State censorship on information has moved from broadcasters to platforms and the laws that govern them
Originally published on Global Voices

Image of person using Telegram by Christian Wiediger via Unsplash (Free to use). Image of Kenyan flag by User:Pumbaa80 via Wikimedia Commons(Public domain). Illustration by Global Voices.
This post by Grace Kobare is part of Global Voices’ October 2026 Spotlight series, “Big Tech and Authoritarianism.” In this Spotlight, we explore how Big Tech facilitates and hinders authoritarian governments and practices, and how these choices influence the Global South. You can support this coverage by donating here.
On January 30, 2018, Raila Odinga held his symbolic “swearing-in” ceremony in Nairobi, and the government, through Kenya’s regulator, switched off the transmitters of KTN, NTV and Citizen TV while they were broadcasting live.
The Interior Ministry defended the move, saying the media had been given a security briefing in advance. The stations stayed off air for days and were only fully back by February 9, 2018.
Kenya's internet freedom drops drastically
The 2018 incident was just one of many examples of Kenyan officials cutting off connectivity — particularly during times of unrest. During the June 2024 tax protests, authorities shut down internet connectivity for around seven hours and arrested a large number of protesters. The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) also reported that at least three networks blocked the web version of Telegram during those protests, and the blocks were reversed the same day.
A year later, during the June 2025 protests throughout Kenya, a communications authority issued a directive to media houses to stop live broadcasts of the unrest, and Telegram was blocked again. Access Now said this violated a High Court injunction against interfering with internet and Telegram access.
Given these incidents, it is no surprise that Kenya’s internet freedom record has worsened in recent years. Freedom House found that in 2025 Kenya had the most severe decline of the 72 countries assessed during the coverage period.
A wider pattern of internet freedom decline
Kenya’s experience is part of a wider pattern. Freedom House found that global internet freedom declined for the 15th consecutive year in 2025, as authoritarian governments used censorship and offline repression to crush protests organized online. Access Now’s 2025 report found that at least 313 shutdowns were implemented globally, and that in Africa the internet was shut down 30 times in 15 countries, with protests the leading trigger, followed by elections.
In Tanzania, an internet blackout was imposed after protests erupted on election day, October 29, 2025. It was only partially eased on November 4, alongside a curfew. An opposition lawyer said online mobilization was part of the reason for the blanket block, and protesters used VPNs to reach platforms such as X Spaces.
In Uganda, the regulator ordered all mobile operators and internet providers to suspend public internet access nationwide from 6 p.m. on 13 January 2026, two days before the general election. Officials had publicly denied plans for a blanket shutdown beforehand. The platforms themselves have been targets too: A Facebook ban followed the five-day blackout of the 2021 election and was still in effect in 2026, and Starlink disabled its terminals in the country after Uganda ordered the service shut down on grounds they were unlicensed.
Kenya’s case shows how state pressure on information has moved from broadcasters to platforms and the laws that govern them.
Checks through Kenya’s courts
The June 2025 Telegram block came despite a High Court injunction. The government has also tried to write that power into law.
In October 2025, President William Ruto signed the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes (Amendment) Act. Human Rights Watch (HRW) said it risks criminalizing legitimate online speech. The Act also expanded the powers of a state committee, the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee (NC4), to make websites and apps inaccessible.
The High Court in Nairobi suspended key sections a week after Ruto signed it. By July 2026, the High Court had declared the website-blocking powers unconstitutional. The chairperson of the Bloggers Association of Kenya, Kennedy Kachwanya, told Human Rights Watch that the amended law poses an unacceptable threat to digital rights and freedom of expression.
Beyond individual platforms
Amnesty International documented a coordinated campaign between June 2024 and July 2025 that used social media and digital tools to suppress Gen Z-led protests in Kenya. Amnesty found that X was central to pro-government networks, as pro-government actors posted identical messages repeatedly to hijack the platform’s algorithm and sway public perception. Amnesty noted that X failed to act on organized campaigns that violate its own policy. A participant told Amnesty he was part of a network of around 20 people paid roughly KES 25,000 (USD 192.50) to KES 50,000 (USD 385.29) a day to push pro-government messages onto X’s trending lists.
The Kenyan government is now seeking more direct leverage over big tech companies. The ICT Cabinet Secretary told the Senate that X must open a physical office in Kenya within three months or lose operating approval. The directive extends to TikTok and Meta, and gives the communications authority powers to suspend non-compliant platforms. The government framed this as a move to protect children online. However, a rights group summary of the move cautions that local presence could let authorities pressure staff and demand takedowns quietly.
Kenya’s courts have so far pushed back on some of the harshest measures, but the pressure keeps changing, from switching off television in 2018, to disrupting internet access in 2024 and blocking Telegram in 2025, and now to demands that platforms set up offices in the country.
What happens next depends partly on the companies themselves. They can resist orders that silence their users, or they can decide that keeping access to the Kenyan market is worth complying with the government’s demands. For Kenyans who rely on these platforms to organize and to be heard, that choice matters, because it helps decide how much of their public conversation stays free from state control.
