Last week, one Mr Okonkwo Chinedu shared a viral list to celebrate. I read it and mourned instead.
Eight Nigerian cities. Lagos No. 485, Abuja No. 741, Onitsha No. 802, Owerri No. 817, Enugu No. 850, Ibadan No. 881, Aba No. 925, Port Harcourt No. 956. Out of 1,000 cities ranked globally in the 2026 Global Cities Index.
His message was proud: “Ndigbo does not wait for government to develop his land. He develops it himself. Five of the top 8 are Igbo cities.”
He is right. And that is precisely the tragedy. Onitsha is Nigeria’s No. 3 but the world’s No. 802. What does it say about a country when its third-best city ranks 802nd on earth? What does it say about Igbo hustle when it builds cities but cannot make them livable?
Compiled by Oxford Economics, the Index ranks 1,000 cities on five pillars: economics, human capital, quality of life, environment, and governance. It measures economic strength, workforce and skills, residents’ well-being, environmental conditions, and institutional effectiveness.
Nigeria has 18 cities on the list, but none in the top 100. Cairo is Africa’s best at No. 255. Lagos, our best, is No. 485. Abuja is No. 741. Port Harcourt is No. 956 — 31 places below Aba.
These are not just wealth rankings. That is why the scores matter.
Onitsha scored 24.6 out of 100 overall. Breakdown: economics 27.1, human capital 45.4, quality of life 27.2, environment 54.2, governance 25.7. Its strongest pillars were environment and human capital. Its lowest was governance. The city’s commercial reputation has not been matched by quality of development.
That is not a failure of entrepreneurship. A 2024 study in the journal _Cities_ describes how the Igbo apprenticeship system transfers business knowledge, with apprentices becoming owners who train others. That system works.
What does not work is building cities without a country.
Compare: New York, ranked No.1 globally, scored 100 overall — economics 100, human capital 89.5, quality of life 80.8, environment 72.8, governance 75.7. Its 2026–2035 capital plan allocates $173.4bn to infrastructure, including $32bn for transportation, $24.7bn for affordable housing, and $23.8bn for public schools. Private enterprise plus massive public investment.
Anambra State’s 2025 budget was N606.99bn, with N467.5 billion in capital expenditure. Of that, the state announced N200 bn for roads, N32bn for Awka 2.0, Onitsha 2.0, and a new industrial city, and N2.5bn for transport and marine infrastructure. These are state-wide allocations, not Onitsha alone. The question is whether public investment is at the scale required.
Look at three examples of that gap:
Onitsha River Port: Built in 1983, rehabilitated in 2012, reopened in 2018 after inactivity. In August 2025, its manager still cited insecurity, low patronage and delayed dredging as obstacles. He said it could generate up to N100bn if fully operational. A functioning port would cut transport costs for traders, but its potential remains locked.
ABA: Manufacturing before power.
By 1961, its shoemaking industry had 92 enterprises employing 301 people. By 2016, operating industries had reportedly fallen from 165 in 2005 to fewer than 30 amid electricity and infrastructure crises. Geometric Power’s 141-megawatt plant was only commissioned in 2024 after years of delay. According to MAN, Nigerian manufacturers spent N1.11tn on alternative energy in 2024 and N1.34tn in 2025. In 2026, Aba manufacturers reported higher output after power improved. Question: How much more could Aba — ranked 925th — have grown if power had come earlier?
Enugu Airport: In September 2018, five South-East governors raised concerns about Akanu Ibiam International Airport — bad runway, poor lighting, no flights after 6:30 p.m. In November 2018, manager Mgbemene Orji confirmed it operated only from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. with inadequate approach lighting. After a year-long closure in 2019 for runway rehabilitation, FAAN shut the runway again in April 2025 over a major asphalt rupture. Minister Festus Keyamo blamed poor construction of a waterlogged section. In June 2026, the government handed it to a concessionaire to finance rehabilitation and expansion. The history raises a question of durability: can businesses depend on it?
The second argument in Chinedu’s post was historical: Lagos was built by Nigeria. Who built the rest?
He recalled post-war hardship. The Civil War ended in January 1970, devastating the former Eastern Region. Under the £20 policy, people who surrendered Biafran currency got a flat £20, regardless of what they held.
Lagos had a head start. Under British rule, it became an administrative centre and port. The railway to the hinterland started in 1898; the Lagos–Ibadan line opened in 1901. After independence, it remained the federal capital until 1991. The World Bank’s 1985 report on Lagos noted substantial federal and state investments in major roads, airport and port facilities. Its commercial advantage remained.
Abuja followed deliberate planning. In 1976, the government established the Federal Capital Development Authority to build a purpose-built capital for the presidency, ministries and diplomats, creating demand for housing, transport and services.
Ibadan shows another route: a major pre-colonial city strengthened by a railway link to Lagos.
A World Bank report on Nigeria’s Second Multi-State Roads Project in the early 1990s, using 1988 data, recorded that 96 per cent of Lagos’s state road network was paved, compared to 64 per cent of the combined network in Imo and Abia. It identified Anambra and Enugu among states with the least-developed state road networks, with over half in poor condition. Historically, it shows the gap is old.
That gap is why the call for six regional economic anchors — one per geopolitical zone — matters. Look beyond the East: In the North-West, Kaduna ranked 979th, Zaria 991st, Kano 992nd. In the North-East, Maiduguri ranked 995th. Cities with agricultural, industrial and resource advantages have not translated them into global competitiveness.
This brings us to Port Harcourt at No. 956. Oxford Economics itself notes that 78 of the first 100 cities are in Europe and North America, because advantages reinforce themselves by attracting skilled workers. But how does a city at the heart of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, in a state that receives 13 per cent derivation revenue, rank below Aba, which has no power? Port Harcourt has petroleum businesses, Onne Port and federal institutions. Yet it ranks close to the bottom. Chinedu claimed Igbo enterprise-built Port Harcourt despite it being South-South. The bigger question is not who built it, but why oil money did not build it.
No African city made the top 10. Lagos at No. 485 is not a success. Onitsha at No. 802 is not a success. Aba at No. 925 is not a success. Port Harcourt at No. 956 is a failure despite oil.
The 2026 Index is not proof that Ndigbo has tried. It shows Nigeria has failed its cities.
Igbo cities prove that private enterprise, apprenticeship and Aku Ruo Ulo can create commercial centres where government is absent. They also prove its absolute limit: you cannot apprentice your way to a seaport, you cannot hustle your way to industrial power, you cannot build hotels without building a sewage system.
Aku Ruo Ulo can bring wealth home. But wealth without public investment — without a river port, without reliable power, without a cargo airport, without roads — cannot become a globally competitive city.
If we don’t fix that, we will be celebrating #802 forever. And No. 802 is not a ranking. It is an indictment.