Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented in a press conference a “lean,” concise document setting out his view of Israel's national security doctrine. It was drafted under his direct guidance by his National Security Advisor Shmuel Ben-Ezra. As expected, in the run-up to an election, the document drew torrents of criticism and scorn from his opponents, regardless of its contents and its role.
The last time the prime minister published a national security doctrine was in 2018. I had the honor of helping launch that effort in 2017 when I was the NSA. The final drafting and refinement were led by the Military Secretary, Maj. Gen. (res.), at the time, Brig. Gen. Eliezer Toledano and his team, with assistance from the National Security Council people.
The 2018 document included about ten unclassified pages, plus roughly eight classified pages. It contained several significant and new principles, among them: punishing those who send the attackers against Israel, not only those who attack us directly, a clear reference to Iran, and adding “civilian” infrastructure targets in the country from which Israel is being attacked to the list of legitimate targets, an obvious reference to Lebanon.
Some of the doctrine’s principles did not hold up on October 7. In the "Nagel Committee on the Defense Budget", which I have already discussed in several articles, we recommended several substantial changes to what we called Israel's “operational concept”, at the request of then Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. He insisted the committee will not develop a new “National Security Strategy”, before the Ministry of Defense had formulated its position. In practice, some of our recommendations clearly fall within the scope of NSS. They all feature prominently in the short document published this week. For example, the shift from a policy of "containment and defense" to one of "prevention and offense", and the principle that maintaining calm is very important, but not at any price.
Another principle we emphasized in our committee report is that an NSS cannot and should not be approved by the cabinet or the full government, as it is in many other places in the world, like the US, for example. The reason is very simple. The ministers understand that adding budgets to the MOD, as a result of the new NSS, will come on their ministry's behalf, so they will not vote for it, even when they accept it completely. This didn’t stop the comptroller and some anti-PM reporters from brutally attacking the fact that the old and new papers were not approved by someone other than the PM, as it should be.
The current document is much shorter than the one published in 2018, which was itself relatively brief compared with a traditional NSS paper. Despite its considerable importance, I don’t think the name "NSS document" is the right definition for such a paper. A full NSS doctrine should be broader and partly classified. I would instead describe it as a set of lighthouse guidelines and principles for Israel’s NSS. This description would not diminish the document’s value and might have defused some of the unjustified criticism.
In this article, I want to address one point in the new document and explain why it is critically important, as we claimed in the Nagel Committee: Technology and independence in force development.
The paper calls for:
Reducing dependence on external sources.
Strengthening Israel’s ability to develop its own forces through research, development, and domestic production.
Building world-leading capabilities in critical technologies such as quantum technology, artificial intelligence, and space.
Achieving all of these ambitions, and some more that are not mentioned probably because of classification, will require a substantial increase in the defense budget.
These principles rely first and foremost on sustained investment in defense and civilian R&D. The rest of this article will focus mainly on defense R&D.
As the committee’s recommendations stated, the IDF’s technological and operational strength, as successfully demonstrated in the Iron Swords War, despite some faults and gaps that emerged, is the result of sustained, long-term investment in defense R&D. This work has been led mainly by the Directorate of Defense Research and Development (MAFAT) and carried out by universities, research institutes, large and small defense companies, and startups.
R&D is conducted primarily through the central R&D budget, which funds basic research, technology incubation, feasibility studies, and demonstrations, as well as through government-to-government cooperation. The R&D budget must match the capacity to advance technologies and developments at the global frontier, keeping them relevant and attractive worldwide while preserving Israel’s technological superiority and independence where needed, and the qualitative edge (QME) of the IDF and the defense establishment.
In addition to advancing military technologies, the R&D budget also acts as a force multiplier for the defense industry, a phenomenon known as the “R&D multiplier”. Several independent studies have found that every shekel invested in research and development generates a return of at least seven times that amount, and sometimes considerably more, in future sales. Most of those sales come from defense export deals by the relevant defense companies. Recently, the trend has become reciprocal: defense R&D is also benefiting from spillovers from the civilian sector.
