When Thai foreign minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow recently clarified that Thailand’s UNCLOS conciliation process with Cambodia in The Hague is non-binding and completely separate from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), he was reassuring a nervous domestic audience.
But to the international community, his statement revealed a familiar pattern: a persistent reluctance by Bangkok to subject its maritime and territorial claims to the rigorous scrutiny of binding international law.
This apprehension toward international judicial bodies is not merely a diplomatic preference for bilateralism; it stems from a fundamental vulnerability in legal strategy and domestic politics.
Under international legal frameworks, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maritime and territorial claims must be justified by rigorous historical evidence, modern hydrographic mapping and recognised international principles.
When states avoid binding courts — such as the ICJ or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) — it is often because their unilateral claims struggle to withstand the objective legal standard applied by neutral international judges. In binding adjudication, rhetoric and domestic political consensus carry no legal weight.
Instead, Thailand’s legal establishment has consistently gravitated toward non-binding mechanisms, like the UNCLOS Annex V conciliation in The Hague. While conciliation provides a structured platform for dialogue, its non-binding nature serves as a safety net. It allows Thai diplomats to participate on the global stage without the risk of an enforceable legal verdict. If the recommendations align with Bangkok’s position, they can be accepted; if they do not, they can be quietly set aside.
Furthermore, this apprehension is deeply tied to domestic political survival. In Thai politics, territorial and maritime claims are heavily politicised. Any government or diplomat that agrees to binding international arbitration risks severe internal backlash if the ruling does not grant them 100 per cent of their claims.
Political leaders fear being accused of compromising national sovereignty by their domestic opponents. Consequently, political self-preservation dictates that decisions must remain strictly within non-binding or bilateral frameworks, where any lack of resolution can be perpetually delayed without political penalty.
However, hiding behind non-binding mechanisms comes at a cost. While it protects political leaders from immediate domestic risk, it prolongs uncertainty for the entire region. Critical issues — such as overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand and the joint development of vital energy resources — remain in perpetual limbo when one party refuses to accept a binding legal resolution.
International law exists precisely to provide equitable, definitive and peaceful resolutions to complex disputes between neighbours. A state confident in the legal merits of its claims should have nothing to fear from an international court. Thailand’s insistence on keeping the Hague proceedings non-binding demonstrates that when faced with the impartial mirror of international jurisprudence, Bangkok still prefers the comfort of non-committal diplomacy over the finality of law.
Tesh Chanthorn is a Cambodian citizen who longs for peace. The views and opinions expressed are his own.