The security of Saudi Arabia is no longer merely a regional concern. It is a strategic imperative for the global economy. When missiles threaten Riyadh’s airports, drones target oil refineries, and attacks endanger the infrastructure that keeps energy flowing to international markets, the consequences extend far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. From European factories and Asian industrial hubs to airlines and ordinary consumers worldwide, the cost of insecurity is becoming impossible to ignore. Yet while the world depends on Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure, the burden of defending it remains disproportionately concentrated on the Kingdom itself.
On October 10, a Houthi missile reportedly struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, killing 13 people and injuring more than 300. The victims included Saudi citizens and nationals of Bangladesh, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, and India. The attack, described as the deadliest strike on the Kingdom in more than a decade, exposed the international consequences of a conflict that too many governments continue to treat as a distant regional crisis.
Repeated missile and drone attacks originating in Yemen have targeted Saudi airports and energy installations, including facilities associated with Aramco. Saudi air defenses have intercepted successive waves of projectiles, but interception alone cannot provide an indefinite guarantee of security. Every attack consumes resources, strains defensive capacity, and increases the risk that a single successful strike could disrupt infrastructure vital to millions of people beyond Saudi Arabia’s borders.
The global energy market has already demonstrated what is at stake. When the war with Iran disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in March, Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, connecting the oil-producing region around Abqaiq with the Red Sea port of Yanbu, became an indispensable alternative route. Before drone attacks forced its temporary closure in September, the pipeline was reportedly carrying approximately four million barrels of oil per day, equivalent to around 4 percent of global supply.
Although traffic through Hormuz has partially recovered, the vulnerability of the Gulf’s energy corridors remains a serious concern. Yanbu offers an alternative when maritime routes through the strait become dangerous or inaccessible. Crude oil and refined petroleum products shipped from the Red Sea help supply international markets, including Europe. Protecting Saudi infrastructure therefore means protecting an essential component of the global energy system.
The world is already paying a security tax.
Energy insecurity does not remain confined to oil-producing countries. It travels through supply chains, raises transportation costs, increases industrial expenses, and ultimately reaches household budgets. The supplied figures put Brent crude at approximately $73 per barrel before the Iran war and above $100 afterward, with prices rising further following the Riyadh airport attack. Goldman Sachs has estimated the geopolitical risk premium at more than $20 per barrel.
Such a premium represents the economic cost of uncertainty. Consumers pay more for fuel, businesses face higher operating expenses, and governments confront renewed inflationary pressure. Airlines are particularly vulnerable, as regional instability forces carriers to suspend flights, reroute aircraft, and reassess operational risks. When international airlines such as Air France-KLM, Lufthansa, Delta, Air India, and Qatar Airways suspend services to affected destinations, the disruption reaches passengers, businesses, tourism, and international commerce.
The contradiction is glaring: countries that benefit from Saudi oil exports share the economic consequences of attacks on Saudi infrastructure, yet they do not necessarily contribute proportionately to defending it.
That arrangement is neither strategically sustainable nor economically sensible.
Collective defense is a practical necessity, not an act of charity.
There is already a precedent for international cooperation. Greece has operated a Patriot air-defense battery in Saudi Arabia since 2021, demonstrating how partner countries can contribute specialized capabilities. According to the supplied account, Greek crews intercepted ballistic missiles targeting the Yanbu refineries in July and engaged additional threats in September. France has also announced plans to deploy troops and air-defense systems to Saudi Arabia on a defensive mission.
These contributions should become the foundation of a broader, coordinated arrangement rather than remain isolated deployments.
International coalitions have repeatedly recognized that protecting maritime commerce requires shared responsibility. Naval forces have escorted merchant vessels and supported shipping security in the Red Sea because disruptions threaten the interests of numerous economies. The same principle should apply to the energy infrastructure that provides an alternative to vulnerable maritime chokepoints.
A pipeline may run across land, but its strategic function resembles that of a vital sea lane. If its disruption can deprive international markets of millions of barrels of oil, protecting it should be treated as a collective economic-security priority.
A standing framework for integrated air and missile defense across the Red Sea region would be a logical response. Participating countries could rotate air-defense batteries, coordinate early-warning systems, share intelligence, improve surveillance, and establish arrangements for replenishing interceptor stocks. Such cooperation would distribute costs while strengthening the defenses of facilities on which international energy markets depend.
Saudi Arabia already invests heavily in its military and fields advanced systems, including Patriot and THAAD. But financial resources alone cannot eliminate the growing imbalance between attackers and defenders. The Houthis’ combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range drones creates a complicated threat, particularly when weapons are launched from mobile platforms and in coordinated waves.
Defenders must protect airports, cities, industrial facilities, religious sites, and extensive pipeline networks simultaneously. Attackers need only identify a vulnerable target and exploit a gap. Interceptors are expensive, inventories are finite, and production cannot expand overnight. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive attack drones makes this imbalance even more difficult to manage.
Europe has recognized the importance of pooling capabilities through initiatives such as the European Sky Shield Initiative. If collective procurement and integrated defense are sensible for European security, applying similar principles to critical energy infrastructure should be equally compelling when Europe’s own energy supplies are at stake.
Defensive cooperation need not mean entering Yemen’s war.
Critics may argue that foreign deployments risk drawing outside powers deeper into the Yemeni conflict. That concern deserves consideration, but it should not become an excuse for inaction. Protecting civilian airports, refineries, and energy transport infrastructure against incoming missiles is fundamentally different from conducting offensive operations inside Yemen.
A clearly defined defensive mandate, transparent rules of engagement, and strict limits on operational objectives could help prevent mission creep. International cooperation should prioritize the protection of civilians and essential infrastructure while supporting diplomatic efforts to reduce regional tensions.
The response must also address the supply of weapons. Saudi Arabia’s largest Asian energy customers—including China, India, Japan, and South Korea—have a substantial interest in the uninterrupted operation of the Kingdom’s export infrastructure. Their participation in maritime surveillance, intelligence-sharing, and efforts to prevent illicit arms transfers would complement defensive deployments.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 provides an existing framework concerning the arms embargo on Yemen. Effective implementation, consistent with international law, could help restrict the flow of weapons and components used in attacks. Preventing a missile from reaching its intended launch site may be less costly than intercepting it over a crowded city.
Ultimately, protecting Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure is not about granting Riyadh a blank cheque or endorsing every aspect of its regional policies. It is about recognizing a basic economic reality: the security of a major energy exporter affects the security and prosperity of its customers.
France’s stated intention to raise energy security with its G7 partners offers an opportunity to move beyond expressions of concern. The outcome should be a practical commitment to shared capabilities, coordinated defense, and sustained investment—not another diplomatic communiqué destined to gather dust.
Saudi Arabia cannot be expected to shoulder indefinitely the full burden of protecting infrastructure that supports the global economy. Countries that depend on its oil, benefit from its export routes, and suffer when those routes are threatened must accept a greater share of responsibility.
The choice is straightforward: invest collectively in prevention or continue paying collectively for insecurity. In a world already struggling with energy volatility, inflation, and geopolitical confrontation, treating Saudi Arabia’s defense as someone else’s problem is an expensive strategic mistake.
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