[Today’s Iran War post is likely to be telegraphic. Your humble blogger apologizes for having been less active on the site in recent weeks; I hope to be able to give a partial explanation by the week after next. In the meantime, I have just returned from a business trip to NYC that was debilitating and also highly frustrating, in that some things I wanted to get done were unduly difficult and in one case, could not be completed despite considerable effort and time expenditure. I had a cold when I left which became much worse as a result of over 20 hours each way of flight time. So I am not yet back in fighting form.
However, this post was virtually complete at launch time. It should be final by 7:30 AM EDT]
Iran and Saudi-Ansar Allah war news has oddly been relegated to below the fold treatment across the news media, with riots in Europe and related market wobbles, evidence of fundamental problems with AI and resulting investor pullback mounting, a possible Putin-Xi-Trump summit, Alberta voting to stay in Canada, and other developments taking pride of place.
But many of these events have become more intense as a result of the effects of the Iran and related Saudi-Ansar Allah war.1
The Press TV landing page helps explain the present limted mainstream media interest: despite lots of saber-rattling, kinetic action right now is limited:
That is not to say noting has happened of late. Iran poked at the US and the US responded:
⚡️🚨 The IRGC Navy reportedly targeted a U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in the northern Arabian Sea. U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter jets from the USS George W. Bush aircraft carrier responded with air attacks against IRGC Navy targets in Konarak, southeastern Iran.
— Middle East Observer (@ME_Observer_) October 19, 2026
However, the excitement on Twitter about the US strikes on the IRCG base are out of line with the severity of the actual attack. Contrast this tweet from The Hormuz Report…
BREAKING: The U.S. has reportedly struck Iran’s Konarak Naval Base on the country’s southeastern coast, hitting a 35mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannon with two projectiles around 1 a.m. local time on October 19 and wounding two Iranian Navy personnel, per an Iranian Navy spokesperson cited by Al Jazeera.
The spokesperson said the projectiles were fired by American forces, while local reports recorded two explosions in the Konarak area. The strike may have involved a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone firing an AGM-114 Hellfire missile after the cannon opened fire.
The last reported U.S. strike on Iranian soil was on September 1, nearly seven weeks ago. Iran is now likely to respond, potentially marking the beginning of a new round of direct U.S.-Iran military confrontation.
Note that PressTV reported that Iran has downed yet another Reaper drone, but it does not seem to be the same Reaper used in the attack on the naval base.
But see how performative that naval base strike actually was:
🇮🇷🇺🇸 IRAN says American forces have struck its Konarak naval base on the SOUTHEASTERN COAST, wounding two Iranian soldiers.
The reported target is particularly interesting.
According to Iran’s navy, the Americans fired just two light projectiles, apparently targeting a single 35mm cannon.
Not a warship. One gun.
Konarak sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, making this a different location from the shipping chokepoint that has dominated much of the conflict.
If Tehran’s account is accurate, the strike appears unusually limited in scope.
What remains unclear is why that particular weapon was targeted and whether it had been involved in any recent confrontation with American forces.
Source: Al Jazeera / Writer: Oliver
— Mario Nawfal (@MarioNawfal) October 19, 2026
So if this is accurate, the US is signaling it does not want to escalate meaningfully at this moment while being able to pretend at home that it had engaged in a muscular response, per the fact that the US had not hit Iranian territory for seven weeks.
And the fact that there has been an increase in diplomatic exchanges suggests that despite Trump’s aggressive rhetoric, the US is still trying to find a way out. From Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش on Twitter:
Intensive Diplomatic Efforts to Prevent Another U.S.–Iran Escalation
Over the past several days, there appears to have been a renewed diplomatic push to prevent another military confrontation between the United States and Iran.
Beyond the recent visits to Tehran by senior regional officials, including Asim Munir, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s statements that Tehran’s leadership is reviewing the American response to Iran’s seven-point proposal, there are growing indications of an intensive diplomatic effort to prevent further escalation.
These efforts come against the backdrop of increasingly aggressive Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz, tough rhetoric from Washington, and, perhaps most importantly, a growing recognition that without a diplomatic agreement, another round of military escalation may be only a matter of time.
That said, we should be extremely cautious about interpreting these developments as evidence of an imminent breakthrough.
