White shirts, fast-track passes: Inside an alleged Immigration racket

Dressed in matching white shirts, small groups of Chinese nationals gather at a restaurant inside the Home Ministry’s Federal Territory complex at around 11am. Local “runners”, familiar with the building, guide them through what appears to be a well-rehearsed routine.

This is the modus operandi Malaysiakini observed during an investigation into an alleged syndicate exploiting the Special Pass facility at the Immigration Department’s Federal Territory office at Jalan Duta, Kuala Lumpur.

Intended to help foreigners resolve urgent immigration matters, the facility is allegedly being abused to extend their stay in Malaysia beyond the period ordinarily allowed under a tourist visa.

During a week-long monitoring operation in early August, Malaysiakini found...

Dressed in matching white shirts, small groups of Chinese nationals gather at a restaurant inside the Home Ministry’s Federal Territory complex at around 11am. Local “runners”, familiar with the building, guide them through what appears to be a well-rehearsed routine.

This is the modus operandi Malaysiakini observed during an investigation into an alleged syndicate exploiting the Special Pass facility at the Immigration Department’s Federal Territory office at Jalan Duta, Kuala Lumpur.

Intended to help foreigners resolve urgent immigration matters, the facility is allegedly being abused to extend their stay in Malaysia beyond the period ordinarily allowed under a tourist visa.

During a week-long monitoring operation in early August, Malaysiakini found indications that local intermediaries were working with immigration officers to secure the passes for Chinese nationals.

The alleged malpractice appears to extend beyond counter-level corruption, involving a senior officer responsible for approving applications. According to at least two Immigration Department insiders, the arrangement is linked to online scam syndicates in the Klang Valley seeking to keep their agents in Malaysia.

The activity appeared to stop for a period after Malaysiakini's monitoring operation but had resumed by Oct 2, the latest date on which it was observed.

How the alleged scheme works

On working days, three to five local agents were seen gathering groups of fewer than 10 Chinese nationals at the restaurant around 11am.

The restaurant appeared to serve only as a meeting point. Malaysiakini found no indication that the establishment or its operators were involved in the alleged scheme. Its proximity to the immigration office allowed agents and applicants to move between the two locations with little fuss.

The foreign nationals wore plain white shirts, which appeared to help immigration officers allegedly involved in the scheme identify them without conspicuous communication.

While the group waited and ate, agents filled out application forms, collected the applicants' original passports, and took facial photographs using their personal mobile phones.

Based on information from sources and what Malaysiakini learned during the investigation, the photographs would be sent directly to immigration officers inside the building through messaging apps for preliminary verification - a process that should take place officially at the counter, rather than through personal devices.

The forms were subsequently passed to a senior officer for written approval, known as an official minute. Without this authorisation, counter officers could not approve the applications, regardless of how complete the documents were.

Around midday, an immigration officer came to the restaurant to distribute special queue numbers, allowing the group to bypass the ordinary queue and its usual screening process, which can take hours.

By around 2pm, agents escorted the applicants to the Visa, Pass, and Permit Division counter to complete the documentation. A process that should involve scrutiny of documents and identity verification took just five to 10 minutes per person.

In several instances, Malaysiakini observed that the applicants did not appear at the counter at all. Instead, local agents allegedly impersonated them and sat before immigration officers to process their applications in their absence.

If confirmed, this would breach the Immigration Department’s standard operating procedure, which requires applicants to appear in person.

Malaysiakini also obtained video recordings and photographs supporting its findings.

Senior officer's approval required

The investigation suggests the alleged scheme extended beyond counter-level officers to a senior officer at KL Immigration.

During its monitoring operation, Malaysiakini identified the officer through their role in issuing minutes for Special Pass application forms before the documents were sent to counter officers for processing and printing.

The applications could not have proceeded without the officer's signature and approval, based on what Malaysiakini observed.

Under Regulation 14 of the Immigration Regulations 1963, the Special Pass is discretionary and requires approval from an authorised officer.

Counter officers cannot independently approve applications. Each must be accompanied by a supporting minute on Form IMM.55 from an authorised officer, such as a director, state deputy director, or chief assistant director of the Visa, Pass, and Permit Division.

The senior officer's approval therefore authorises junior officers to issue the passport sticker. In the alleged scheme, this appears to have been the crucial step allowing applications to proceed despite apparent departures from normal procedures.

Applicants are officially required to appear at the counter for facial and biometric verification and produce their original passport, a completed IMM.55 form, a valid return flight ticket, and a substantive letter explaining their need for the pass.

These safeguards are intended to prevent abuse, but several appeared to have been bypassed in the cases observed by Malaysiakini.

RM20 official fee, RM1,500 through agents

The official fee for a Special Pass application is RM20, reflecting its intended purpose as a temporary facility for foreigners facing genuine emergencies.

