North Korea’s balancing act is back in the spotlight. In September, it opened its first road bridge with Russia. Just last week, North Korea opened a similar one with China. Pyongyang’s land bridge with Russia will strengthen the bilateral arms trade while the one with China will provide it with energy products, raw materials, and heavy equipment for domestic consumption.
The two bridges are a microcosm of how North Korea seeks to benefit from improved relations with Moscow and Beijing. North Korea is looking for military assistance from Russia and economic help from China. The clear division of labor ensures North Korea’s alliances with Russia and China are complementary, not competitive with each other.
North Korea has decades of experience when it comes to managing relations with Moscow and Beijing for its own benefits. In July 1961, the country signed two separate alliance treaties with the Soviet Union and China by exploiting the Sino-Soviet Split. The more bitter Moscow and Beijing were toward each other, the more willing they were to meet Pyongyang’s demands.
The combined Soviet and Chinese economic aid meant North Korea enjoyed a relatively higher living standard compared to its communist peers China and North Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Its military was also on par with that of South Korea thanks to generous Soviet and Chinese transfers of weapons and technologies.
However, North Korea’s balancing act failed when the Soviet Union encountered economic trouble and began to amend ties with China in 1986. Moscow was no longer interested in competing with China for influence over North Korea and began to cut back economic and military aid. China in turn reduced the amount of military and economic support due to Soviet retrenchment.
Without a split to leverage, Pyongyang could not demand that Moscow and Beijing maintain a generous level of aid. North Korea went bankrupt in the 1990s, and its military slipped behind South Korea’s.
North Korea has now crafted a new playbook on how to get Russia and China to support Pyongyang’s goals – even in the absence of a split. In the past, North Korea handled Moscow and Beijing by having them compete over both military and economic aid. Now, North Korea balances between its two patrons by assigning them a separate domain of cooperation suitable to their specific needs.
North Korea’s outreach to Russia revolves around military exchanges to get Moscow to assist in the development of its weapons of mass destruction program. North Korea leverages Russia’s need for weapons, troops, and ammunition for the war against Ukraine in exchange for Russia’s military technology. In return, Russia has been vocal about its support for North Korea’s nuclear program and even pledged to defend Pyongyang under the 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.
North Korea-Russia arms trade nearly doubled from 2023 to 2025, growing from $7.7 billion to $14.4 billion. This amount overshadows the food and fuel trade, which reached a record high of $34 million in 2024. North Korean laborers in Russia work in drone factories or in warzones along the Russia-Ukraine border. Pyongyang is also stressing its blood sacrifice for Russia’s war to remind Moscow of its military debt.
North Korea’s outreach to China takes on a completely different tone. Pyongyang emphasizes economic cooperation with China because it understands Beijing desires political and economic stability on the Korean Peninsula. In 2026, bilateral trade increased to $1.5 billion, up 19.6 percent compared to the first half of 2025. This marks a record high since China imposed sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test in 2017. Noticeably, weapons made up little of the trade rebound. Unlike their peers in Russia, North Korean laborers in China mostly work in the food service and textile industry.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited North Korea in June, he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un agreed to bolster ties in politics, economy, and culture. The military aspect of the Kim-Xi summit was largely absent from public view although the visit corresponded with the 65th anniversary of the signing of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Unlike Russia and North Korea, China and North Korea didn’t publicly praise the mutual defense clause in the treaty. However, Pyongyang got Beijing to quietly drop “denuclearization” in its North Korea policy and to stop enforcing international sanctions.
Russia and China have been comfortable with North Korea’s division of labor. Neither Moscow nor Beijing sees each other’s expanding cooperation with North Korea as a threat. China accepts Pyongyang sending troops to Russia’s war in Ukraine so long as North Korea’s participation doesn’t undermine China’s desire for stability in Northeast Asia. China even harbored a Russian ship involved in the North Korea-Russia arms trade, which had to be conducted by air and sea routes before the new land bridge was opened.
For its part, although Russia’s 2024 alliance treaty with North Korea mirrors the 1961 treaty, Moscow doesn’t treat it as a rival to China’s 1961 alliance treaty. Russia even supports trilateral dialogue with China and North Korea over Chinese vessels’ use of the Tumen River for access to the Sea of Japan. Russia’s support for North Korea’s nuclear and conventional forces modernization doesn’t come at China’s expense as North Korea doesn’t plan on invading South Korea anytime soon.
From North Korea’s perspective, selling weapons to Russia and wigs to China means its alliances with both are complimentary instead of competitive. Pyongyang can secure long-term support from Russia and China not through their spite toward each other but through their genuine interest in fostering a stable ally in the Asia-Pacific.
Thanks to Russian and Chinese backing, North Korea’s economy is booming and its military is undergoing the most comprehensive modernization program since 1991. Russia’s and China’s support also gives North Korea stronger diplomatic leverage in case it decides to restart dialogue with the United States. Importantly, North Korea doesn’t base its foreign policy on the state of Beijing-Moscow relations like it did during the Cold War. If either Russia or China loses interest in bolstering North Korea’s economy and military at some point in the future, the other patron will not reduce aid just because it has “won” the competition.