OPINION: How NL became a taken-from province – and what it must look for in Churchill Falls deal

After 22 years living as an Indigenous Newfoundlander in Ontario, I am certain of one thing: my Canadian citizenship was conditional on accepting my inferiority to other Canadians. Canadian laws are not meant to define the country, but to keep common people in line. Every law is a guideline that applies absolutely to the poor, and is conditional for the rich and the ruling party. My experience fighting for equality has left me jaded. I know I can never achieve equality in Canada.

I have resolved to find acceptance as an equal citizen, even if it is outside of Confederation. When the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Tribunal trampled my rights, publicly on the Indigenous mascots case, and privately for standing up to a stupid Newfie joke, I began to consider ways to make others see what I have seen.

I started by writing columns in Huffington Post Canada on the trampling of Indigenous human rights exemplified by mascots. I continued after the Mississauga case on the funding of mascots was manipulated by creating an award-winning documentary on the culture of Indigenous racism in Canada, and the villainy of the false promises of the Charter. As that documentary, while imperfect, was oppressed in Canada, I have redirected my efforts into undoing a system that allows universal rights to be denied or sold off when convenient.

As a Newfoundlander, I have always felt mainland Canada was a hostile environment. You can choose to ignore Stupid Newfie jokes, but I couldn’t, not because of the harm to me but because when I tolerate them, it gives permission to be meaner to people less able to defend themselves.

I first went to the HRTO over a Stupid Newfie Joke in 2009, and the retaliation for that joke was certified A-OK by the HRTO. It appears that I did not know my place, and putting me in that place was good for Canada.

I remember that as I do a deep dive into the numbers on the original Churchill Falls deal. The trampling of my rights in the Human Rights tribunals mirrors the abuse of Newfoundland and Labrador by the predatory Hydro-Québec deal; a deal upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Do you want to know how bad the deal has been for Newfoundland and Labrador and why Newfoundland and Labrador has never been a Have-Not province but a Taken From Province? To start, you can look up the average sale cost per kWh from Hydro-Québec since 1972 to determine the value of the 31 TWh purchased from Churchill Falls.

In 1972, when power sales commenced, Hydro-Québec sold power for an average of $0.0188 while paying NL $0.03/kWh. That is 81 per cent of all revenues going to Hydro-Québec in 1972 if the full 31 TWh, or $490M in one year on a $960M investment.

By 1980, as the NL rate decreased to $0.002 and average sale prices went up to $0.024/kWh for Hydro-Québec power, the return was $745M. By 1990, with sales averaging $0.0331/kWh, Hydro-Québec’s sales from Churchill Falls exceeded $1B, while NL received $62M before giving Quebec 34.2 per cent. Realistically, it was $41M to NL.

The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the Hydro-Québec investment in Churchill Falls by 1990, was 38.5 per cent. On average, Newfoundland and Labrador received 65.8 per cent of $69.5M for 31 TWh of electricity, while Quebec sold it for $579M from 1972 to 1990. That is loan sharking money. All monies collected by Hydro-Québec from 1991 did not improve that return for Quebec but decimated the Newfoundland and Labrador economy. It was gravy.

In 1990, Newfoundland and Labrador’s debt was over $3B Canadian. Debt maintenance in 1991 was $490M versus a total budget of $3B. Receiving only $62M for the power generated by Hydro-Québec while they sold it for $1.1B impoverished Newfoundland and Labrador as it faced the collapse of the fishery. Canada should have stepped in to ensure equitable treatment of NL by Quebec. But the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the colonial exploitation of Newfoundland and Labrador in the Hydro-Québec deal.

Since 1991, according to data available from Statistics Canada, NL’s total debt was $3.55B. Debt spiralled to $19B in 2026, with average annual debt service of $864M from 1991 to 2026. Of those 35 years, only nine times did NL produce a surplus. Receiving only $0.002/kWh mattered when, on average, Hydro-Québec was selling that power for almost $0.05/kWh, 25 times the purchase price.

If the revenue from the annual 31 TWh of power sold to Quebec were split according to ownership share of Churchill Falls, an acceptable deal that would have generated a 20.1 per cent internal rate of return for Hydro-Québec, above the standard 17 per cent return on capital demanded by Canada’s banks, NL’s financial fortunes would have been different.

