Washington’s diesel diplomacy with Moscow is fueling discord with Kyiv.
On Sunday, US President Donald Trump declared that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to stop attacking each other’s energy infrastructure. But while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Ukraine had halted its strikes on Russian refineries for two days, Moscow continued its strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities. The Kremlin has yet to confirm any energy ceasefire and has rejected a separate Ukrainian proposal for a sixty-day ceasefire.
The announcement comes only days after a round of peace talks in Miami among US, Ukrainian, and European leaders, and amid sharp exchanges between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy over Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries. Tensions also flared over a deal that Trump announced on Friday to purchase Russian diesel, which would involve temporary sanctions relief for Moscow.
What do these developments mean for energy markets, sanctions against the Kremlin, the partnership between Washington and Kyiv, and efforts to end Russia’s war on Ukraine? Our experts weigh in.
1. What are the broader implications of the US-Russia diesel deal for US sanctions against the Kremlin and global energy markets?
Trump’s latest move aims to provide relief to the global diesel market. Making it easier for third countries to buy diesel refined in Russia will, it is hoped, offset the diesel that used to come out of the Strait of Hormuz. As part of the deal, Russia promises to sell the United States 300,000 metric tons of diesel now, 500,000 in November, and a million in December, weakening its ban on diesel exports. This would presumably bolt onto what Russia was already selling, though that amount has been in decline. Russia managed to export just under 600,000 metric tons of diesel and gasoil in September, a ten-year low.
The plan raises several questions. One is whether it is legal in the US given the country’s ban on importing fuel from Russia. Another is who might now be emboldened to buy more. A third is whether the scheme will depress prices enough to justify another economic boon for Moscow, provided Russia actually has the capacity to export more.
The US Department of the Treasury has temporarily lifted sanctions on imports of Russian diesel fuel until April. But the 2022 Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, which bans energy imports from Russia, can only be lifted by congressional approval (which is out of Trump’s reach even in this Congress) or by Russia meeting a series of requirements on Ukraine’s territorial integrity (which it won’t). The US produces enough diesel for its own needs, so firms are unlikely to expose themselves to legal uncertainty by importing Russian diesel to the US when they stand to gain little. On the other hand, the diesel deal will make third countries a little less fearful of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which allows the US president to impose additional tariffs on goods from top buyers of Russian oil and gas. And for diesel prices to come down globally, Trump needs countries to increase their purchases from Russia.
Vladimir Putin’s ramp-up of exports also seems a little fantastical, although not because of Russia’s existing diesel-export ban, which can be lifted by decree. Rather, it’s because out of Russia’s six main diesel-exporting refineries, several are operating below capacity. According to Maritime Executive, one refinery is out of service and two are operating at 25 percent of capacity following Ukrainian strikes.
For the sake of argument, the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center has calculated that the proposed increase in diesel exports at current prices would generate an additional $4.7 billion in export income for Russia by the end of the year. This would boost Russia’s current account further than it already has been by the Hormuz crisis. But it would not do much to tackle the country’s fiscal deficit, which, despite higher oil and gas income, has already reached $62 billion this year. Taxation is less onerous for refined products than it is for crude, but the Kremlin is quite skilled at coming after the “exceptional profits” made by firms whenever energy prices are high.
The main point is that the increased exports for Russia, even if they don’t meet the announced volumes, are helpful to Moscow but a drop in the ocean as far as the global diesel market is concerned. Washington’s signal hasn’t affected prices today. But it adds to a context of sanctions permissiveness, which is worth far more to Moscow than a few million metric tons of fuel are worth to American consumers.
—Charles Lichfield is the director of economic foresight and analysis and the C. Boyden Gray senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.
The “diesel deal” runs counter to the Lindsey Graham sanctions act and may not be legal under the terms of the law passed by Congress in 2022 prohibiting US purchases of Russian oil. The “deal” encourages Putin to continue his war by suggesting the United States lacks commitment to its own ostensible policy of seeking a negotiated end to the war.
However, if linked to an energy ceasefire, as Trump has announced and Ukraine has publicly accepted, the diesel deal might not be such a liability for the US. The Russians have not accepted such a ceasefire nor any similar proposal, of course. And if they reject it now, Trump could have grounds for a face-saving rescinding of this questionable idea.
