow of domestic and international visitors create economic opportunities. But those same features can make it harder to identify suspicious activity if property rentals and foreign-national registration are not properly monitored.
Reports concerning the recent operations have raised questions about accommodation arrangements, the use of rented buildings and the presence of large numbers of foreign nationals in locations not immediately associated with ordinary tourism.
Investigators should establish whether the properties were rented through local intermediaries, whether the occupants’ identities were properly recorded, whether their immigration status was verified and whether the activities conducted on the premises matched the stated purpose of their stay.
Bangladesh already has procedures requiring relevant information about foreign nationals to be reported to the authorities. The effectiveness of those procedures depends on compliance, reliable records and timely coordination between immigration officials, police and local administrative offices.
If individuals can occupy properties for extended periods without adequate verification, the problem is not simply a matter of nationality. It is an enforcement gap that organized criminal groups of any origin could exploit.
The authorities should therefore examine the complete chain of responsibility: property owners, landlords, intermediaries, employers, recruitment agents and any local facilitators suspected of helping foreign nationals establish operations.
Where evidence establishes deliberate assistance to criminal activity, those involved should face appropriate legal consequences. At the same time, landlords and businesses should not be accused of wrongdoing merely because foreign nationals rented their properties.
The unresolved allegation of a wider criminal network
Intelligence-based claims cited in the information underlying this investigation suggest that several hundred foreign nationals may be connected to suspected criminal operations in Bangladesh. One estimate puts the number at approximately 400 people associated with networks led by Chinese and Pakistani nationals.
That figure has not been independently established by the publicly available evidence reviewed for this report. It should therefore be treated as an intelligence allegation requiring verification, not as a confirmed count of criminals operating in Bangladesh.
The distinction matters because an inflated or poorly substantiated estimate could undermine public confidence and distract investigators from the individuals and financial structures for which evidence can be obtained.
The more useful questions are specific. How many suspects have been identified? How many are confirmed to have entered Bangladesh through particular routes? Which properties have been linked to suspected fraud? What evidence connects the different locations? Are there common financial beneficiaries, recruiters or digital accounts?
Investigators should also examine allegations that criminal networks may engage in activities beyond online fraud. Claims involving Indian counterfeit currency and US dollars, illegal weapons, narcotics or other serious offences require separate, corroborated evidence. They should not be presented as established components of the same operation merely because the allegations concern some of the same nationalities.
The possibility of a broader criminal enterprise warrants investigation. Establishing its actual scale and scope, however, depends on evidence that can withstand legal scrutiny.
From raids to dismantling the networks
Bangladesh now needs a coordinated response that extends beyond occasional raids.
First, the authorities should review the immigration records of foreign nationals arrested in the recent operations and establish their travel histories, visa status and declared purpose of entry. Any inconsistencies should be investigated through lawful procedures and shared with relevant partner agencies where appropriate.
Second, forensic teams should examine seized phones, laptops, SIM cards and other equipment. Investigators should seek evidence of communications with overseas organizers, fraudulent websites, victim lists, financial accounts and the movement of suspected proceeds.
Third, police and financial-intelligence agencies should trace the money. Identifying the people who receive and control the profits is essential to dismantling criminal networks rather than merely disrupting their immediate operations.
Fourth, the government should strengthen reporting and verification requirements for foreign nationals residing in rented accommodation, hotels and commercial premises. The objective should be consistent enforcement, not indiscriminate restrictions based on nationality.
Fifth, Bangladesh should improve cooperation with countries that have investigated similar operations, including through lawful information-sharing and mutual legal assistance. If evidence connects suspects in Bangladesh with operations abroad, investigators will need cooperation across jurisdictions to identify organizers and recover assets.
Finally, the authorities must protect people who may have been trafficked or coerced into participating in scams. Victim identification, access to legal assistance and appropriate protection should form part of the investigative process. Treating every person discovered at a suspected operation as an equally culpable offender can obscure the coercion that sustains some of these networks.
These measures would also help reassure legitimate foreign investors, tourists and business visitors that Bangladesh is strengthening its institutions rather than closing its doors indiscriminately.
Bangladesh cannot afford complacency
The September raids in Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar should be treated as a warning that transnational cybercrime can establish a foothold wherever criminal networks find exploitable gaps in enforcement. The reported recovery of thousands of phones in one operation and dozens of laptops in another warrants a thorough investigation into the people, financing and digital infrastructure behind the suspected schemes.
The removal of additional visa-clearance requirements for Pakistani citizens deserves examination as part of a broader review of immigration risk management, but it must not be treated as proof that the policy caused the alleged crimes. Nor should the conduct of particular suspects be used to stigmatize entire national communities.
What Bangladesh needs is neither complacency nor political scapegoating. It needs evidence-led policing, credible immigration oversight, financial investigations capable of following illicit money and international cooperation that reaches beyond the people found at the scene.
If the suspected networks are allowed to exploit gaps between immigration control, police investigations and financial oversight, the costs could extend far beyond the immediate victims of online fraud. Bangladesh’s reputation as a destination for legitimate tourism, trade and investment could suffer, while criminal groups gain a stronger platform from which to target victims across borders.
The decisive test for the authorities is whether they can turn the recent arrests into a comprehensive effort to identify the organizers, trace the proceeds, protect trafficking victims and close the loopholes that made the operations possible. Bangladesh must ensure that its openness to the world does not become an opportunity for international criminal networks to operate with impunity.