The gaps between Washington and Tehran remain substantial. Iran continues to insist on the full implementation of its seven demands, particularly the lifting of the maritime blockade, the release of frozen Iranian assets, alongside a broader ceasefire across the various regional fronts and credible guarantees against future military attacks.
Washington, meanwhile, continues to demand that nuclear negotiations begin without making them conditional on the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
While the Iranians have demonstrated some willingness to expedite diplomatic engagement, there is little indication that Tehran is prepared to make additional substantive concessions. Similarly, Washington has shown no clear willingness to fundamentally reconsider its own demands.
This is why we need to distinguish between renewed diplomatic activity and genuine diplomatic progress.
The fact that diplomatic channels are active does not necessarily mean that the underlying disagreements are narrowing. Rather, it reflects a growing awareness among the parties involved of the potentially devastating consequences of another military confrontation.
The current diplomatic efforts are encouraging, but they should not be mistaken for a breakthrough. Both sides appear interested in avoiding another war, yet neither seems willing to make the concessions necessary to secure a sustainable agreement.
The bottom line is that Diplomacy is gaining momentum, but the fundamental deadlock remains. The key question is whether the shared desire to avoid another war will ultimately outweigh the unwillingness of either side to compromise.
Yours truly remains deeply skeptical that there can be any negotiated solution. It isn’t just that the bargaining positions of the two sides are light-years apart. That gap reflects a difference in perspective between the two sides as to how long its opponent can keep fighting. Even though the US is in deep denial about how overmatched it is in theater on the military front, between depleted weapons stocks and strained logistics due to the loss of bases, too many seem confident that Iran is about to fall apart economically. The Mario Nawfal channel regularly features believers in US/Israel inevitable victory. They are scary in the depth of their conviction. And you can be sure that that type has undue access to Trump.
Let us not forget that the US is still scheming with Israel:
Something doesn’t quite add up. Or perhaps it does.
– Israeli media Ynet and Walla report that Emirati representatives were present yesterday at the secret meeting at Ovda air base between Netanyahu and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, held against the backdrop of discussions over a possible resumption of large-scale military operations against Iran.
– Yet, almost at the same time, a UAE government-linked Royal Jet Boeing 737 flew from Abu Dhabi to Tehran. According to flight trackers, this was the second such UAE flight to Tehran in 48 hours.
– If both reports are accurate, Abu Dhabi seems to be keeping very active channels open in both directions: close security coordination with Israel and the US, while at the same time maintaining a direct line with Tehran.
– Not necessarily a contradiction. Time will tell.
#Iran #UAE
— Babak Vahdad (@BabakVahdad) October 20, 2026
Even the normally negotiation-optimistic Trita Parsi has thrown in the towel. From Can Trump and Iran ever reach a deal again?:
On March 9 of this year, roughly ten days into the Iran war, I made the following points on Twitter:
Trump is desperately seeking to end the war, but Iran has a vote to, and it won’t allow the war to end quite yet for a few reasons:
Tehran objects to what it would consider a premature ceasefire out of fear that it would only give the US and Israel time to regroup, rearm, and then re-attack Iran. For the conflict to be ripe for a ceasefire, Tehran believes that enough cost must have been inflicted on the US, regional states, Israel, and on the global economy that all states conclude that starting the war was a mistake – and as a result, no state will seek to restart it….
Iran, of course, does not want, nor can it afford, an endless war. But it will likely demand some significant steps in order to accept a ceasefire. This may include a commitment from Trump not to restart the war (though I don’t understand the value of such a commitment).
But more importantly, it will likely require sanctions relief and release of its frozen funds abroad.
In retrospect, the assessment appears to have held up quite well. My expectations of what a deal would entail closely follow the key points of the MOU three months later…
In light of reports that Trump is eyeing a strike on Pickaxe Mountain using the Mother of All Bombs, how has the situation evolved, and would a new deal look very different?
Consider the following developments:
Trump’s Perceived Desire for a Deal
….Trump is seen as an inherently unstable and immature person who may want a deal, but does not have the discipline to secure one or the strength to keep it in the face of attacks from Israel and pro-Israeli forces in the US.
Moreover, Tehran no longer believes even a face-saving exit for Trump would work and, as a result, is far less inclined to offer him one than it was in June. …
Trump Hasn’t Hurt Enough
…the Iranian narrative suggests that Trump did not hurt enough before agreeing to the MOU. Had the war been more costly, he would have had stronger incentives to keep the agreement….