—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. He is also a former State Department coordinator for sanctions policy.
2. To what extent does the verbal sparring between Trump and Zelenskyy threaten the US-Ukrainian partnership—and what’s really behind it?
Over the past few days, we have witnessed quick pivots in Trump’s policy toward Ukraine and the war.
First, he made a deal with Putin to demonstrate to US voters that he is doing everything he can to reduce the price of diesel in the US, even though the amount of diesel that the United States can obtain from Russia would have, at best, a very small impact on prices here. Zelenskyy’s sharp criticism of Trump, while substantively sound, was tactically an error. Trump has no tolerance for critics, and his rhetorical response to Zelenskyy was intemperate.
But the good news is that it seems this was a one-day story on Saturday. By Sunday, Trump had pivoted to announcing that he had secured an “energy ceasefire” between Russia and Ukraine. Zelenskyy, recognizing that he was on thin ice with Trump, quickly said Ukraine would accept the ceasefire if Moscow did. Moscow has yet to say anything about this, and it attacked a Ukrainian energy facility after Trump’s announcement. Shrewdly, Putin never contradicts Trump publicly. But since he wants to establish political control of Ukraine, he has rejected numerous Trump proposals for either a peace or a ceasefire. This latest ceasefire initiative appears to be no exception.
—John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.
We’re in a dangerous moment in US–Ukraine relations, reminiscent of the February 2025 Oval Office blowout. While this is concerning, that episode showed us that the bilateral relationship can recover from difficult moments.
Much of this is driven by timing and domestic politics. In the United States, Trump and his administration are increasingly focused on issues that could hurt them politically ahead of the midterms, with gas prices a major vulnerability. In Ukraine, this autumn has been bloody and terrifying, with intensified Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. Civilian casualties during the first eight months of the year were up 55 percent from the same period in 2025. As winter rapidly approaches in Ukraine, Russian strikes are already causing serious damage. Power outages have returned to Kyiv, and UN officials warn of a looming humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile, Putin is seeking economic lifelines for a weakened Russian market, including through arrangements like the diesel deal.
The relationship between the United States and Ukrainian presidents and negotiating teams matters, but it is not the whole US–Ukraine relationship. In the United States, we are seeing bipartisan support for Ukraine and pushback on the diesel deal, including from Republicans, such as Senator John Kennedy, who recognizes that any deal with Putin (who Kennedy called “a butcher” … who “will never be our friend”) presents its own risks.
The priority now must be to lower tensions and avoid actions that benefit Russia at Ukraine’s expense. Cutting off intelligence sharing or weapons procurement through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, which US officials reportedly threatened to do again this past week, would weaken Ukraine and undermine Trump’s own goal of achieving a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the war.
With US concerns about Russia extending across party lines, Trump must balance domestic pressure over gas prices with the need to secure real concessions from Moscow, not just Kyiv.
—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where she oversees the Center’s strategy, programming, and policy work on Ukraine and the broader Eurasia region.
3. Why has energy infrastructure become such a focal point of both the war and the negotiations to end it?
Ukraine’s ability to withstand the winter has been a major concern since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Russia’s attacks on energy infrastructure have repeatedly threatened electricity, heating, water, and essential services, with serious humanitarian consequences. Energy infrastructure is a key part of national security, resilience, and the economic capacity needed to sustain a war.
That is also why energy has become such an important part of both fighting and negotiations. For Ukraine, Russian strikes threaten civilian life and economic stability. For Russia, energy infrastructure is a key source of revenue to finance its war and to project global power. Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to inflict significant damage on Russian refineries and other energy facilities as it seeks to constrain Moscow’s ability to sustain and prolong the military campaign.
The battlefield remains critical, but when territorial changes are limited, developments in the energy sphere can move quickly and have visible, far-reaching effects. They have significant military, economic, and political consequences that extend well beyond Ukraine. This makes energy issues more subject to domestic concerns and pressures—just as we are seeing now with Trump’s focus on this aspect of the war right ahead of US midterms.
—Shelby Magid