Stability is a central element of the government’s narrative. So central, in fact, that it will feature in the central dilemma put to voters ahead of the election. Who can guarantee stability? The confrontation will increasingly revolve around individuals, the strengths and weaknesses of political leaders, and less and less around the parties’ platforms. One might argue that the personality of the leader has always been decisive. But there has never been another case of a governing party polling so far ahead of the second-place party after eight years in power, with its leader seeking a third consecutive term. Nor have the leaders of the established parties ever seemed more politically worn down than the prime minister himself.
Kyriakos Mitsotakis appears to have read the political landscape better than the others. In early summer, the prime minister’s inner circle had begun leaning toward October elections. A specific date had even been suggested, although the prevailing rumors pointed to September 27.
Government spin doctors, ministers and deputy ministers contributed to this by posing as anonymous but “well-informed sources.” Their aim was to draw out the still-immature political parties of Alexis Tsipras and Maria Karystianou. Since then, those parties have been maturing under the scrutiny of public opinion, the media and social media, which tend to magnify flaws and shortcomings. Antonis Samaras did not take the bait.
By the end of the summer, when some of Mitsotakis’s closest associates, still working from their summer scenarios, presented him with their election plans, he changed the direction of the wind. According to accounts from people familiar with the political weather inside the Maximos Mansion, the prime minister asked them: “But how can I call an election on a promise of stability when I will have undermined it myself?”
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After the sudden gust that swept away their elaborate analyses of snap elections—which until then had seemed almost certain—some of them, though not all, conceded that he had a point. How could he guarantee stability when the polls showed New Democracy far from securing an outright majority? No one could predict what kind of parliament would emerge after the election, which parties would be willing to cooperate to form a government, or under what conditions. There would be a major contradiction between the demand for stability and the likely outcome, amid an energy and inflation crisis that “burned” the early-election scenario, no matter how insistently other ministers argued that winter would bring an increasingly difficult situation.
Pressure on government bonds had not yet emerged in a way that threatened to derail economies such as France’s, which is also plagued by political instability, or Britain’s, which faces the risk of a repeat of the “Liz Truss effect.” Even the United States, already struggling with plenty of other problems, was hit by Guilfoyle—the devil who wore MAGA, as international media aptly put it.
Kimberly Guilfoyle is returning to her home country amid a storm of scandal and allegations of inappropriate behavior. Yet rumors are already circulating about a diary in which she allegedly recorded everything and which she hopes will become her lifeline. Eric Diters, a donor to Donald Trump, known as “Honey please,” is threatening to bring down the Trump administration with a 16-minute recorded phone conversation he made from Athens, which, he hints, also implicates Vance and Rubio.
Vance said he would support calls for an investigation into Guilfoyle’s conduct, while Trump ruled out the possibility of granting her a pardon. But why has the U.S. ambassador to Greece caused such an uproar in America? Trump’s inner circle and the president himself have done far worse. Why did Trump take the unusual step of abruptly removing her from her post and then suggest that her case could have criminal implications? A reasonable assumption is that people around him know and fear that there is more—and worse—than what has become public so far, particularly with the midterm elections approaching. It is also considered certain that if the Democrats win the House of Representatives, and perhaps the Senate as well, in November, investigations into various individuals, including Trump himself, will begin.
Why should any of this matter to us? Because the Guilfoyle scandal has a Greek political and business dimension. If investigations begin, who knows what might be uncovered about various people in Athens, who, according to rumors, have recently been sleeping uneasily. It is entirely possible that the first stitch in the government’s sweater will come loose in Washington. After that, the government will have to chase stability in Athens. Asked about the reports, the government spokesperson said he was not competent to comment and referred the matter to the ministers who had held meetings with Guilfoyle and Christos Marafatsos.
A second stitch is dangerously loosening in Cairo, where the Court of Cassation is expected to issue its ruling in the coming days on Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai. According to reports, the court appears to be leaning toward the initial ruling, which was less favorable to the monastery. However, the possibility that it will uphold the more favorable verdict issued by the Ismailia Court of Appeals has not been ruled out. In Greece, that verdict was received last year almost as if it were a national catastrophe.
Whatever the outcome, unless an out-of-court settlement is signed, it will be unfavorable and will trigger a religious and political storm from which the government will find it difficult to emerge unscathed. Among other things, the government has invested in its relationship with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which it is trying to involve in managing the crisis with Egypt, despite the complications arising from the fact that the Patriarchate is based in Israel.
A third stitch is being stretched in Paris over the electricity interconnection cable linking Greece and Cyprus. France will have to navigate a delicate balance among Athens, Ankara and Nicosia, maintaining relationships and agreements while reconciling conflicting interests. Everyone knows that although France has no Talleyrand at the helm, its diplomacy is steeped in the principle of “above all, no excessive zeal.”
Kyriakos Mitsotakis has confidently set the threshold for his own electoral challenge at 25 percent. “Because that is not going to happen. New Democracy will be close to 30 percent or higher,” people in his camp predict.
If stitches are starting to come undone in the knitted fabric, what percentage would constitute a safety net to prevent stability from being disrupted?