That is, incentives or face-saving exits won’t end the war; Trump reaching a military dead-end will.
Pickaxe Won’t End the War
These perceptions profoundly shape the implications of Trump striking Pickaxe Mountain with a MOAB..
Tehran does not believe Trump will use such an attack to provide himself with a face-saving exit, but rather as a step toward greater escalation. Iran’s experience with Trump is that he backs off only if Tehran inflicts high costs on his strategy.
A proportional Iranian response to an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be to strike at other nuclear facilities in the region, including in the UAE and Israel…
Tehran Continues to Insist on a Regional Ceasefire
…I have not sensed any shift in Tehran’s position on this issue, even though the regional situation has grown more complex, making such a ceasefire harder to ensure amid fighting between Ansarullah and Saudi Arabia.
Tehran Feels Stronger Internally
Trump’s February attack on Iran came less than two months after the largest and bloodiest protests against the Islamic Republic…
Today, the government’s assessment of its internal strength and support has shifted 180 degrees. As one analyst in Iran told me: “The Iranian people and the Islamic Republic now share a destiny.”…
Time is on Iran’s Side
Much like the collapse of the MOU, Tehran and Washington assess the benefit of time very differently. The White House insists that its blockade of the Persian Gulf, combined with higher volumes transiting the Strait, means Tehran has lost the battle of the Strait and that, over time, its economic and strategic situation will deteriorate dramatically.
Tehran sees it the other way around. Observers in Iran insist Tehran is collecting fees from ships transiting the Strait, is selling between 500,000 and 1,000,000 barrels of oil a day, and that Trump’s air blockade is already starting to fall apart…
Over time, Tehran believes the US negotiating position will only weaken…
The Lure of Sanctions Relief is Waning
Iran’s economy needs sanctions relief…
As part of the MOU, Trump famously issued a blanket waiver that allowed Iranian oil sales…But just 16 days later…Trump withdrew the waiver and swiftly reimposed the oil sanctions.
The dramatic turn of events over 16 days reinforced Tehran’s view that US sanctions relief is fleeting, fickle, and unreliable….
Conclusion: A Deal is Not in the Making
…I suspect Iran mainly seeks temporary deals to lower the temperature in the immediate term, without ever seriously addressing the core nuclear issue until Trump leaves office.
To clarify: MOAB is formally not “the Mother of All Bombs” but is Massive Ordnance Air Blast. Experts have uniformly been dismissive of the idea that it would accomplish anything against Pickaxe Mountain. It’s an airburst weapon and not intended for hard targets like infrastructure, much the less a mountain. One commentator compared it to deploying napalm at scale. One use of the MOAB was to clear jungle to create helicopter landing spots.
Keep in mind that the MOAB is indeed such a huge bomb that very very few aircraft can carry it, and they are slow and would make for easy targets. From Wikipedia:
The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blastis a large-yield bomb…The bomb is designed to be delivered by a C-130 Hercules, primarily the MC-130E Combat Talon I or MC-130H Combat Talon II variants….
Pentagon officials suggested MOAB might be used as an anti-personnel weapon, as part of the “shock and awe” strategy integral to the 2003 invasion of Iraq…
The MOAB is not a penetrator weapon and is primarily an air burst bomb intended for soft to medium surface targets covering extended areas and targets in a contained environment such as a deep canyon or within a cave system.
So why the chatter about the MOAB? One possibility comes out of recent talks by very-Trump-circle-connected Robert Barnes. He has reported that Trump regularly brings up the idea of nuking Iran, but that Dan Caine has become very successful at derailing that line of discussion by bringing up other hopefully Trump-pleasing options. Trump has become very fond of big showy explosions and the MOAB is so powerful that it generates a mushroom cloud.
However, some commentator worry that the talk of Pickaxe Mountain is a diversion and the US might instead deploy it against Tehran or a smaller city. That would be sure to produce the Mother of All Retaliations.
There are also new reports of the US attacking another Trump fetish object, Kharg Island. Too many commentators claim that this would deliver a crushing blow to Iran oil exports. This is false. Kharg is far and away the most convenient and efficient loading site. But Iran has four more for sea transit on its southern coast.