In recent years, especially in light of wars and the threats perceived by countries around the world, global demand for Israeli military technologies has risen dramatically. At the same time, competition is increasing, including from some countries that were not previously in the field. The rapid pace of change, input costs, technological developments, and other macroeconomic shifts led the committee to recommend increasing the budget allocated to the central R&D at MAFAT and to some specific huge projects, like space. This is in addition to the funding MAFAT directs toward R&D in the industry through government-to-government deals that it leads.
Recently, the boundaries between civilian and military technologies have become increasingly blurred. This creates intense competition for the technological workforce between the military sector and the civilian technology companies, even though some civilian technologies later find their way into military use. One example is autonomous robotic systems, including all types of drones, which have become a decisive factor in the Russia-Ukraine war and in our region. Similar competition exists in other technological fields, including AI, quantum technology, energy, advanced computing, advanced optics, and space. It is expected to intensify in the coming years.
Key elements in achieving technological superiority through R&D investment
The committee recommended focusing a significant part of R&D and force-development efforts on several key areas, with the goal of creating a complete system: a concept, an organizational framework, and the required weapons and equipment.
Israel must continue strengthening important areas that have received funding in recent years, including artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, space technologies, directed energy, with an emphasis on HPEM, and deep technologies. These fields will be essential to establishing Israel’s technological superiority over the coming decade.
At the same time, the defense establishment must continue identifying "disruptive technologies", particularly low-end capabilities. Some of these are based on “good enough” solutions that would allow the acquisition of large numbers of inexpensive systems. For example, a drone capable of flying 2,000 kilometers, carrying 50 kilograms of explosives, for less than $100,000 per unit.
The following is a partial list of key areas, without further detail. More information can be found in the unclassified version of the committee’s report:
Long-range missiles and munitions launched from the ground.
AI-based analysis and decision-making systems, leaving the final decision in human hands.
Robotics and autonomy for the battlefield.
Advanced space technologies.
Deep technologies.
Directed energy, with an emphasis on HPEM.
Hypersonic capabilities and high-speed flight.
New approaches to unmanned systems in the air, land, sea, underground, and underwater.
Scientific and technological workforce
The main resource needed to advance research and development in the IDF and the defense industries is technological talent. In recent years, the shortage of technological personnel in the IDF has become more severe. I will address this problem in a separate article, including the immediate recommendations the committee underlined that should be implemented. Some of them were already ordered for immediate implementation by the prime minister in 2025. We must act before we reach the point of no return.
Academia and high-tech as engines of defense innovation
Academia provides an essential foundation for many areas of science and technology that serve Israel’s security. Israeli academic institutions, including the Technion, the Weizmann Institute of Science, and the country’s other universities, are major sources of knowledge in fields such as artificial intelligence, cyber, nanotechnology, quantum, and nuclear physics. Israeli researchers develop groundbreaking solutions for the defense establishment, from missile-defense systems such as Iron Dome to advanced cyber technologies used by the intelligence services.
In Israel’s challenging security environment, where threats are constantly evolving, technological superiority is not a luxury; it is essential to survival. Countries and terrorist organizations are investing more in advanced technologies, and this threat requires Israel to maintain a significant technological edge.
Investing in academic research and development, dual-use civilian infrastructure, and startups, and accelerating and strengthening these efforts alongside the traditional defense industry, will enable Israel to stay one step ahead of its enemies. Technologies such as autonomous drone swarms, AI systems for intelligence analysis, and machine-learning-based information security solutions are all products of academic research that have been integrated into the defense industry, alongside significant advances in the private sector. It is essential to make full use of these assets as part of a comprehensive national vision and to invest in programs that can generate substantial progress in science and the economy.
Brig. Gen. (Res.) Prof. Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington. He served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s national security adviser and as acting head of Israel’s National Security Council.