The Long March: How This Has Defined China and Rwanda Today

BEIJING— Sitting in my room in Beijing’s Chaoyang District, I find myself reflecting on a defining chapter of Chinese history: the Long March.

Across China, the 90th anniversary of the Long March in 2026 has brought renewed attention to the sacrifices, determination and political convictions that helped shape the country’s modern history.

Through television documentaries, historical exhibitions, cultural programmes and public discussions, the Chinese people are revisiting the extraordinary journey of the Red Army and the legacy it left behind.

For me, as a Rwandan journalist living in China’s capital, this history evokes another struggle that transformed a nation: the liberation movement led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its armed wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which began its military campaign on October 1, 1990.

The two movements emerged in different historical circumstances and faced different adversaries. Their military campaigns cannot be treated as identical. Yet their histories invite a compelling question: how does a movement’s determination to survive, overcome adversity and pursue a common objective influence the nation it eventually helps to shape?

The question is particularly relevant as China continues its pursuit of technological advancement and economic modernisation, while Rwanda builds on its post-genocide reconstruction and development ambitions.

The experiences of these two countries suggest that resilience can become a powerful national resource. But they also remind us that the real measure of a liberation movement lies in what it builds after the struggle ends.

Beijing revisits the Long March

One of the most striking expressions of China’s connection to its revolutionary past is the attention given to the Long March’s 90th anniversary.

On September 22, 2026, an exhibition titled The Great Expedition: A Thematic Exhibition Commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the Victory of the Long March opened at the Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution in Beijing. It opened to the public on September 25.

According to a report published by People’s Pictorial, the exhibition covers approximately 3,300 square metres and is organised into seven sections. It features 875 cultural relics, 186 documentary items, 357 photographs and charts, 73 works of art and 16 videos. More than 300 artefacts and documents are being displayed for the first time.

The exhibition traces the Red Army’s journey through key episodes, including the devastating crossing of the Xiang River, the Zunyi Conference, the crossing of the Luding Bridge and the army’s passage through snow-covered mountains and marshlands.

These displays do more than recount military history. They present the Long March as a defining experience through which sacrifice, discipline, perseverance and collective purpose became central to China’s revolutionary identity.

At the opening ceremony, Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, emphasised the historical significance of the march and its continuing role in inspiring the Chinese people.

The message is unmistakable: the Long March is not remembered merely as a journey across China’s difficult terrain. It is presented as a source of lessons for the country’s continuing development.

For an observer in Beijing, the anniversary provides an opportunity to consider how historical memory shapes contemporary national ambitions. It also raises a question that extends beyond China: what happens when a country’s defining historical experiences become part of the values it seeks to pass from one generation to another?

The actual history: Why the Red Army marched

To understand the significance of the Long March, it is necessary to revisit the circumstances in which it began.

In October 1934, the main force of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army began withdrawing from its revolutionary base in Jiangxi Province, southeastern China. The Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek had launched successive military campaigns to encircle and destroy the Communist forces.

The retreat was a strategic effort to preserve the Red Army and the Communist movement. It was not originally a campaign against Japan, although resistance to Japanese aggression subsequently became central to China’s national struggle.

The journey involved different Red Army formations travelling along separate routes through some of the country’s most difficult terrain. The soldiers encountered repeated military engagements, hunger, disease, exhaustion and extreme weather.

The crossing of the Xiang River in late 1934 was especially costly, inflicting devastating losses on the Red Army. In early 1935, the army crossed the Wu River in Guizhou Province as it manoeuvred to evade pursuing Nationalist forces.

These episodes illustrate the scale of the challenges confronting the retreating army. Survival required more than physical endurance. It demanded changes in military strategy, organisational adaptation and the ability to continue despite severe setbacks.

The Red Army eventually reached northern Shaanxi, where Yan’an became an important centre of Communist political and military organisation. The broader Long March involved several formations and concluded with the regrouping of the main Red Army forces in 1936.

Estimates of the number of soldiers who began and completed the journey vary according to the formations and stages being counted. The losses were nevertheless enormous.

The march did not immediately deliver political victory. Instead, it preserved the Communist movement at a moment when its survival was in serious doubt. It also helped strengthen Mao Zedong’s leadership and became one of the foundational narratives of the Communist Party of China.

That distinction is important. The Long March’s historical significance lies partly in the fact that it was a retreat that enabled a movement to survive, regroup and continue its struggle.

Resilience, in this context, did not mean avoiding defeat or loss. It meant retaining the capacity to continue after a potentially fatal setback.

From the Long March to Rwanda’s liberation struggle

As I reflect on China’s history from Beijing, my thoughts turn to Rwanda and the events that led to the country’s liberation struggle.