Another impediment to any sort of negotiated outcome: Iran is becoming much less willing to make concessions on nuclear enrichment to secure a settlement:
BREAKING: Iranian lawmakers say Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s position on nuclear weapons will differ from his late father’s and that Iran must now acquire nuclear weapons.
"The nuclear doctrine must change," Iranian MP Naderi says, adding that the discussion of nuclear deterrence has become more serious and has now reached the level of Friday prayer imams (top state clerics).
"Our response so far in terms of revenge has not been sufficient. A response will be sufficient when we achieve definitive deterrence, which will happen, we are in this process," he adds.
— The Hormuz Letter (@HormuzLetter) October 18, 2026
Ansar Allah continues to mix things up:
The Houthis hit a training centre in Yemen’s Shabwa governate with three ballistic missiles, killing at least 53 recruits and wounding more than 200 others with the death toll expected to rise.
As to the fact that Egypt is considering more than token (as in limited and defensive) support of the Saudis, government survival risk suggests this won’t get off the ground. From Policy Tensor on Twitter:
Let me put it a bit more colorfully. If Sisi intervenes and the Houthis strike Cairo, the Egyptians will take to the streets in large numbers for the Houthis. It is not obvious that the junta survives. In Pakistan, body bags coming home from Yemen may dramatically escalate the Khan rebellion against the junta. In Turkey, Erdogan’s support may collapse on the same rock.
The Sunni autocrats, the bootlickers of the West, may not survive to tell the tale if they take on the Houthis. And I really do mean the Houthis, not Iran. It may have to do with the obvious David vs Goliath framing in the Yemen war. Or it may have to do with the less-obviously Shia coding of the Houthis.
What is clear is that it is hard to see any government relying on Islamism in any form to take the fight to the Houthis and live to tell the tale.
This coverage of the kinetic war front means we have relegated the economic discussion to late in this post, when the real economy effects of the Strait of Hormuz choking are having a strong effect on politics in many countries, as citizens rebel against higher energy and food costs. A Nomura analysis during Arab Spring found that food and fuel costs breaching a certain level of average household income was a strong predictor of large-scale protests.
We hope to unpack the detail in future posts, but a not-sufficiently-well-reported aspect of the current energy crisis is the degree to which vastly higher tanker prices are adding to actual total fuel costs. Reporting on paper oil costs, which already understate physical market levels, omit this substantial added expense. We have linked to OilPrice stories that indicate that petrostates have even lowered prices to offset the transit costs.
Keep in mind further that we do not have good data on tanker hits. Reports to UKMTO are voluntary. There are YouTube claims (which I regard as credible) that Iran has done substantial damage to fleet of smaller shuttle ships that carry oil on the Oman side of the Gulf to be offloaded to bigger vessels past the Strait of Homuz, in the Gulf of Oman.
A fresh update:
🚢 There are only about 950 supertankers in the world, each carrying about 2 million barrels of crude. Energy analyst Rory Johnston warns that losing a couple a day to attacks around Hormuz "adds up very, very quickly."
Johnston, founder of Commodity Context, told Drop Site News’ Ryan Grim the attacks are getting more serious. Early strikes mostly holed double hulls, damage repairable in a week or two. Now drones are hitting engine rooms, which may take months. Of more than 110 attacks since the war began, three ships have sunk, two in recent weeks.
Shipping a barrel from the Gulf to China now costs $25 to $30, more than ten times the prewar rate, with tanker day rates of $1.3 to $1.5 million.
🔗 Watch our full interview, where Johnston explains why Trump’s diesel deal with Putin is a "nothing burger" and why any relief in prices is unlikely until 2027.
@Rory_Johnston | @ryangrim
— Drop Site (@DropSiteNews) October 19, 2026
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1 The Saudi-Ansar Allah conflict is “related” because Ansar Allah had been sitting out the Iran war, despite reports of entreaties by Tehran for Ansar Allah to saddle up. The trigger for the revival of this was air travel by Ansar Allah officials and others out of Saana to attend the funeral for the martyred Supreme Leader and other Iranians. The Saudis tried to prevent the return flights, which they deemed to be a violation of their air embargo. That led to the very forceful Ansar Allah attacks and successful re-capture of strategically important occupied Yemen territory. Yours truly does not buy the canard that the Saudi-backed “internationally recognized” government is legitimate.
