During the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States, the Arab Gulf states have borne the brunt of Iranian drone and missile strikes while incurring mounting economic costs.
With limited prospects for a U.S.-Iran settlement, Gulf states, using Oman as an interlocutor, have pursued talks with Iran aimed at ending the conflict and reopening the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping. This reflects a significant shift in regional dynamics: Gulf states are increasingly exploring arrangements with Iran to restore navigation without direct U.S. involvement.
Even without U.S. acquiescence, securing a negotiated agreement will be difficult. Distrust between the Arab Gulf states and Iran runs deep, rooted in historic grievances and long-term contestation for hegemony in the Middle East. The ongoing conflict has intensified hostility and resentment on both sides.
But the conflict has also revealed the Gulf states’ vulnerability while underscoring the limits of the U.S. security umbrella. Recent Houthi and Iran-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Bab Al-Mandab and Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline highlight the limits of promoting alternative shipping routes and efforts by Arab Gulf states to engineer their way out of the crisis. The need for a resolution is increasingly urgent.
A return to the status quo ante, including a return to free transit under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), seems increasingly unlikely. Replacing the norms of international maritime law with a regime allowing Iran to impose tariffs, which seems to be the basis for discussions between Oman and Iran, is untenable. While transit fees might be part of the long-term resolution, Arab Gulf states will reject any arrangement that suggests Iranian sovereignty over the strait. In fact, such an approach might prolong security tensions, with the United States feeling bound to counter Iranian claims of control with strikes or at least regular freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the strait.
History offers examples of alternative approaches to maintaining trade in the context of great-power competition. The most frequently cited precedent in this regard is the 1936 Montreux Convention, which continues to govern transit through Turkey’s Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The convention offers useful lessons for Hormuz, particularly in its approach to foreign naval access. But a more applicable model may come from a less obvious place: the Danube River after the Crimean War.
The 1856 Treaty of Paris established the European Commission of the Danube amid intense regional competition in Europe. Unable to secure an agreement on the use of the river, the signatories devised an approach that handed responsibility for navigability and shipping safety on the lower Danube to an independent international organization.
While the signatories maintained oversight through a board, the commission operated independently, even charging tolls and raising debt to fund trade infrastructure expansion. By delegating management of the river to an independent body, competing powers reduced potential flashpoints while allowing all of Europe to benefit from trade along the Danube, which runs from what is now southwestern Germany to the Black Sea coast between modern Romania and Ukraine. Initially seen as a temporary expedient, the commission remained in place for over 85 years.
A similar Strait of Hormuz Commission could help return stability and trade flows to the region. The institution could be overseen by a board representing the eight countries bordering the Gulf. Major trading partners in Asia and Europe, together with the United States, could participate through an advisory body, giving them influence and incentives to cooperate with the scheme without giving them a veto.
Initially, the commission would have a narrow mandate: ensuring safe commercial passage; coordinating escort, rescue, and environmental-response services; and maintaining facilities required for these functions. To reduce the risk of military miscalculation, the commission could require naval vessels to report intended transit and share that information with member states, as required under Montreux. Its costs could be covered by reasonable service charges, tolls or member financing.
The Danube approach would allow the institutional structure and responsibilities of the commission to develop incrementally. An initial agreement could establish principles and procedures for commercial transit, maritime safety and communication among the parties. More sensitive functions, from military deconfliction of the strait to support for broader regional infrastructure development, could be added as confidence in the commission develops.
The governing principle would be shared management without shared sovereignty. Neither Iran nor Oman would relinquish territorial claims, and the commission would acquire no sovereignty over the strait. Its authority would extend only to the management and security of navigation through the strait. The objective would not be to resolve the region’s rivalries, but to insulate one vital shared interest from them.
Crucially, establishing such a commission would not have to await a comprehensive settlement of the Gulf’s wider conflicts. Indeed, that would defeat much of its purpose. Concentrating on the narrower shared interest of restoring predictable commercial transit would give the countries of the region a platform for practical collaboration and building confidence. If successful, the commission would provide a foundation for constructive dialogue on more contentious issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, eliminating political interference and support for proxy groups, and resolving longstanding territorial disputes. The commission would not have a mandate to resolve these disputes, but it could help build trust and the habits of cooperation needed to address them through other diplomatic channels.
Critics will argue that negotiating such an arrangement rewards Iran for challenging international maritime law and using its geographical position to extract concessions. Others will voice concern about the precedent for strategic waterways such as the Strait of Malacca and Bab Al-Mandab.
Both concerns are legitimate. But insisting on a legal regime that can no longer reliably secure transit does not in itself reopen Hormuz. Nor would shared management of the strait require abandoning the principles of freedom of navigation. Ultimately, as the international rules-based order comes under growing pressure, upholding universal principles like freedom of navigation may require new arrangements that address local contexts and create incentives for neighboring states — including rivals — to uphold them.
For Iran and the Gulf states, the choice is ultimately pragmatic. Cooperation after years of distrust and the imposition of more recent wounds inflicted by the current conflict will be difficult. But a jointly established commission could reopen the strait for sustained trade while helping to address the parties’ core security and economic concerns.
More important, it would establish a model for the Gulf’s emerging security order: regionally-owned, internationally-supported, and built around the institutional management of shared interests rather than dependence on any single outside power.