With 65.8 per cent of revenues from power sales achieved by Hydro-Québec from the 31 TWh taken from the Churchill Falls deal, NL’s share of the revenue would have started at over $775M in 1991 and would have doubled by 2026. Those values exclude money generated by spot market sales and the capabilities of Hydro-Québec that would have increased the average sales price from 1996.

Economically, the benefit of receiving revenues according to the ownership share of the Churchill Falls deal, NL would not have been in deficit in any single year since 1991. By 1996, NL’s $3.5B debt would have been paid off. Total surpluses from 1991 would have been close to $26B. Debt service savings, assuming the debt was paid off in 1996, would have been almost $24B. The results would be dramatic for Newfoundland and Labrador.

The emigration pressure created by the cod fishery moratorium would have been minimized.
Nascent industries like pulp and paper, gypsum, mining and others would have been able to withstand pressures, and if NL was able to use power as required from Churchill Falls, it would have been able to operate longer with reduced power rates.

Deals on the Hibernia Oil Field development would have been more beneficial to NL if it had been able to self-finance more of the development.

Without internal sources of capital, all capital for the development of Hibernia, Voisey’s Bay, and the Lower Churchill, NL was forced into accepting further colonial exploitation.

Maybe Newfoundland would export pickled herring to Europe instead of NL sending raw herring to Scandinavia and buying back the processed product. Capital would have been able to fund fish processing industries to keep money, jobs and people in Newfoundland and Labrador.

The terms of any new power deal must seek to address past harms and ensure the continued success of Quebec’s and Newfoundland and Labrador’s economy. The federal government must be involved to ensure the fair treatment of both parties.

The first requirement of any new power deal on Churchill Falls is the surrendering of Hydro-Québec’s interest in any Churchill Falls deal. The ownership share and the existing deal are forfeit!

The second requirement is that any deal with Quebec be limited to a deal that provides NL with a market share of any revenue from power sold by Hydro-Québec. A negotiating starting point is that NL receive 85 per cent of all revenues from any power sold from Churchill Falls based on Hydro-Québec’s 2025 cost calculation formulas. No Hollywood accounting.

If Hydro-Québec sells power for an average of $0.10/kWh, then Newfoundland and Labrador’s revenue would be $0.085 per cent/kWh.

Hydro-Québec’s ability to create excess profit on spot market sales is its business.

NL and Quebec must work with the federal government to replace the installation of low-efficiency home heating technologies like oil and baseboard heating with heat pumps.

The power from the Churchill Falls projects will be provided to NL residents at the same price as power is provided to residents of Quebec. A 15 per cent rebate on $0.18/kWh is not the same as Quebec citizens’ cost of $0.075/kWh.

Longer daylight hours in Labrador in June and July would provide an unlikely opportunity for solar power to offset and extend the base of the duck curve for power demand in the New England ISO where Quebec sells its power.

Canada provides the capital investment for the development of the Lower Churchill, with the no-interest loan being wound down as transfer payments to NL decline.

Canada and Quebec assume a 50/50 share of Newfoundland’s debt payments until revenues from the Lower Churchill bring NL’s debt rating to the same level as the country.

Canada provides zero-interest funding for the development of a critical minerals refinery in Labrador, where power can be purchased at par with Quebec industry, to maximize critical mineral development in the province.

Canada expands the capacity of oil and LNG production from the Hibernia field and provides gas cost relief through local production.

These are some alternatives to the continued partnership with Quebec.

• Investigate a partnership with the National Security Agency in the United States to use power from Churchill Falls to run a data centre in Labrador
• Consider private data centres.
• Expand the transmission capacity to the United States via a direct current link through Nova Scotia and the Emera route; or
• Contract directly with ISO New England to go around Nova Scotia.

Newfoundlanders must realize their power in the Canadian economy. We do not need to accept terms forced on the province designed to continue Newfoundland and Labrador’s economic colonization. We must be willing to fight for our province, and if we are prevented from protecting our place in Canada, then our country.
Brad Gallant is a Memorial Education grad, a former teacher, banker, utility middle management, and now award-winning documentary producer whose work can be found on https://beyondgreenproductions.com. He is frustrated by malicious inequality.