Three broad scenarios emerge when assessing how Israel’s policy toward Syria could evolve following the Knesset elections scheduled for October 27. Each scenario reflects a different potential configuration of political power in Israel and the strategic priorities that may follow.
Scenario One: A Deadlock Leading to a U.S.-Backed Unity Government
The first — and widely discussed — scenario is the one outlined by the Israeli newspaper Maariv: a near‑perfect tie between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc and its rivals, leaving neither side with the parliamentary majority required to form a government on its own.
In such a case, the likelihood of a U.S.-brokered unity government would rise sharply. This aligns with reporting by Israel Hayom, which described American efforts to exclude far‑right National Security Minister Itamar Ben‑Gvir from the next coalition while keeping Netanyahu in office for two years, after which he would be succeeded by Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yeshar party.
Washington’s objective, according to these reports, is to stabilize Israel’s political landscape, conclude ongoing conflicts, advance regional arrangements, and create conditions conducive to normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Within this framework, a potential agreement with Syria would be folded into a broader regional settlement. A unity government, free from hard‑line factions, would have greater latitude to offer concessions. Netanyahu would likely maintain his security‑centric rhetoric while accepting phased arrangements with Damascus that he could present to his base as a consolidation of wartime gains.
Scenario Two: An Eisenkot‑Led Coalition with Arab Party Support
The second scenario mirrors the first but introduces a key distinction. Polling conducted by The Economist suggests that Netanyahu’s opponents — including Jewish and Arab parties — could secure a 64‑seat majority in the 120‑seat Knesset. According to the magazine’s analysis, parties representing Arab voters, who constitute roughly 20 percent of Israel’s electorate, would support a coalition led by Gadi Eisenkot.
Under this scenario, the prospects for a security agreement between Israel and Syria would increase substantially. Eisenkot has argued that Israel now possesses an opportunity to convert “major military achievements” into “political gains” through “expanded agreements” that establish security controls and grant broad freedom of intervention to the Israeli military establishment.
This “freedom of intervention” would inevitably become the subject of complex negotiations, particularly because Eisenkot’s proposed arrangements include the status of Mount Hermon and a “complete” withdrawal of Turkish and Russian forces from Syria.
What distinguishes Eisenkot — a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces — from Netanyahu is his opposition to prolonged deployment and expansion inside Syrian territory, which he views as a strategic drain. He also favors pursuing a “regional settlement” in coordination with Washington.
Scenario Three: A Netanyahu–Bennett Alliance
The third scenario, considered the least likely based on current data, envisions Netanyahu forming a coalition with former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Naftali Bennett, a figure associated with the national‑religious right.
Bennett supports maintaining a security buffer zone inside Syria and aligns closely with Netanyahu’s approach to the Syrian theater. Under this arrangement, Israel’s current tactical posture toward Syria would largely continue, with limited room for diplomatic or strategic recalibration.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
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