The Russian invasion of Ukraine has underlined the role of space communications infrastructure in securing internet connectivity on the modern battlefield. Russia is currently developing a satellite network project meant to serve as a domestic alternative to SpaceX’s Starlink. This could give the Kremlin a dangerous edge in Ukraine, while transforming the security and space safety landscape on a global scale.
Since it was established in 2015, SpaceX owned low-earth orbit (LEO) constellation Starlink has been the major driver in the development of global satellite connectivity. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Starlink has provided vital support for Ukraine as the Russian military has repeatedly attacked every part of the country’s communications infrastructure. Satellites are exceptionally difficult to disrupt, while constant connectivity on the battlefield is an invaluable resource.
Starlink has also highlighted the need for countries to have reliable connectivity. On October 13, restrictions were suddenly and without any prior announcement introduced to Starlink in Ukraine, disrupting military operations.
The Kremlin is now in the process of deploying its own satellite network, known as Rassvet. This raises security concerns over the implications for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the potential for this new network to enable aggression elsewhere in the world.
Ukraine’s leadership and military intelligence are warning that Rassvet poses serious threats not only to Ukraine but to Europe and the wider world. According to Denys Sienik, Chargé d’Affaires at the Ukrainian Embassy in the United States, if Rassvet is launched by the end of 2026 or early 2027, “Russia will be able to strike targets within Ukraine virtually in real time. This will cause more death and destruction. This is a risk to more than just Ukraine.”
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The Rassvet project is being managed by Bureau 1440, an aerospace company owned by Yadro CEO Alexy Shelobkov. It is intended as a major upgrade for Russian military communications in Ukraine after Starlink disabled unauthorized terminals used by Kremlin forces at the start of 2026.
Moscow has positioned Rassvet as “sovereign” satellite technology, but to accelerate deployment, Russia has contracted Chinese satellite manufacturing through Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST). Rassvet is part of a broader axis of technological interdependence together with China, Iran, and North Korea.
For the Kremlin, genuine technological sovereignty is not essential. The main aim is to produce a network that is independent from Western control for use during military operations in Ukraine. China and SSST will oblige, within the framework of established bilateral agreements. A Chinese satellite network controlling Iranian-designed drones is perfectly acceptable to the Russian authorities, as long as it can be used to target Ukrainians.
The Chinese are in the early stages of deploying major LEO satellite networks like Starlink. It is possible that these networks will be used by the Russian military as part of their collaboration. The problems with Chinese satellite programs are more complicated but fall beyond the scope of this article.
Rassvet is an explicitly dual-use technology. There are two different thresholds for these uses: Military applicability and commercial viability. Rassvet is unlikely to meet its targets for commercial viability with its current launch schedule, but it will have military applications in Ukraine long before it is fully operational. This makes sense. After all, providing resilient high-speed satellite internet to hundreds of thousands of people requires far more satellites than controlling several hundred drones during an attack window lasting several hours per day.
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Russian commanders have high hopes for Rassvet. LEO broadband connections extend the control range for drones and improve maneuverability, while also enhancing resistance to jamming and other disruption. As the network develops, it should significantly increase Russia’s ability to launch drone strikes against targets across Ukraine.
Ukraine and the country’s partners are now exploring options to disrupt, delay, or derail the Rassvet initiative. This could include sanctions and trade restrictions against Bureau 1440, its subsidiaries, and Chinese companies. It should not be too challenging to justify such measures. Rassvet is a large-scale satellite network created for use in Ukraine at a time when Russia is routinely targeting the Ukrainian civilian population. It will increase the lethality of Russian war crimes.
The potential impact of Rassvet on the international security infrastructure is a further cause for concern. This Russian satellite network is part of a growing technological alignment that links Moscow with Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang. The emergence of a satellite control system suitable for attack drones should alarm anyone who might conceivably be targeted by Russia or its authoritarian allies.
The Rassvet initiative is particularly alarming considering longstanding allegations that Russia seeks to weaponize space. While prohibited under international law, Kremlin officials including former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev have raised the possibility of “full-scale space warfare.” In 2024, US intelligence reportedly accused Russia of trying to develop a nuclear space weapon that would destroy satellites by creating a massive energy wave when detonated, crippling commercial and government satellites.
Expanding sanctions measures to limit the flow of critical components to Russia may be the most effective tool currently available to slow the progress of the Rassvet program. This would tie in with existing sanctions targeting dual-use exports from Chinese state-backed industries. However, sanctions would likely only succeed in stalling the development of the Rassvet network. Ukraine and the country’s partners must prepare for a new security environment where this tool is available to the Kremlin and other authoritarian actors.
Joshua Stein is a researcher with a PhD from the University of Calgary. His work on technology policy includes satellite and quantum technologies.
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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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