To establish the alleged syndicate's charges, a Malaysiakini journalist posed as an applicant's representative and negotiated directly with the agents.

The syndicate quoted up to RM1,500 per passport for a full package.

Based on the five to 10 applicants Malaysiakini observed being processed daily during its week-long monitoring operation, the arrangement could generate RM7,500 to RM15,000 a day at that rate. This is an estimate based on the observed volume and quoted fee, not verified earnings.

In a separate check, a journalist approached the immigration enquiry counter to ask whether a special programme existed for issuing Special Passes to Chinese nationals.

An officer said no such programme existed, suggesting that the arrangement observed by Malaysiakini was not official policy.

Alleged links to scam syndicates

Why, then, is there such demand for the service among Chinese nationals?

According to at least two Immigration Department insiders contacted separately by Malaysiakini, the demand is linked to online scam syndicates operating in the Klang Valley, particularly in technology hubs such as Cyberjaya.

The area has been the focus of several enforcement operations involving Chinese nationals suspected of working in online scams.

In November 2019, immigration officers detained 680 Chinese nationals in a raid on a six-storey building in Cyberjaya allegedly used as a call centre for a China-based online investment scam syndicate. The operation, conducted after nearly two months of surveillance, also uncovered more than 8,000 mobile phones and hundreds of computers.

In March 2021, the MACC in Selangor arrested a businessperson with the "Datuk Seri" title on suspicion of accepting a RM300,000 bribe to secure the release of 22 Chinese nationals held at an immigration depot.

An MACC source said the 44-year-old had claimed he could resolve the group's detention. The individuals were being held over suspected involvement in an online gambling syndicate and a “Macau scam”.

More recently, in July 2026, police arrested nine Chinese men suspected of involvement in online stock-fraud activities at a luxury condominium in Mont Kiara, Kuala Lumpur.

These cases illustrate the recurring presence of suspected scam operations involving Chinese nationals in the Klang Valley, where Immigration sources say demand for the alleged Special Pass arrangement persists.

“Most of the Chinese nationals involved in online scam syndicates need to stay longer than their original tourist visa allows.

“Right now, visa exemption or social visit pass facilities only allow them to stay 30 days in Malaysia, and that period isn't enough for them.

“So they use this special pass to extend their stay up to 90 days or more without having to leave Malaysia,” a source told Malaysiakini.

Malaysiakini could not establish whether all foreign nationals involved in these operations had joined the scam syndicates voluntarily. Previous reports have highlighted cases in which call-centre workers were trafficking victims forced to participate in the operations.

High-speed internet and the security offered by condominiums and commercial premises make the Klang Valley, including Cyberjaya, attractive to scam syndicates operating call centres. But the limited duration of visitors' visas poses a logistical challenge.

The alleged Special Pass black market appears to offer a way around that constraint, with local intermediaries and allegedly complicit immigration officers facilitating extensions without applicants having to leave the country.

If substantiated, the allegations would point to more than immigration non-compliance. The abuse could help cybercrime networks sustain their operations in Malaysia, raising broader questions about enforcement and national security.

Repeat passes raise concerns

A Special Pass is intended to let foreigners resolve urgent matters, including health issues, changes in pass status, or court proceedings, before leaving Malaysia.

In principle, it is issued only once, for a maximum of 30 days, reflecting its temporary and emergency purpose, although the period may be extended.

Malaysiakini's investigation found indications that the syndicate was manipulating the Immigration database by submitting applications and obtaining approvals for Special Passes for the same individuals.

Such repeat issuance should be detectable if internal checks are working as intended. The apparent ability to secure successive passes raises questions about whether collusion may have compromised those safeguards.

In some cases observed by Malaysiakini, successive passes enabled foreign nationals to remain in Malaysia for more than 100 days, with their stays covered by valid documents on paper.

If confirmed, this would undermine the facility's intended purpose and point to possible weaknesses in the Immigration Department's internal oversight and audit systems.

The findings leave several questions unanswered. How widespread is the alleged malpractice within the department? Does a similar arrangement operate at immigration offices in other states? And how directly is the alleged abuse of Special Passes facilitating online scam syndicates?

Under existing rules, individual Immigration officers are not authorised to speak directly to the media. Public statements must come from the department or an authorised state-level director.

Malaysiakini contacted the Immigration Department's Kuala Lumpur office, including through an in-person visit, on Aug 10. It also alerted a KL Immigration officer to its findings and provided video and photographic evidence of the alleged syndicate's activities.

The department was given more than a month to respond.

In response, the office said: “We are still investigating.”

The department did not elaborate on the scope of the investigation, whether it included the senior officer identified by Malaysiakini, or when the probe was expected to conclude.