On October 1, 1990, the RPF launched its armed campaign from Uganda against the government of President Juvénal Habyarimana. The movement emerged from the unresolved plight of Rwandan refugees who had fled the country in earlier decades and faced persistent barriers to returning home.

Many Rwandan refugees had spent much of their lives outside their homeland. For them, the struggle was closely connected to questions of belonging, citizenship, political representation and the right to return to Rwanda.

The 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement sought to end the conflict through a negotiated political arrangement. Its implementation was disrupted by the death of President Habyarimana in April 1994 and the ensuing Genocide against the Tutsi, during which more than one million people were killed.

The RPF’s military advance ended the genocide in July 1994, bringing the genocide against Tutsi to a close and opening a new chapter in Rwanda’s history.

The liberation struggle must therefore be understood within a much wider context than military victory. It was connected to the refugee question, the failure of political reconciliation, the genocide and the immense challenge of rebuilding a country devastated by the genocide.

The comparison with the Long March is not that the two struggles were the same. China’s Red Army was retreating from Nationalist encirclement during a civil war, while the RPF began its campaign to secure the return of refugees and pursue political change in Rwanda.

Their historical circumstances were distinct. Yet both experiences raise questions about perseverance, organisational cohesion and the ability of a movement to continue pursuing its objectives in the face of severe losses.

For the RPF, the struggle became part of the political history informing Rwanda’s post-1994 reconstruction. For the CPC, the Long March remains a defining account of the survival of the revolutionary movement.

Both histories demonstrate how experiences of adversity can become central to the identity of political organisations long after the fighting has ended.

Can resilience explain the rise of China and Rwanda?

It is tempting to attribute China’s economic transformation and Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery primarily to the resilience of the movements that came to lead them.

There is a reasonable argument that prolonged struggles can produce organisational discipline, a shared sense of purpose and a determination to overcome obstacles. Such qualities may influence the institutions and political priorities that emerge after conflict.

But resilience alone cannot explain the development of either country.

China’s rise has been shaped by decades of economic reform, industrialisation, investment in infrastructure, education, agricultural transformation, international trade and technological innovation. Its large domestic market and ability to mobilise resources have also played important roles.

The World Bank estimated in 2022 that the number of people in China living below the international extreme-poverty line had fallen by close to 800 million over approximately four decades. The institution’s assessment highlighted sustained investment, agricultural productivity, industrialisation and other structural changes as important factors in that achievement.

Rwanda’s development trajectory has been different. Following the genocide, the country prioritised reconstruction, institutional reform, infrastructure, public services, national unity and efforts to expand the private sector.

In 2023, the World Bank reported that one million people had lifted themselves out of extreme poverty in Rwanda over the preceding decade, with improvements in agriculture among the contributing factors.

These figures cover different periods and national circumstances, so they should not be treated as directly comparable. They nevertheless illustrate the scale of the development challenges both countries have confronted.

The important question is how political determination becomes practical policy.

Resilience may help a country persevere through difficult circumstances, but economic progress also requires effective institutions, appropriate policies, productive investment, education, innovation and opportunities for citizens to participate in economic life.

A country’s historical narrative can influence its ambitions. Its future, however, depends on what its people and institutions do with those ambitions.

Unity: The foundation of national reconstruction

Another striking connection between China’s revolutionary history and Rwanda’s post-genocide experience is the emphasis placed on national unity.

The Long March is remembered as an experience that tested the Red Army’s cohesion and helped preserve the Communist movement through a period of extraordinary danger.

In contemporary China, the CPC presents the march as a source of inspiration for national rejuvenation, collective effort and the pursuit of modernisation.

Rwanda’s emphasis on unity has a different but equally important historical context. The genocide against the Tutsi demonstrated the devastating consequences of dehumanisation, political division and the mobilisation of communities against one another.

Rebuilding Rwanda required more than restoring roads, schools, hospitals and government institutions. It also required confronting a history in which social divisions had been exploited and the institutions responsible for protecting citizens had failed catastrophically.

National unity, reconciliation and a shared Rwandan identity consequently became central to the country’s post-genocide political narrative.

The comparison raises another question: does a shared language help a country build unity?

Kinyarwanda is widely spoken across Rwanda and provides an important means of communication between citizens. China’s linguistic landscape is more diverse, although Mandarin serves as the country’s official national standard language.

Yet neither a common language nor a shared historical narrative automatically guarantees national cohesion. Countries with different languages can build effective institutions, while societies that share a language can still experience deep divisions.

Unity requires more than communication. It requires trust, institutions that serve the public, a sense of belonging and opportunities for citizens to contribute to national development.

In Rwanda, the ideal of unity is tested in the everyday experience of citizens. A public school, health facility or road in a rural district should be part of the same national commitment to public service as the infrastructure found in Kigali.

Development should not be determined by a community’s geographical location or its history of marginalisation. Citizens must be able to see and experience the benefits of national progress.

