Political governments come and go, but those who certify project feasibility remain. Holding them accountable would be the real measure of development. Who should be held responsible for the cancellation of the BRT project? In this article, Subail bin Alam seeks to find the answer.
On 18 October, the Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, decided to cancel the Airport–Gazipur Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project. The stations and lane dividers will be dismantled, turning the corridor into an ordinary highway.
When the project was approved by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) in 2012, its estimated cost was around Tk 20.4 billion. It was supposed to be completed in 2016. After three revisions, the cost rose to Tk 42.68 billion. In 2025, ECNEC under the interim government rejected a proposal seeking a further increase to Tk 65.98 billion in the fourth revision. By then, Tk 28.11 billion had already been spent, yet not a single dedicated bus had taken to the road.
The project was financed primarily through foreign loans. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a loan of $260 million, while the French Development Agency provided a loan of €40 million. Even though the project has been cancelled, the disbursed loans must still be repaid with interest. Yet I have been unable to find figures showing how much of the approved financing was actually disbursed.
The human cost is even greater than the financial loss. Seven people died in various accidents during construction. On 15 August 2022, five members of the same family were killed in Uttara when a concrete girder fell on them. At the time, this writer published an article on the subject on Prothom Alo’s website. But nothing changed.
Through my professional work, I have had the opportunity to work on almost all of the country’s mega-projects, including this BRT project. Time and again, I witnessed unsafe construction practices, faulty planning, and internal theft. Even repeated warnings about safety failed to get through to the Chinese contractor. Today, we are all paying the price for those mistakes.
A team of experts from the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) found that even if the BRT had become operational, passengers travelling from Gazipur would still have had to get off at the airport and change buses. Moreover, the specially designed buses, with doors on the right-hand side, could not have operated outside the dedicated corridor.
However, cancelling the project also comes at a cost. According to the Bangladesh Institute of Planners, dismantling the infrastructure and restoring the corridor could require more than another Tk 10 billion.
Three questions must therefore be considered separately: Was the decision to cancel the project justified? How much will cancellation cost? And who is responsible for 14 years of failure? The Cabinet has answered the first question, but no one has spoken up about the third.
BRT is not an exception, but part of a pattern
A white paper committee reviewed seven major projects undertaken by the previous Awami League government and found that their costs had been increased from Tk 1.14 trillion to Tk 1.95 trillion without cost-benefit analyses. The committee estimated that, out of approximately $60 billion allocated to development projects over 15 years, between $14 billion and $24 billion had been squandered through bribery, extortion, theft, and inflated budgets.
In the first year of operation, traffic forecasts for the Karnaphuli Tunnel projected 18,485 vehicles per day. In reality, an average of just 3,910 vehicles used it daily. Figures presented by the Roads and Bridges Minister in Parliament in June 2026 showed that monthly toll revenue still stood at Tk 33.7 million, while expenses amounted to Tk 69.5 million. We do not know who prepared this forecast, which was off by nearly a factor of five, who reviewed it, or who signed it off.
There are rules in place, after all. Feasibility studies are mandatory for government projects costing more than Tk 500 million. Yet RAJUK submitted a proposal worth Tk 168 billion without conducting a feasibility study. I have repeatedly warned about the Ganges Barrage project as well: proceeding to the main contract on the basis of an outdated 2013 feasibility study would repeat the same mistakes. The paperwork that enables rules to be violated is prepared right at officials’ desks.
Six signatures before ECNEC
ECNEC decides which projects to approve; it is the technical professionals who certify whether a project is feasible. The BRT project was approved before its comprehensive feasibility study and design had been completed. Once construction began, it became apparent that there was no drainage system, no plan to relocate utility lines, and no alternative traffic arrangements for the busy roads.
At least six levels of scrutiny failed to catch these shortcomings:
1. The consultants responsible for the feasibility study and design.
2. The implementing agency and the project director.
3. The ministry secretary.
4. The Planning Commission and the Project Evaluation Committee, which also approved three rounds of revisions.
5. The Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED).
6. The financiers: the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the French Development Agency.
BUET described the project as a systemic failure and recommended ensuring accountability for the consultants and officials involved. ECNEC under the interim government had also called for those responsible to be identified. Yet no reports have emerged of action being taken against anyone. On the contrary, following the deaths of five people in Uttara in 2022, the Roads and Highways Department’s own investigation committee blamed the Chinese contractor and declared that the project authorities had played no role. The department effectively absolved itself of responsibility.
According to Professor AK Enamul Haque, a member of the white paper committee, bureaucrats plundered 40 per cent of the Annual Development Programme (ADP) funds over 15 years. A consultant whose feasibility study is proven wrong generally faces no obstacles in bidding for subsequent projects. A project director under whose watch costs double rarely has their promotion held up. The personal cost of failure is virtually zero, so behaviour remains unchanged.
How other countries hold signatories accountable
United Kingdom: The permanent secretary of each ministry is personally accountable to Parliament for public spending as the “accounting officer.” If an expenditure fails to meet even one of the following criteria—regularity, propriety, value for money, or feasibility—the secretary must seek a written directive from the minister. That directive is made public, and responsibility shifts to the minister.
