Kabila’s return tests DRC’s prospects for peace

Joseph Kabila's return to the political landscape of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) could shift the nation's prolonged war from a rebellion in the country's east to a broader contest over who can govern.

He enters at a time when the country is caught in a vicious cycle of political violence, economic devastation and citizen displacement. Kabila will lead the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition that brings together the M23 and the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC).

His presence should help the movement appeal to Tshisekedi's opponents well beyond the eastern provinces. In January 2025, M23 captured Goma and later took control of Bukavu. Losing these cities is more than a military defeat. M23 now controls significant territory, key strategic routes and border crossings in North and South Kivu.

The capture of these two capitals by M23 raises crucial issues about national sovereignty and the state's failure to protect its territory, resources, and citizens.

John Ngono of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project believes that Kabila's entry could transform a military threat from rebel groups into a broader political challenge.

Richard Moncrieff of the International Crisis Group argues that Kabila's higher profile is intended to attract support "beyond the very narrow political base that the M23 enjoys." Ultimately, the real test is whether the Kabila name translates into broader geographic support and stronger diplomatic leverage.

The Tshisekedi government has consistently blamed external actors, most particularly Rwanda, for persistent instability and conflict. It has taken little responsibility for the conditions that have allowed the crisis to persist.

Even though United Nations experts and Western governments have documented substantial Rwandan military support for M23, Kigali has consistently denied its involvement. Instead, Rwanda has long contested that the FDLR threatens its security, arguing that the Congolese government cooperates with this armed rebel group, which includes elements linked to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

One of the worst historical atrocities ever experienced in the region. No publicly established evidence shows collaboration between Kabila and Rwanda's President, Paul Kagame. Nor is there any evidence of a plan to partition the country or create an independent state in the east.

However, a territory need not be formally declared independent for the state's authority to be jeopardised. For as long as an armed coalition controls towns, borders, transport corridors, and mineral revenues, sovereignty remains imperilled.

Kabila's entry adds a new layer of political authority to the endless peacemaking process, badly marred by distrust and ceasefire violations. The Washington and Doha peace processes now face a more complicated political landscape. While the FRN says it will honour commitments made under the Doha process, practical questions remain about who has the authority to negotiate and who commands forces on the ground.

Alternatively, who will be held accountable for non-compliance? A political solution is needed. SADC's 2025 withdrawal of its military mission in the DRC illustrated how regional military intervention without political resolution is horribly ineffective.

For Tshisekedi, the most urgent challenge is to address and remedy the security challenges, governance shortfalls, and institutional weaknesses that have left the state highly vulnerable.

Credible negotiations with the parties that currently hold territory are necessary. For the FRN, the challenge will be to show a willingness to negotiate arrangements that respect the DRC's territorial integrity. Rwanda must disclose its military involvement and interests.

For lasting peace, the international community must treat Rwanda's security concerns as legitimate. There can be no sustainable peace while economic sovereignty remains in jeopardy. DRC's mineral wealth benefits foreign nations while much of its population remains trapped in insecurity and deprivation.

Any meaningful settlement can not simply reconfigure political or military control. It must address resource sovereignty and governance. Patrice Lumumba understood that independence is incomplete for as long as ordinary citizens cannot exercise meaningful control over their own wealth and future.

Kabila's return should not be romanticised. Neither should it be dismissed. It exposes the vulnerabilities of a government that has failed to secure the east. Kabila's return marks a turning point in the rebellion's political organisation. He is no longer simply criticising the Tshisekedi administration; he is now leading an organised force that challenges its authority.

History tends to repeat itself. Three decades ago, Kabila's father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, helped overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila brings governing experience, established networks, and a national profile.

However, the FRN may be less potent than it appears. While interests may align in the short term, longer ambitions may differ, leading to conflict unless a common vision accounts for Kabila's national political ambitions and M23's military and security objectives. Kabila may have popular appeal, but he is no flawless politician.

Kabila served as President of the DRC from 2001 to 2019. He faced accusations of corruption and institutional weakness. Significantly, the first M23 rebellion began during his Presidency. In September 2025, a Congolese military court sentenced him to death in absentia for treason, war crimes and related charges linked to alleged support for the M23 rebellion—charges he has denied as politically motivated.

The real test of the new coalition does not lie in whether it can challenge or oust Tshisekedi or consolidate territorial gains. Its true victory will lie in whether it can broker a settlement that ends the fighting, protects civilians, and restores the authority of legitimate Congolese institutions.

If it does not achieve these objectives, then a change in leadership will not materially benefit the people of the DRC. It will be just another meaningless change in the contest for power.

* Heller is a political analyst and author of No White Lies: Black Politics and White Power in South Africa.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Media Group.