The deeper lesson is that unity becomes meaningful when it is translated into equal dignity, access to public services and shared opportunities.

The RPF and the CPC: A relationship beyond historical parallels

The comparison between the two movements is not limited to their historical experiences. The Communist Party of China and the Rwandan Patriotic Front have developed a relationship involving political exchanges, governance discussions and cooperation between their respective institutions.

A particularly important feature of the relationship is the exchange of experiences in party organisation, leadership development and national governance.

In January 2024, Wang Huning, a member of the CPC’s senior leadership, met an RPF delegation led by then RPF Secretary General Wellars Gasamagera in Beijing. The discussions addressed the relationship between the parties and countries, China’s development experience and opportunities to strengthen cooperation. The RPF delegation expressed its interest in learning from China’s experience in party and state governance.

In July 2025, Chinese Ambassador to Rwanda Gao Wenqi met Gasamagera and highlighted the parties’ frequent high-level exchanges and cooperation in governance, party-school development, cadre training and the preservation and use of revolutionary heritage sites. Gasamagera, in turn, emphasised the importance of learning from each other’s experiences.

These exchanges are significant because they show that the relationship extends beyond formal diplomatic engagement between the two governments.

The parties have an interest in understanding how each organises leadership, develops its institutions and pursues national development priorities. Their exchanges also create opportunities to discuss the preservation of historical memory and the role of political organisations in shaping national identity.

The relationship operates within broader diplomatic ties established between Rwanda and China in 1971. In September 2024, President Xi Jinping and President Paul Kagame announced the elevation of bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Xi also highlighted the importance of exchanges on party and state governance.

However, the CPC and RPF emerged from different political and historical circumstances. The CPC developed from China’s revolutionary struggle and governs a Marxist-Leninist one-party state. The RPF emerged from the struggle of Rwandan refugees for return and political change and has led Rwanda through its post-genocide reconstruction.

Their cooperation should not be interpreted as proof that their political systems or histories are identical. Rather, it reflects a relationship in which both parties see value in political dialogue, institutional learning and cooperation on development.

The real measure of this relationship is whether it produces practical benefits for citizens through improved public services, stronger economic opportunities, skills development and more effective institutions.

From the battlefield to peacekeeping

The legacies of China’s revolutionary history and Rwanda’s liberation struggle also invite reflection on the responsibilities their countries have assumed internationally.

Rwanda has become a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations. According to UN figures for July 31, 2025, Rwanda contributed 5,905 uniformed personnel, including troops, police officers and other personnel serving in peacekeeping roles. This placed the country among the leading contributors at that reporting date.

China also contributes military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, while India has a longstanding record of participation in international peacekeeping.

For Rwanda, international peacekeeping has particular resonance. A country that experienced genocide and the collapse of institutions responsible for protecting its population now contributes personnel to international efforts to support peace and protect civilians.

This is a notable aspect of Rwanda’s international engagement, although the country’s historical experience alone cannot explain every aspect of its peacekeeping policy.

Likewise, China’s international role has developed through its own political priorities, economic transformation and evolving approach to international affairs.

Both countries’ participation in peacekeeping offers an opportunity to examine how national experiences influence their understanding of security and international responsibility.

The ultimate test is not simply the number of personnel deployed. It is whether peacekeeping efforts protect civilians, uphold international law and contribute to sustainable peace.

What the next generation can learn

One of the most important legacies of the Long March is the way it has been incorporated into China’s national consciousness.

Its story is taught, commemorated and interpreted as a lesson in perseverance and collective purpose. For the CPC, the march provides a historical reference point for mobilising citizens around contemporary national objectives.

Rwanda has likewise placed considerable emphasis on remembering the liberation struggle, commemorating the genocide against the Tutsi and teaching future generations about the importance of unity and preventing the recurrence of mass atrocities.

There are important differences between these historical experiences and the purposes of their commemorations. Yet both countries demonstrate how societies use historical memory to explain their present circumstances and communicate their aspirations for the future.

Historical memory is most useful when it encourages citizens to ask difficult questions, understand the costs of conflict and recognise the responsibilities that accompany political change.

It should not become a substitute for examining history critically or acknowledging the suffering experienced by people on different sides of a conflict.

For young people in China and Rwanda, the most valuable lesson may be that resilience is not simply the ability to endure hardship. It is also the ability to learn, adapt, develop new skills and create opportunities for the next generation.

A country’s progress should ultimately be measured by whether young people can access quality education, find meaningful employment, establish businesses, participate in public life and look towards the future with confidence.

Was the sacrifice worth it?

This is perhaps the most difficult question raised by the Long March and Rwanda’s liberation struggle.

The soldiers who died along China’s rivers, mountains and difficult terrain did

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