In 2016, despite written objections from the transport secretary over London’s Garden Bridge project, the minister issued a directive and assumed responsibility for an additional £15 million in spending. The project was eventually cancelled, resulting in a loss of £43 million in public funds. However, the records clearly identify who raised objections and who overrode them by issuing the directive.
South Korea: Since 1999, an independent institution, the Korea Development Institute (KDI), rather than individual ministries, has conducted preliminary feasibility studies for major projects. Before that, between 1994 and 1998, the ministries’ own feasibility studies had approved 32 out of 33 projects. According to South Korean estimates, reviewing 961 projects between 1999 and 2022 generated development-related savings of approximately 170 trillion won.
However, there is also a cautionary lesson here: exemptions and relaxed criteria introduced in the name of regional development caused the approval rate for projects outside the capital to jump from 52 percent to 89 percent. This brings our own “fast-track” projects to mind.
World Bank: In connection with the Padma Bridge project in 2013, the World Bank debarred SNC-Lavalin for 10 years. In 2023, it debarred the local consulting firm BETS for 22 months over payments made by the firm to officials in connection with a water project in Chattogram. The power to blacklist firms exists, but the punishment comes from the lender rather than from our own public procurement system.
Chain of accountability: Six proposals
However, accountability does not mean indiscriminate punishment. Incorrect forecasts, negligence, and deliberate corruption are not the same thing. Delays in land acquisition, slow fund disbursement, and pressure from superiors can also be genuine problems. That is precisely why a system of written objections is needed, so that the distinction between reasonable risks and knowingly made mistakes is documented on paper.
Let the process begin with the BRT project. An independent committee outside the ministry should determine within 90 days who signed off on which feasibility studies, designs, or revisions, and who ignored which warnings. Its report should be made public, identifying individuals by name and specifying their roles. Confidentiality cannot be used as an excuse when public money has been wasted.
The next step is structural reform:
Independent review agency: An institution independent of the ministries, modeled on the Korea Development Institute (KDI), should review feasibility studies for projects costing more than Tk 500 million. Its reports should be submitted to Parliament. No exemptions should be allowed for “fast-track” projects.
Written certifications to be submitted to parliament: Under a Development Project Proposal (DPP), the secretary and project director should sign certifications confirming that a project is feasible and implementable. If a minister overrides their professional judgment, the minister must issue a written directive. Both documents should be submitted to the Public Accounts Committee and the Comptroller and Auditor General. Major projects should also be subject to a public hearing once a year.
Financial liability for consultants: Professional liability insurance and performance bonds should be made mandatory. When seeking compensation from BRT contractors, the cost of defects arising from faulty designs should also be recovered from the consultants. Furthermore, if a multilateral development bank debars anyone, that person should automatically become ineligible to work on public projects in Bangladesh as well.
Automatic postmortem review: An independent review should be conducted whenever a project’s cost increases by more than 20 percent or it undergoes a second revision. The costs, progress, forecasts, and actual outcomes of every major project should be published on a single website. If there is evidence of corruption, the case should be referred to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).
Project directors should be engineers: Technical mega-projects should be led by full-time engineers with relevant experience in the sector. They should be assigned to the projects for their entire duration. The position must not become a reward for someone’s promotion.
A Chief Technical Officer in the Prime Minister’s Office: Engineers are responsible for carrying out nearly 70 percent of the work under the Annual Development Programme (ADP), yet they have little role in decision-making. The government also has to rely on bureaucrats’ advice to move projects forward. To address this weakness, an engineer could be appointed as a Chief Technical Officer (CTO) in the Prime Minister’s Office. The CTO would provide technical advice to the government and ensure proper oversight of major projects.
Generating revenue from what has already been Built
Loan repayments will continue regardless. Leaving completed assets unused would therefore amount to a second waste of public money. Where demand exists but management is weak, toll-operate-transfer agreements could be awarded through open tenders.
In 2018, India leased out nine operational highways for 30 years, receiving an upfront payment of 96.81 billion rupees—1.5 times its own estimate. This means transferring operational responsibility, not ownership.
Where demand can be generated, as in the case of the Karnaphuli Tunnel, the Anwara economic zone must be brought into operation quickly. The tunnel’s daily operating costs have been reduced from Tk 3.7 million to Tk 2.2–2.3 million. This indicates that the earlier costs had been inflated.
Where demand does not exist, the objective should be to minimize losses.
The lifts, escalators, and steel structures at the BRT’s 15 stations should undergo an independent valuation and then be sold through open auction or reused in other projects. Demolition work must also be awarded through transparent tenders. Otherwise, the cancellation process itself could become a new avenue for plunder.
In addition, following Professor Shamsul Hoque’s recommendation, a commuter train service between Gazipur and Kamalapur should be introduced using the railway’s third and fourth tracks.
Governments change, but the signatories remain
For 14 years, the people of Gazipur have endured dust and traffic congestion, and seven people have lost their lives. If all they get in return is a cancellation letter, with not even a single line written naming those who signed off on the project, then the foundation for the next BRT failure is being laid today.
Announcing the cancellation of a project does not end the responsibility. The government must also disclose how public money was wasted and provide answers.
Political governments come and go, but those who certify project feasibility remain. Holding them accountable would be the real measure of development.
* Subail bin Alam is an engineer-economist and a writer on sustainable development. Email: contact@subail.com
* The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.
* This article appeared in Prothom Alo print and online and has been translated into English by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online