Prosperity rests on things no growth figure can capture: reliable water, public health and conditions that let people live and work safely. When Türkiye hosts the United Nations climate summit, COP31, in Antalya this November, the country will have a chance to put those connections at the center of climate diplomacy. Under the compromise reached at last year’s summit in Belem, Brazil, Türkiye holds the presidency while Australia leads the negotiations. Whatever the division of labor, the host’s message matters. Cutting carbon from power, transport, industry and buildings is best understood as protecting development, provided livelihoods are safeguarded and the burden is shared fairly.
The location lends that argument weight. Around the Mediterranean, heat, drought and water scarcity compound one another, putting harvests, ecosystems and health at risk together. The World Meteorological Organization ranked 2025 among the three warmest years on record, a year in which extreme heat, torrential rain and tropical cyclones disrupted economies across the world. Climate stability is part of the foundation of economic security, not a separate concern.
Türkiye’s own trajectory frames the question it faces as host. Between 2015 and 2024, its fossil carbon dioxide emissions rose by 25.1%, while the European Union’s fell by 20.1%. Global emissions grew too, though more slowly than Türkiye’s. How can an economy keep meeting people’s needs while steadily cutting the carbon it releases?
The ratios tell a more mixed story. Over the same decade, the carbon Türkiye emitted per dollar of economic output fell, staying below the global level but above the EU’s. Emissions per person, by contrast, climbed above the world average while remaining below the European figure. A falling ratio of carbon to output can sit comfortably alongside a rising annual total. It can also reflect changes in the make-up of the economy, or in how output is measured, as much as genuine gains in efficiency.
For the climate, the total is what counts. The warming caused by carbon dioxide is closely tied to the cumulative amount emitted over time, a relationship the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes as near-linear. Cutting annual emissions slows the build-up, but it does not remove what is already in the atmosphere. Rising living standards therefore need to come with falling emissions in absolute terms, rather than an economy that simply grows faster than its carbon output.
Where growth is
Electricity and heat generation remained Türkiye’s largest source of fossil carbon dioxide in 2024. Yet transport and industrial processes accounted for 60.7% of the net increase in emissions between 2019 and 2024, and over the full period since 2015 the largest absolute increases came from transport and from fuel burned in industry. Where emissions are growing deserves as much attention as where they are highest.
Industry poses two distinct problems. One is the fuel that factories burn for heat and power, and the other is the carbon released by the chemistry of production itself. In cement making, heating limestone gives off carbon dioxide no matter what energy source is used, so cleaner fuels alone cannot close the gap. For Türkiye, a major cement producer and one of the world’s largest exporters of it, the distinction is far from academic. Buildings form a third front. How goods are moved, how materials are made and how homes are heated deserve the same scrutiny as electricity generation, with clear targets for each sector and evidence that the chosen measures work.
Recent years provide a useful test case. Between 2021 and 2024, emissions from electricity and heat production and from industrial fuel use fell, while those from transport rose, leaving the national total almost unchanged. That gives policymakers a sharper starting point: establish what drove the reductions, build on the changes that look durable and direct support where further progress is within reach.
Other countries show why that level of detail matters. Between 2019 and 2024, China’s emissions growth was concentrated in power generation, while the United Kingdom recorded declines in every reported sector and Sweden’s total fell even as emissions from fuel extraction and industrial combustion rose. A single national trend can conceal very different sectoral stories and cannot, on its own, show which policies worked.
Who bears cost
National totals say little about fairness. Over the same period, India and Indonesia increased their emissions while remaining below the global average per person in 2024. The United States, Germany and Japan cut their totals yet stayed above that average. Population, income and stage of development belong in any serious discussion of responsibility.
Low emissions can signal clean energy, but they can also signal limited access to energy and to economic opportunity. Communities that have contributed least to warming are often among the most exposed to its effects. A fair transition has to protect people’s ability to build better lives while carbon comes down, which means support for vulnerable households and workers should be designed in from the start.
The same reasoning applies to adaptation. Farms, households and factories often draw on the same water, so a single drought can strike several parts of the economy at once. National emissions data cannot predict a local water shortage or a failed harvest; preparing for those requires local evidence. Housing, health care, working conditions and public services also shape how hard climate risks hit. Cutting emissions and protecting communities have to move forward together.
The gains extend beyond temperature. Burning less fossil fuel improves air quality, a benefit separate from limiting carbon dioxide’s warming effect and one that is felt locally. At sea, carbon dioxide absorbed by the ocean alters seawater chemistry, making it more acidic and threatening the conditions marine life depends on. According to the IPCC, some consequences of ocean warming and sea-level rise are irreversible on timescales of centuries to millennia. Decisions about carbon reach far beyond the next economic cycle.
A complete strategy must also cover other greenhouse gases, land use and the emissions embedded in traded goods. Agriculture and waste, whose climate impact comes largely from methane and nitrous oxide, cannot be judged on their fossil-carbon figures alone. Trade is already a practical matter: the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism entered its definitive phase in January 2026, attaching a carbon cost to imports of cement, steel, aluminium, fertilizers and other emissions-intensive goods. For a country whose largest export market is the EU, that is a domestic economic question as much as a diplomatic one.
Progress toward the Paris temperature goals takes more than a favourable comparison with an international average. Limiting warming requires global carbon dioxide emissions to reach net zero, alongside deep cuts in other greenhouse gases.
Türkiye has committed to net zero by 2053 and in 2025 adopted its first climate law, which lays the groundwork for a national emissions trading system. The task now is to turn those commitments into concrete economic choices: measurable reductions in every major emitting sector, investment guided by evidence, and support that keeps essential services affordable as the economy changes. The case Türkiye can carry to Antalya is straightforward: better living standards with less carbon. Its lasting value will show in healthier communities, more secure livelihoods, and a sounder base for the prosperity still to come.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.